The white state has thrown overboard every pretence of rule
process. Armed to the teeth it has presented the people with only one
that is its overthrow by force and violence. It can now truly be said
little, if any, scope exists for the smashing of white supremacy other
means of mass revolutionary action, the main content of which is armed
resistance leading to victory by military means.
The political events which have occurred in the last few
years have convinced
the overwhelming majority of the people that no mass struggle which is
backed up by armed resistance and military offensive operations, can
make a real impact. This can be seen from the general mood of the
their readiness to undertake even desperate and suicidal violent
the Leballo type. It can also be gauged by their reluctance to
orthodox political struggles in which they expose themselves to massive
retaliation without a prospect of hitting back. We are confident that
will respond in overwhelming numbers to a lead which holds out a real
possibility of successful armed struggle .
Thus two important ingredients of a revolutionary situation
are present: -
- A disillusionment with constitutional or
semi-constitutional forms of struggle and a conviction that the road to
victory is through force;
- A militancy and a readiness to respond to a lead which
holds out a real possibility of successful struggle.
In the light of the existence of these ingredients the
military struggle depends for its success on two further factors: -
- The strength of the enemy. This must not be looked at
statically but in the light of objective factors, which in a period of
military struggle may well expose its brittleness and
- The existence of a clear leadership with material
resources at its disposal to spark off and sustain military operations.
The objective military conditions in which the movement
finds itself makes
the possibility of a general uprising leading to direct military
unlikely one. Rather, as in Cuba, the general uprising must be sparked
organised and well prepared guerrilla operations during the course of
masses of the people will be drawn in and armed.
We have no illusions about the difficulties which face us in
successfully prosecuting guerrilla operations leading to military
do we assume that such a struggle will be over swiftly. We have taken
account and carefully weighed numerous factors and we mention some of
- We are faced with a powerfully armed modern state with
tremendous industrial resources, which can, at least in the initial
period, count on the support of three million whites. At the same time
the State is isolated practically from the rest of the world, and if
effective work is done, will have to rely in the main on its own
resources. The very concentration of industry and power and the
interdependence of the various localities operates as both an advantage
and a disadvantage for the enemy. It operates as a disadvantage because
effective guerrilla operations can within a relatively short period
create far greater economic havoc and confusion than in a backward,
- The people are unarmed and lack personnel who have been
trained in all aspects of military operations. A proper organisation of
the almost unlimited assistance which we can obtain from friendly
Governments will counter-balance its disadvantage. In the long run a
guerrilla struggle relies on the enemy for its source of supply. But in
order to make this possible an initial effective arming of the first
group of guerrilla bands is essential. It is also vital to place in the
field persons trained in the art of war who will act as a nucleus of
organisers and commanders of guerrilla operations.
- The absence of friendly borders and long scale
impregnable natural bases from which to operate are both disadvantages.
But more important than these factors is the support of the people who
in certain situations are better protection than mountains and forests.
In the rural areas which become the main theatre of guerrilla
operations in the initial phase, the overwhelming majority of the
people will protect and safeguard the guerrillas and this fact will to
some measure negative the disadvantages. In any event we must not
underestimate the fact that there is terrain in many parts of South
Africa, which although not classically impregnable is suitable for
guerrilla type operations. Boer guerrillas with the support of their
people operated in the plains of the Transvaal. Although conditions
have changed there is still a lesson to be learnt from this.
Although we must prepare for a protracted war we must not
lose sight of the
fact that the political isolation of South Africa from the world
nations and particularly the active hostility towards it from almost
of the African Continent and the Socialist world may result in such
assistance in various forms, that the state structure will collapse far
than we can at the moment envisage. Direct military intervention in
Africa, an effective economic and military boycott, even armed
action at some more advanced stage of the struggle are real
will play an important role. In no other territory where guerrilla
have been undertaken has the international situation been such a vital
operating against the enemy. We are not unaware that there are powerful
monopoly interests who will attempt to bolster up the white state. With
effective work they can be isolated and neutralised. The events of the
years have shown that the issue of racial discrimination cuts across
ideological conflict albeit that the West proceeds from opportunistic
The following plan envisages a process which will place in
the field, at a
date fixed now, simultaneously in pre-selected areas armed and trained
bands who will find ready to join the local guerrilla bands with arms
equipment at their disposal. It will further coincide with a massive
campaign both inside and outside South Africa and a general call for
unprecedented mass struggle throughout the land, both violent and
In the initial period when for a short while the military adv. [sic]
ours the plan envisages a massive onslaught on pre-selected targets
create maximum havoc and confusion in the enemy camp and which will
the masses of the people and other friendly forces a feeling of
here at least is an army of liberation equipped and capable of leading
victory. In this period the cornerstone of guerrilla operations is
"shamelessly attack the weak and shamelessly flee from the strong".
