424 U.S. 828
March 24, 1976

MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Fort Dix Military Reservation is a United States Army post located in a predominantly rural area of central New Jersey. Its primary mission is to provide basic combat training for newly inducted Army personnel. Accordingly, most of its 55 square miles are devoted to military training activities. The Federal Government exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the entire area within Fort Dix, including the state and county roads that pass through it. Civilian vehicular traffic is permitted on paved roads within the reservation, and civilian pedestrian traffic is permitted on both roads and footpaths. Military police regularly patrol the roads within the reservation, and they occasionally stop civilians and ask them the reason for their presence. Signs posted on the roads leading into the reservation state: "All vehicles are subject to search while on the Fort Dix Military Reservation" and "Soliciting prohibited unless approved by the commanding general." The main entrances to Fort Dix are not normally guarded, and a sign at one of the entrances says "Visitors Welcome." Civilians are freely permitted to visit unrestricted areas of the reservation.

Civilian speakers have occasionally been invited to the base to address military personnel. The subjects of their talks have ranged from business management to drug abuse. Visiting clergymen have, by invitation, participated in religious services at the base chapel. Theatrical exhibitions and musical productions have also been presented on the base. Speeches and demonstrations of a partisan political nature, however, are banned by Fort Dix Reg. 210-26 (1968), which provides that "[d]emonstrations, picketing, sit-ins, protest marches, political speeches and similar activities are prohibited and will not be conducted on the Fort Dix Military Reservation." The regulation has been rigidly enforced: Prior to this litigation, no political campaign speech had ever been given at Fort Dix. Restrictions are also placed on another type of expressive activity. Fort Dix Reg. 210-27 (1970) provides that "[t]he distribution or posting of any publication, including newspapers, magazines, handbills, flyers, circulars, pamphlets or other writings, issued, published or otherwise prepared by any person, persons, agency or agencies... is prohibited on the Fort Dix Military Reservation without prior written approval of the Adjutant General, this headquarters."

In 1972, the respondents Benjamin Spock and Julius Hobson were the candidates of the People's Party for the offices of President and Vice President of the United States, and Linda Jenness and Andrew Pulley were the candidates of the Socialist Workers Party for the same offices. On September 9, 1972, Spock, Hobson, Jenness, and Pulley wrote a joint letter to Major General Bert A. David, then commanding officer of Fort Dix, informing him of their intention to enter the reservation on September 23, 1972, for the purpose of distributing campaign literature and holding a meeting to discuss election issues with service personnel and their dependents. On September 18, 1972, General David rejected the candidates' request, relying on Fort Dix Regs. 210-26 and 210-27. Four of the other respondents, Ginaven, Misch, Hardy, and Stanton, were evicted from Fort Dix on various occasions between 1968 and 1972 for distributing literature not previously approved pursuant to Fort Dix Reg. 210-27. Each was barred from re-entering Fort Dix and advised that re-entry could result in criminal prosecution.

On September 29, 1972, the respondents filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to enjoin the enforcement of the Fort Dix regulations governing political campaigning and the distribution of literature, upon the ground that the regulations violated the First and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction, but the Court of Appeals reversed that order and directed that preliminary injunctive relief be granted to the respondents Spock, Hobson, Jenness, and Pulley.  Pursuant to this judgment the respondent Spock conducted a campaign rally at a Fort Dix parking lot on November 4, 1972. The District Court subsequently issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the military authorities from interfering with the making of political speeches or the distribution of leaflets in areas of Fort Dix open to the general public, and the Court of Appeals affirmed this final judgment. We granted certiorari to consider the important federal questions presented....

In reaching the conclusion that the respondents could not be prevented from entering Fort Dix for the purpose of making political speeches or distributing leaflets, the Court of Appeals relied primarily on this Court's per curiam opinion in Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197.  In the Flower case the Court summarily reversed the conviction of a civilian for entering a military reservation after his having been ordered not to do so. At the time of his arrest the petitioner in that case had been "quietly distributing leaflets on New Braunfels Avenue at a point within the limits of Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas."  The Court's decision reversing the conviction, made without the benefit of briefing or oral argument, rested upon the premise that "'New Braunfels Avenue was a completely open street,'" and that the military had "abandoned any claim that it has special interests in who walks, talks, or distributes leaflets on the avenue." Under those circumstances, the "base commandant" could "no more order petitioner off this public street because he was distributing leaflets than could the city police order any leaflete[er] off any public street."

The decision in Flower was thus based upon the Court's understanding that New Braunfels Avenue was a public thoroughfare in San Antonio no different from all the other public thoroughfares in that city, and that the military had not only abandoned any right to exclude civilian vehicular and pedestrian traffic from the avenue, but also any right to exclude leafleteers -- "any claim [of] special interests in who walks, talks, or distributes leaflets on the avenue."

