The narrow question presented in this case is whether the right of the public and press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the United States Constitution.
In March 1976, one Stevenson was indicted for the murder of a hotel
manager who had been found stabbed to death on December 2, 1975. Tried
promptly in July 1976, Stevenson was convicted of second-degree murder
in the Circuit Court of Hanover County, Va. The Virginia Supreme Court
reversed the conviction in October 1977, holding that a bloodstained
shirt purportedly belonging to Stevenson had been improperly admitted
Stevenson was retried in the same court. This second trial ended in
a mistrial on May 30, 1978, when a juror asked to be excused after
trial had begun and no alternate was available.
A third trial, which began in the same court on June 6, 1978, also
ended in a mistrial. It appears that the mistrial may have been
declared because a prospective juror had read about Stevenson's
previous trials in a newspaper and had told other prospective jurors
about the case before the retrial began.
Stevenson was tried in the same court for a fourth time beginning on September 11, 1978. Present in the courtroom when the case was called were appellants Wheeler and McCarthy, reporters for appellant Richmond Newspapers, Inc. Before the trial began, counsel for the defendant moved that it be closed to the public:
Later that same day, however, appellants sought a hearing on a motion to vacate the closure order. The trial judge granted the request and scheduled a hearing to follow the close of the day's proceedings. When the hearing began, the court ruled that the hearing was to be treated as part of the trial; accordingly, he again ordered the reporters to leave the courtroom, and they complied.
At the closed hearing, counsel for appellants observed that no evidentiary findings had been made by the court prior to the entry of its closure order and pointed out that the court had failed to consider any other, less drastic measures within its power to ensure a fair trial. Counsel for appellants argued that constitutional considerations mandated that before ordering closure, the court should first decide that the rights of the defendant could be protected in no other way.
Counsel for defendant Stevenson pointed out that this was the fourth
time he was standing trial. He also referred to "difficulty with
information between the jurors," and stated that he "didn't want
information to leak out," be published by the media, perhaps
inaccurately, and then be seen by the jurors. Defense counsel argued
that these things, plus the fact that "this is a small community," made
this a proper case for closure.
The trial judge noted that counsel for the defendant had made similar statements at the morning hearing. The court also stated:
Appellants then sought review in this Court....,
We begin consideration of this case by noting that the precise issue presented here has not previously been before this Court for decision....Here for the first time the Court is asked to decide whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that some other overriding consideration requires closure.
The origins of the proceeding which has become the modern criminal trial in Anglo-American justice can be traced back beyond reliable historical records. We need not here review all details of its development, but a summary of that history is instructive. What is significant for present purposes is that throughout its evolution, the trial has been open to all who cared to observe....
As we have shown, the historical evidence demonstrates conclusively
that at the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials
both here and in England had long been presumptively open. This is no
quirk of history; rather, it has long been recognized as an
indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial....
When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows. Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. Without an awareness that society's responses to criminal conduct are underway, natural human reactions of outrage and protest are frustrated and may manifest themselves in some form of vengeful "self-help," as indeed they did regularly in the activities of vigilante "committees" on our frontiers.... "
Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante the enforcement of criminal laws, but they cannot erase from people's consciousness the fundamental, natural yearning to see justice done - or even the urge for retribution. The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice is "done in a corner [or] in any covert manner." To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process "satisfy the appearance of justice," and the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it....
From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as
valid today as in centuries past, we are bound to conclude that a
presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial
under our system of justice....
Despite the history of criminal trials being presumptively open since long before the Constitution, the State presses its contention that neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights contains any provision which by its terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials. Standing alone, this is correct, but there remains the question whether, absent an explicit provision, the Constitution affords protection against exclusion of the public from criminal trials....
The Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the long
history of trials being presumptively open. Public access to trials was
then regarded as an important aspect of the process itself; the conduct
of trials "before as many of the people as chuse to attend" was
regarded as one of "the inestimable advantages of a free English
constitution of government." In guaranteeing freedoms such as
those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as
protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning
to those explicit guarantees. "[T]he First Amendment goes beyond
protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting
the stock of information from which members of the public may
draw." Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen. "In a
variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment right
to `receive information and ideas.'" What this means in the
context of trials is that the First Amendment guarantees of speech and
press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing
courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time that
Amendment was adopted....
It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend criminal
trials to hear, see, and communicate observations concerning them as a
"right of access," or a "right to gather information," for we have
recognized that "without some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press could be eviscerated." The explicit, guaranteed
rights to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at a trial
would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial could, as it was
here, be foreclosed arbitrarily....