We are convinced that this plan is capable of fulfillment.
But only if the
whole apparatus of the movement both here and abroad is mobilised for
implementation and if every member now prepares to make unlimited
the achievement of our goal. The time for small thinking is over
leaves us no choice.
- Port Elizabeth - Mzimkulu.
- Port Shepstone - Swaziland.
- North Western Transvaal, bordering respectively
Bechuanaland & Limpopo.
- North Western Cape - South West.
- Simultaneous landing of 4 groups of 30 based on our
present resources whether by ship or air - armed and properly equipped
in such a way as to be self sufficient in every respect for at least a
- At the initial stages it is proposed that the 30 are
split up into platoons of 10 each to operate more or less within a
contiguous area and linking their activities with pre-arranged local
- Simultaneously with the landing of the groups of 30 and
thereafter, there should be a supply of arms and other war material to
arm the local populations which become integrated with the guerrilla
- On landing, a detailed plan of attack on pre-selected
targets with a view to taking the enemy by surprise, creating the
maximum impact on the populace, creating as much chaos and confusion
for the enemy as possible.
- Choice of suitable areas will be based on the nature of
the terrain, with a view to establishing base areas from which our
units can attack and to which they can retreat.
- Before these operations take place political authority
will have been set up in secrecy in a friendly territory with a view to
supervising the struggle both in its internal and external aspects. It
is visualised that this authority will in due course of time develop
into a Provisional Revolutionary Government . 7. This Political
Authority should trim its machinery so that simultaneously with the
commencement of operations it will throw out massive propaganda to win
world support for our struggle, more particularly: -
- A complete enforcement of boycott,
- Enlisting the support of the international trade union
movement to refuse handling war materials and other goods intended for
the South African Government,
- Raising a storm at the United Nations which should be
urged to intervene militarily in South West Africa.
- Raising of large scale credits for the prosecution of
- Arranging for radio facilities for daily transmission
to the world and to the people of South Africa.
- If possible the Political Authority should arrange for
the initial onslaught to bombard the country or certain areas with a
flood of leaflets by plane announcing the commencement of our armed
struggle as well as our aims, and calling upon the population to rise
against the Government.
- Stepping up transport plans, e.g. a weekly or bi weekly
airlift of trainees outside the country in order to maintain a regular,
if small flow of trained personnel.
- In order to facilitate the implementation of the
military aspect of the plan it is proposed the National High Command
appoint personnel to be quartered at Dar under the auspices of the
In preparation for the commencement of operations when our
lands, intensive as well as extensive work will have been done. For
guerrilla units will have been set up in the main areas mapped out in
above as well as in the other areas away from the immediate scene of
Progressively sabotage activity throughout the country will
be stepped up
before these operations. Political pressure too, in the meanwhile will
stepped up in conjunction with the sabotage activity.
In furtherance of the general ideas set out above the plan
organisation is along the following pattern: -
- Our target is that on arrival the external force should
find at least 7,000 men in the four main areas ready to join the
guerrilla army in the initial onslaught. Those will be allocated as
- Eastern Cape - Transkei 2,000
- Natal - Zululand 2,000
- North Western Transvaal 2,000
- North-Western Cape 1,000
- To realise our target in each of the main areas it is
proposed that each of the four areas should have an overall command
whose task it will be to divide its area into regions, which in turn
will be allocated a figure in proportion to their relative importance.
- The preparation for equipping the initial force envisaged
in I above will take place in three stages, thus:
- By importation of Military supply at two levels:
- Build up of firearms, ammunition and explosives by
maintaining a regular flow over a period of time.
- By landing additional [supplies] simultaneously with
the arrival of our external force.
- Acquisition and accumulation internally of firearms,
ammunition and explosives at all levels of our organisation.