That being so, the Court perceived the Flower case as one simply falling under the long-established constitutional rule that there cannot be a blanket exclusion of First Amendment activity from a municipality's open streets, sidewalks, and parks.

The Court of Appeals was mistaken, therefore, in thinking that the Flower case is to be understood as announcing a new principle of constitutional law, and mistaken specifically in thinking that Flower stands for the principle that whenever members of the public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or operated by the Government, then that place becomes a "public forum" for purposes of the First Amendment. Such a principle of constitutional law has never existed, and does not exist now. The guarantees of the First Amendment have never meant "that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please." "The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."

The respondents do not contend, that the Fort Dix authorities had abandoned any claim of special interest in regulating the distribution of unauthorized leaflets or the delivery of campaign speeches for political candidates within the confines of the military reservation. The record is, in fact, indisputably to the contrary. The Flower decision thus does not support the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case.

Indeed, the Flower decision looks in precisely the opposite direction. For if the Flower case was decided the way it was because the military authorities had "abandoned any claim [of] special interests in who walks, talks, or distributes leaflets on the avenue," then the implication surely is that a different result must obtain on a military reservation where the authorities have not abandoned such a claim. And if that is not the conclusion clearly to be drawn from Flower, it most assuredly is the conclusion to be drawn from almost 200 years of American constitutional history.

One of the very purposes for which the Constitution was ordained and established was to "provide for the common defence," and this Court over the years has on countless occasions recognized the special constitutional function of the military in our national life, a function both explicit and indispensable.  In short, it is "the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise."  And it is consequently the business of a military installation like Fort Dix to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum.

A necessary concomitant of the basic function of a military installation has been "the historically unquestioned power of [its] commanding officer summarily to exclude civilians from the area of his command."  The notion that federal military reservations, like municipal streets and parks, have traditionally served as a place for free public assembly and communication of thoughts by private citizens is thus historically and constitutionally false.

The respondents, therefore, had no generalized constitutional right to make political speeches or distribute leaflets at Fort Dix, and it follows that Fort Dix Regs. 210-26 and 210-27 are not constitutionally invalid on their face. These regulations, moreover, were not unconstitutionally applied in the circumstances disclosed by the record in the present case. The fact that other civilian speakers and entertainers had sometimes been invited to appear at Fort Dix did not of itself serve to convert Fort Dix into a public forum or to confer upon political candidates a First or Fifth Amendment right to conduct their campaigns there. The decision of the military authorities that a civilian lecture on drug abuse, a religious service by a visiting preacher at the base chapel, or a rock musical concert would be supportive of the military mission of Fort Dix surely did not leave the authorities powerless thereafter to prevent any civilian from entering Fort Dix to speak on any subject whatever.

With respect to Reg. 210-26, there is no claim that the military authorities discriminated in any way among candidates for public office based upon the candidates' candidates' supposed political views.  It is undisputed that, until the appearance of the respondent Spock at Fort Dix on November 4, 1972, as a result of a court order, no candidate of any political stripe had ever been permitted to campaign there.

What the record shows, therefore, is a considered Fort Dix policy, objectively and evenhandedly applied, of keeping official military activities there wholly free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind. Under such a policy members of the Armed Forces stationed at Fort Dix are wholly free as individuals to attend political rallies, out of uniform and off base. But the military as such is insulated from both the reality and the appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political causes or candidates.

Such a policy is wholly consistent with the American constitutional tradition of a politically neutral military establishment under civilian control. It is a policy that has been reflected in numerous laws and military regulations throughout our history. And it is a policy that the military authorities at Fort Dix were constitutionally free to pursue.

With respect to Reg. 210-27, it is to be emphasized that it does not authorize the Fort Dix authorities to prohibit the distribution of conventional political campaign literature. The only publications that a military commander may disapprove are those that he finds constitute "a clear danger to [military] loyalty, discipline, or morale," and he "may not prevent distribution of a publication simply because he does not like its contents," or because it "is critical -- even unfairly critical -- of government policies or officials...."  There is nothing in the Constitution that disables a military commander from acting to avert what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base under his command.

It is possible, of course, that Reg. 210-27 might in the future be applied irrationally, invidiously, or arbitrarily. But none of the respondents in the present case even submitted any material for review. The noncandidate respondents were excluded from Fort Dix because they had previously distributed literature there without even attempting to obtain approval for the distribution. This case, therefore, simply does not raise any question of unconstitutional application of the regulation to any specific situation.

For the reasons set out in this opinion the judgment is reversed.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs, dissenting.

Only four years ago, in a summary decision that presented little difficulty for most Members of this Court, we held that a peaceful leafleteer could not be excluded from the main street of a military installation to which the civilian public had been permitted virtually unrestricted access. Despite that decision in Flower v. United States (1972), the Court today denies access to those desirous of distributing leaflets and holding a political rally on similarly unrestricted streets and parking lots of another military base. In so doing, the Court attempts to distinguish Flower from this case. That attempt is wholly unconvincing, both on the facts and in its rationale. I, therefore, dissent.

