In view of the profound and unusual interest that this
case has aroused
not only in this community but in the entire country and even beyond
its
boundaries, the court feels it his duty to state the reasons which have
led him to the determination he has reached.
It is not an uncommon thing that pleas of guilty are entered in
criminal
cases, but almost without exception in the past such pleas have been
the
result of a virtual agreement between the defendants and the State's
Attorney
whereby in consideration of the plea the State's Attorney consents to
recommend
to the court a sentence deemed appropriate by him, and in the absence
of
special reasons to the contrary, it is the practice of the court to
follow
such recommendations.
In the present case the situation is a different one. A plea of guilty
has been entered by the defense without a previous understanding with
the
prosecution and without any knowledge whatever on its part. Moreover,
the
plea of guilty did not in this particular case, as it usually does,
render
the task of the prosecution easier by substituting the admission of
guilt
for a possibly difficult and uncertain chain of proof. Here the State
was
in possession not only of the essential substantiating fact, but also
of
voluntary confessions on the part of the defendants. The plea of
guilty,
therefore, does not make a special case in favor of the defendant.
Since
both the cases--that, namely, of murder and that of kidnapping for
ransom--were
of a character which invested the court with discretion as to the
extent
of the punishment, it became his duty under the statute to examine
witnesses
as to the aggravation and mitigation of the defense. This duty has been
fully met. By consent of counsel for the State and for the defendants,
the testimony in the murder case has been accepted as equally
applicable
to the case of kidnapping for ransom. In addition, a prima facie case
was
made out for the kidnapping case as well. The testimony introduced,
both
by the prosecution and the defense, has been as detailed and elaborate
as though the case had been tried before a jury. It has been given the
widest publicity and the public is so fully familiar with all its
phases
that it would serve no useful purpose to restate or analyze the
evidence.
By pleading guilty, the defendants have admitted legal responsibility
for
their acts; the testimony has satisfied the court that the case is not
one in which it would have been possible to set up successfully the
defense
of insanity as insanity is defined and understood by the established
law
of this state for the purpose of the administration of criminal justice.
The court, however, feels impelled to dwell briefly on the mass of data
produced as to the physical, mental, and moral condition of the two
defendants.
They have been shown in essential respects to be abnormal; had they
been
normal they would not have committed the crime. It is beyond the
province
of this court, as it is beyond the capacity of humankind in its present
state of development to predicate ultimate responsibility for human
acts.
At the same time, the court is willing to recognize that the careful
analysis
made of the life history of the defendants and of their present mental,
emotional and ethical condition has been of extreme interest and is a
valuable
contribution to criminology. And yet the court feels strongly that
similar
analyses made of other persons accused of crime will probably reveal
similar
or different abnormalities. The value of such tests seems to lie in
their
applicability to crime and criminals in general.
Since they concern the broad question of human responsibility and legal
punishment and are in no wise peculiar to the individual defendants,
they
may be deserving of legislative but not judicial consideration. For
this
reason the court is satisfied that his judgment in the present case
cannot
be affected thereby. The testimony in this case reveals a crime of
singular
atrocity. It is, in a sense, inexplicable, but is not thereby tendered
less inhuman or repulsive. It was deliberately planned and prepared for
during a considerable period of time. It was executed with every
feature
of callousness and cruelty. And here the court will say, not for the
purpose
of extenuating guilty, but merely with the object of dispelling a
misapprehension
that appears to have found lodgment in the public mind, that he is
convinced
by conclusive evidence that there was no abuse offered to the body of
the
victim. But it did not need that element to make the crime abhorrent to
every instinct of human ability, and the court is satisfied that
neither
in the act itself, nor in its motives or lack of motives, or in the
antecedents
of the offenders, can he find any mitigating circumstances. For the
crime
of murder and of kidnapping for ransom the law prescribes different
punishments
in the alternatives. For the crime of murder the statute declares:
"Whoever
is guilty of murder shall suffer the punishment of death or
imprisonment
in the penitentiary for his natural life or for a term not less than
fourteen
years. If the accused is found guilty by a jury they shall fix the
punishment
by their verdict; upon a plea of guilty, the punishment shall be fixed
by the court." For the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the statute
reads:
"Whoever is guilty of kidnapping for ransom shall suffer death or be
punished
by imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, or for any term not less
than five years." Under the pleas of guilty, the duty of determining
the
punishment devolves upon the court, and the law indicates no rule or
policy
for the guidance of his discretion. In reaching his decision the court
would have welcomed the counsel and support of others. In some states
the
legislature, in its wisdom, has provided for a bench of three judges to
determine the penalty in cases such as this. Nevertheless, the court is
willing to meet his responsibilities. It would have been the task of
least
resistance to impose the extreme penalty of the law. In choosing
imprisonment
instead of death, the court is moved chiefly by the consideration of
the
age of the defendants, boys of eighteen and nineteen years.
It is not for the court to say that he will not, in any case, enforce
capital
punishment as an alternative, but the court believes it is within his
province
to decline to impose the sentence of death on persons who are not of
full
age.
This determination appears to be in accordance with the progress of
criminal
law all over the world and with the dictates of enlightened humanity.
More
than that, it seems to be in accordance with the precedents hitherto
observed
in this State. The records of Illinois show only two cases of minors
who
were put to death by legal process...to which number the court does not
feel inclined to make an addition.
Life imprisonment, at the moment, strikes the public imagination as
forcibly
as would death by hanging, but to the offenders, particularly of the
type
they are, the prolonged suffering of years of confinement may well be
the
severest form of retribution and expiation.
The court feels it proper to add a final word concerning the effect of
the parole law upon the punishment of these defendants. In the case of
such atrocious crimes, it is entirely within the discretion of the
department
of public welfare, never to admit these defendants to parole.
To such a policy the court urges them strictly to adhere; if this
course
is persevered in in the punishment of these defendants, it will both
satisfy
the ends of justice and safeguard the interests of society.
[At this point the sentences formally were passed as
follows:]
"In no. 33,623, indictment for murder, the sentence of the court is
that
you, Nathan F. Leopold, Jr., be confined in the penitentiary at Joliet
for the term of your natural life. The court finds that your age is 19.
"In no. 33,623, indictment for murder, the sentence of the court is
that
you, Richard Loeb, be confined in the penitentiary at Joliet for the
term
of your natural life. The court finds that your age is 18.
"In 33,624, kidnapping for ransom, it is the sentence of the court that
you, Nathan F. Leopold, Jr. be confined in the penitentiary at Joliet
for
the term of 99 years. The court finds your age at 19.
"In 33,624, kidnapping for ransom, the sentence of the court is that
you,
Richard Loeb, be confined in the penitentiary at Joliet for the term of
99 years."
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