- Collection and accumulation of other military such as
food, medicines, communication equipment etc.
- It is proposed that auxiliary guerrilla/sabotage units in
the four main areas be set up before and after the commencement of
operations. They may engage in activities that may serve to disperse
the enemy forces, assist to maintain the fighting ability of the
guerrillas as well as draw in the masses in support of the guerrillas.
- It is proposed that in areas falling outside the four
main guerrilla areas MK units should be set up to act in support of the
activities in the guerrilla areas, and to harass the enemy.
- In order to draw in the masses of the population the
political wing should arouse the people to participate in the struggles
that are designed to create an upheaval throughout the country.
DETAILED PLAN OF IMPLEMENTATION.
In order to implement the plans set out above in Parts I to
111 we establish
Departments which are to be charged with duties to study and submit
reports and plans in respect of each of their Departments with the
terms of reference: -
1. Intelligence Department
This Committee will be required to study and report on the
- The exact extent of each area
- The portions of the country that are naturally suited for
our operations and their location within each area.
- Points along the coast which would be suitable for
landing of men and supplies and how these are going to be transferred
from the point of landing to the area of operations.
- The situation of enemy forces in each area, thus: -
- the military and the police as well as their strength
- military and police camps, and towns, and the distances
- system of all forms of communication in the area,
- the location of trading stations and chiefs and
- air fields and air strips in the areas.
- Selection of targets to be tackled in initial phase of
guerrilla operations with a view to causing maximum damage to the enemy
as well as preventing the quick deployment of reinforcements.
In its study the Committee should bear in mind the following main
- strategic road, railways and other communications
- power stations
- police, stations, camps and military forces
- irredeemable Government stooges.
- A study of climatic conditions in relation to seasons, as
well as diseases common to the area.
- The population distribution in the areas as well as the
- Rivers and dams.
- And generally all other relevant matters
2. External Planning Committee which shall be
charged with the
following tasks: -
- Obtaining of arms, ammunition and explosives and other
- In co-operation with our internal machinery, making
arrangements for the despatch of items in I above into the country
- Obtaining of transport by land, sea and air for the
landing of our task force and for the continued supply of military
3. Political Authority
We make a strong recommendation that the joint sponsoring
should immediately set about creating a political machinery for the
the revolutionary struggle as set out in Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of Part 11 and
up a special committee to direct guerrilla political education.
4. Transport Committee.
This Committee is assigned the following duties: -
- The organisation of transport facilities for our trainees
- To organise transport for the re entry of our trainees
- To undertake any transport duties assigned to them from
time to time .
5. Logistics Department - Technical and Supply Committee
Its Functions are: -
- To manufacture and build up a stock of arms, ammunition
from internal sources.
- To organise reception, distribution and storage of
supplies from external sources.
- To organise the training of personnel in the use of
equipment referred to in (a) and (b) above.
- Obtaining of all other relevant supplies necessary to
prosecute an armed struggle, to wit, inter alia, medical supplies,
clothing, food, etc., and the storage of these at strategic points.
- Acquiring equipment to facilitate communications.
- To undertake all duties and functions that fall under the
Department of Logistics.
1. Immediate Duties of the National High Command in
Relation to the
- To map out regions in each area with a view to organising
Regional and District Commands and NK [sic] units.
- To achieve this we strongly recommend the employment of
10 full time organisers in each area.
- The organisers shall be directly responsible to the
National High Command .
- The NHC is directed to recruit and arrange for the
external training of at least 300 men in the next two months.
- Intelligence Alex Secundus Otto
- External Planning Committee Johnson, Thabo and
Joseph together with a senior ANC rep. as well as co-opted personnel,
seconded to us by friendly Govts.
- Transport Committee Percy secundus Nbata.
- Logistics Dept. Bri-bri secundus Frank
3. Special Directives to Heads of Departments.
The Heads of Departments are required to submit not later
than the 30th May,
1963, plans detailing: -
- The structural organisation of their Department
- The type and number of personnel they require to be
allocated to them and their duties and functions.
- The funds required for their work both for immediate and
long term purposes.
- Schedule of time required to enable them to fulfill given
targets and what these are.
- Other matters relating to the efficient execution of the
4. Organisation of Areas. Organisers and Setting up of
Rethau and James for this task.