According to the Court, the record here is"indisputably to the contrary" of that in Flower.  But in Flower, this Court relied on the following characterization of Fort Sam Houston -- the military fort involved there -- and its main street in holding that a peaceful leafleteer could not be excluded from that street.

"'There is no sentry post or guard at either entrance or anywhere along the route. Traffic flows through the post on this and other streets 24 hours a day. The street is an important traffic artery used freely by buses, taxi cabs and other public transportation facilities as well as by private vehicles, and its sidewalks are used extensively at all hours of the day by civilians as well as by military personnel. Fort Sam Houston was an open post; the street, New Braunfels Avenue, was a completely open street.'"

Fort Dix, at best, is no less open than Fort Sam Houston. No entrance to the Fort is manned by a sentry or blocked by any barrier. The reservation is crossed by 10 paved roads, including a major state highway. Civilians without any prior authorization are regular visitors to unrestricted areas of the Fort or regularly pass through it, either by foot or by auto, at all times of the day and night. Civilians are welcome to visit soldiers and are welcome to visit the Fort as tourists. They eat at the base and freely talk with recruits in unrestricted areas. Public service buses, carrying both civilian and military passengers, regularly serve the base. A 1970 traffic survey indicated that 66,000 civilian and military vehicles per day entered and exited the Fort. Indeed, the reservation is so open as to create a danger of muggings after payday and a problem with prostitution. There is, therefore, little room to dispute the Court of Appeals' finding in this case that "Fort Dix, when compared to Fort Sam Houston, is a fortiori an open post."

The inconsistent results in Flower and this case notwithstanding, it is clear from the rationale of today's decision that despite Flower there is no longer room, under any circumstance, for the unapproved exercise of public expression on a military base. The Court's opinion speaks in absolutes, exalting the need for military preparedness and admitting of no careful and solicitous accommodation of First Amendment interests to the competing concerns that all concede are substantial. It parades general propositions useless to precise resolution of the problem at hand. According to the Court, "it is 'the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise,' and "it is consequently the business of a military installation like Fort Dix to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum." But the training of soldiers does not as a practical matter require exclusion of those who would publicly express their views from streets and theater parking lots open to the general public. Nor does readiness to fight require such exclusion, unless, of course, the battlefields are the streets and parking lots, or the war is one of ideologies and not men.

With similar unenlightening generality, the Court observes:"One of the very purposes for which the Constitution was ordained and established was to 'provide for the common defence,' and this Court over the years has on countless occasions recognized the special constitutional function of the military in our national life, a function both explicit and indispensable." But the Court overlooks the equally, if not more, compelling generalization that -- to paraphrase the Court -- one of the very purposes for which the First Amendment was adopted was to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity," and this Court over the years has on countless occasions recognized the special constitutional function of the First Amendment in our national life, a function both explicit and indispensable. Despite the Court's oversight, if the recent lessons of history mean anything, it is that the First Amendment does not evaporate with the mere intonation of interests such as national defense, military necessity, or domestic  security....

"'In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.' "'Unduly' must mean not more than necessary, and until today, the Court has recognized this criterion in First Amendment cases: "'In the area of First Amendment freedoms government has the duty to confine itself to the least intrusive regulations which are adequate for the purpose.'

True to these principles and unlike the Court's treatment of military interests, respondents' position is not that the First Amendment is unbending. Contrary to the intimations of today's decision, they do not contend that "[t]he guarantees of the First Amendment... [mean] 'that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please.'"  Respondents Spock and Hobson's initial letter to the Fort Dix commander indicating their intent to campaign on the base also indicated in unequivocal terms their willingness to confine the rally to such times and places as might reasonably be designated by petitioners. The other respondents sought only to distribute leaflets in unrestricted areas.....

Not only does the Court's forum approach to public speech blind it to proper regard for First Amendment interests, but also the Court forecloses such regard by studied misperception of the nature of the inquiry required in Flower....


While I concur fully in MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent, I wish to add a few separate words. I am deeply concerned that the Court has taken its second step in a single day toward establishing a doctrine under which any military regulation can evade searching constitutional scrutiny simply because of the military's belief -- however unsupportable it may be -- that the regulation is appropriate. We have never held - and, if we remain faithful to our duty, never will hold - that the Constitution does not apply to the military.

The First Amendment infringement that the Court here condones is fundamentally inconsistent with the commitment of the Nation and the Constitution to an open society. That commitment surely calls for a far more reasoned articulation of the governmental interests assertedly served by the challenged regulations than is reflected in the Court's opinion. The Court, by its unblinking deference to the military's claim that the regulations are appropriate, has sharply limited one of the guarantees that makes this Nation so worthy of being defended. I dissent.

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