The State argues that the Constitution nowhere spells out a
guarantee for the right of the public to attend trials, and that
accordingly no such right is protected. The possibility that such a
contention could be made did not escape the notice of the
Constitution's draftsmen; they were concerned that some important
rights might be thought disparaged because not specifically guaranteed.
It was even argued that because of this danger no Bill of Rights should
But arguments such as the State makes have not precluded recognition of important rights not enumerated. Notwithstanding the appropriate caution against reading into the Constitution rights not explicitly defined, the Court has acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights are implicit in enumerated guarantees. For example, the rights of association and of privacy, the right to be presumed innocent, and the right to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial, as well as the right to travel, appear nowhere in the Constitution or Bill of Rights. Yet these important but unarticulated rights have nonetheless been found to share constitutional protection in common with explicit guarantees. The concerns expressed by Madison and others have thus been resolved; fundamental rights, even though not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized by the Court as indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined.
We hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the
guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such
trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of
freedom of speech and "of the press could be eviscerated"....
There was no suggestion that any problems with witnesses could not
have been dealt with by their exclusion from the courtroom or their
sequestration during the trial. Nor is there anything to indicate that
sequestration of the jurors would not have guarded against their being
subjected to any improper information. All of the alternatives
admittedly present difficulties for trial courts, but none of the
factors relied on here was beyond the realm of the manageable. Absent
an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal
case must be open to the public.
This case would have been unnecessary had Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), construed the Sixth Amendment to forbid excluding the public from criminal proceedings except in narrowly defined circumstances. But the Court there rejected the submission of four of us to this effect, thus requiring that the First Amendment issue involved here be addressed. On this issue, I concur in the opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually absolute protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never before has it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever. An additional word of emphasis is therefore appropriate.
Twice before, the Court has implied that any governmental restriction on access to information, no matter how severe and no matter how unjustified, would be constitutionally acceptable so long as it did not single out the press for special disabilities not applicable to the public at large. In a dissent joined by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., MR. JUSTICE POWELL unequivocally rejected the conclusion that "any governmental restriction on press access to information, so long as it is nondiscriminatory, falls outside the purview of First Amendment concern." And in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 1940 , I explained at length why MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and I were convinced that "[a]n official prison policy of concealing . . . knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of information at its source abridges the freedom of speech and of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." Since MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN were unable to participate in that case, a majority of the Court neither accepted nor rejected that conclusion or the contrary conclusion expressed in the prevailing opinions. Today, however, for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference with access to important information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by the First Amendment.
It is somewhat ironic that the Court should find more reason to recognize a right of access today than it did in Houchins. For Houchins involved the plight of a segment of society least able to protect itself, an attack on a longstanding policy of concealment, and an absence of any legitimate justification for abridging public access to information about how government operates. In this case we are protecting the interests of the most powerful voices in the community, we are concerned with an almost unique exception to an established tradition of openness in the conduct of criminal trials, and it is likely that the closure order was motivated by the judge's desire to protect the individual defendant from the burden of a fourth criminal trial.
In any event, I agree that the First Amendment protects the public and the press from abridgment of their rights of access to information about the operation of their government, including the Judicial Branch; given the total absence of any record justification for the closure order entered in this case, that order violated the First Amendment.MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in the judgment.
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale (1979), held that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was personal to the accused, conferring no right of access to pretrial proceedings that is separately enforceable by the public or the press. The instant case raises the question whether the First Amendment, of its own force and as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, secures the public an independent right of access to trial proceedings. Because I believe that the First Amendment - of itself and as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment - secures such a public right of access, I agree with those of my Brethren who hold that, without more, agreement of the trial judge and the parties cannot constitutionally close a trial to the public.... 1MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring in the judgment.
The First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public a right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal... As has been abundantly demonstrated...it has for centuries been a basic presupposition of the Anglo-American legal system that trials shall be public trials.... The opinions referred to also convincingly explain the many good reasons why this is so. With us, a trial is by very definition a proceeding open to the press and to the public.
But this does not mean that the First Amendment right of members of
the public and representatives of the press to attend civil and
criminal trials is absolute. Just as a legislature may impose
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon the exercise of
First Amendment freedoms, so may a trial judge impose reasonable
limitations upon the unrestricted occupation of a courtroom by
representatives of the press and members of the public....
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
In the Gilbert and Sullivan operetta "Iolanthe," the Lord Chancellor recites:
The issue here is not whether the "right" to freedom of the press
conferred by the First Amendment to the Constitution overrides the
defendant's "right" to a fair trial conferred by other Amendments to
the Constitution; it is instead whether any provision in the
Constitution may fairly be read to prohibit what the trial judge in the
Virginia state-court system did in this case. Being unable to find any
such prohibition in the First, Sixth, Ninth, or any other Amendment to
the United States Constitution, or in the Constitution itself, I
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