The Supreme Court's "Political Question Doctrine"

The political question doctrine could be read narrowly or more broadly. Read narrowly, the political question doctrine should be invoked only when the issue presented to the Court is one that "has been textually committed to another branch of government." That is, if the framers of the Constitution made clear their intention that the judiciary not resolve a particular question of constitutional interpretation, that determination must be respected. More broadly, the political question doctrine might be invoked when there is a lack of judicially manageable standards to decide the case on the merits, when judicial intervention might show insufficient respect for other branches of government, or when a judicial decision might threaten the integrity of the judicial branch.

In Baker v Carr (1962), the Court concluded that the political question doctrine did not bar courts from reaching the merits of a challenge brought against Tennessee's system of apportioning its state legislature. Although the case was "political" in the sense that it was about politics, and there were questions about how courts might grant relief if Tennessee's apportionment scheme was declared unconstitutional, the Court saw neither as reasons for invocation of the political question doctrine.

"Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found:
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
(2) or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
(3) or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
(4) or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
(5) or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
(6) or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."
(Baker v Carr)

Congressman Adam Clayton Powell

In Powell v McCormack (1969), the Court also rejected an argument that the case ought to be dismissed as presenting a political question. The Court concluded, in a case involving the refusal of the House of Representatives to seat Adam Clayton Powell, that the decision to exclude members was not textually committed to the House--with the exception of criteria identified in Article I, Section 5 relating to age, citizenship, and state residency. Since the refusal to seat Powell was based on a determination that Powell had acted unethically prior to his election, the Court found the exclusion not authorized by Article I and ordered Powell's seating.

Judge Walter Nixon

In Nixon v United States (`1993), the Court found a textual commitment to the Senate of the manner in which it might "try" a federal officer for impeachment. Judge Walter Nixon, convicted in an impeachment proceeding for accepting a bribe, argued that the Senate proceeding violated the Constitution because under Senate impeachment rules he was allowed to bring certain evidence only before a Senate Committee, not the full Senate. The Court refused to interpret the word "try," concluding that the framers reserved that question for the Senate itself to answer.

Finally, in Vieth v Jubelirer (2004) considered whether cases involving claims of partisan gerrymandering are constitutional. The Court divided 4-1-4 in Vieth on the issue of whether judicially manageable standards existed that could be used to decide such cases. Four justices saw claims of partisan gerrymandering as presenting a non-justiciable political question, four justices believed that standards existed or could be developed to decide such cases, and one justice (Kennedy) stood in the middle, writing a concurring opinion that suggested he had doubts about the ability of the Court to develop judicially-manageable standards, but was unwilling to rule out the possibility completely. (Interestingly, Kennedy hinted that gross cases of partisan gerrymandering might violate the First Amendment, not the Equal Protection Clause, as most other justices see as the better basis for challenging such laws.) Kennedy presumably voted with the majority in a subsequent case challenging a reapportionment scheme in Texas pushed by Republican House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, designed to eliminate as many as possible House Democrats from Texas. The Court ordered the case sent back to the lower courts to determine whether the Texas reapportionment plan violated the Constitution.