KADRMAS ET AL. v. DICKINSON PUBLIC SCHOOLS ET AL
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH DAKOTA
Decided June 24, 1988
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants urge us to hold that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a State to allow some local school boards, but not others, to assess a fee for transporting pupils between their homes and the public schools. Applying well-established equal protection principles, we reject this claim and affirm the constitutionality of the challenged statute.
North Dakota is a sparsely populated State, with many people
living on isolated farms and ranches. One result has been that some children, as late as
the mid-20th century, were
educated in "the one-room school where, in many cases, there [we]re
twenty or more pupils with one teacher attempting in crowded conditions
and under other disadvantages to give instructions in all primary
grades." The State has experimented with various ameliorative
devices at different times in its history. Beginning in 1907, for
example, it has adopted a series of policies that "in certain
circumstances required and in other circumstances merely authorized
[local public] school districts to participate in transporting or
providing compensation for transporting students to school."
Since 1947, the legislature has authorized and encouraged
thinly populated school districts to consolidate or "reorganize"
themselves into larger districts so that education can be provided more
efficiently. Reorganization proposals, which obviously must
contemplate an increase in the distance that some children travel to
school, are required by law to include provisions for transporting
students back and forth from their homes....
Appellee Dickinson Public Schools, which serves a relatively
populous area, has chosen not to participate in such a reorganization.
Until 1973, this school system provided free bus service to students in
outlying areas, but the "pickup points" for this service were often at
considerable distances from the students' homes. After a plebiscite of
the bus users, Dickinson's School Board instituted door-to-door bus
service and began charging a fee. During the period relevant to this
case, about 13% of the students rode the bus;
their parents were charged $97 per year for one child or
per year for two children....
In 1979, the State enacted the legislation at issue in this
case. This statute expressly indicates that nonreorganized school
districts, like Dickinson, may charge a fee for transporting students
to school; such fees, however, may not exceed the estimated cost to the
school district of providing the service.....
In September 1985, appellants, along with others who have
withdrawn from the case, filed an action in state court seeking to
enjoin appellees - the Dickinson Public Schools and various school
district officials - from collecting any fee for the bus service. The
action was dismissed on the merits, and an appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court of North Dakota. After rejecting a state-law challenge,
which is not at issue here, the court considered appellants' claim that
the busing fee violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court characterized the 1979 statute as "purely economic
legislation," which "must be upheld unless it is patently arbitrary and
fails to bear a rational relationship to any legitimate government
purpose." The court then concluded "that the
charges authorized [by the statute] are rationally related to the
legitimate governmental objective of allocating limited resources and
that the statute does not discriminate on the basis of wealth so as to
violate federal or state equal protection rights....."
Unless a statute provokes "strict judicial scrutiny" because it interferes with a "fundamental right" or discriminates against a "suspect class," it will ordinarily survive an equal protection attack so long as the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Appellants contend that Dickinson's user fee for bus service unconstitutionally deprives those who cannot afford to pay it of "minimum access to education." Sarita Kadrmas, however, continued to attend school during the time that she was denied access to the school bus. Appellants must therefore mean to argue that the busing fee unconstitutionally places a greater obstacle to education in the path of the poor than it does in the path of wealthier families. Alternatively, appellants may mean to suggest that the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively requires government to provide free transportation to school, at least for some class of students that would include Sarita Kadrmas. Under either interpretation of appellants' position, we are evidently being urged to apply a form of strict or "heightened" scrutiny to the North Dakota statute. Doing so would require us to extend the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause beyond the limits recognized in our cases, a step we decline to take.
We have previously rejected the suggestion that statutes having different effects on the wealthy and the poor should on that account alone be subjected to strict equal protection scrutiny. Nor have we accepted the proposition that education is a "fundamental right," like equality of the franchise, which should trigger strict scrutiny when government interferes with an individual's access to it.
Relying primarily on Plyler v. Doe, however, appellants suggest that North Dakota's 1979 statute should be subjected to "heightened" scrutiny. This standard of review, which is less demanding than "strict scrutiny" but more demanding than the standard rational relation test, has generally been applied only in cases that involved discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. In Plyler, which did not fit this pattern, the State of Texas had denied to the children of illegal aliens the free public education that it made available to other residents. Applying a heightened level of equal protection scrutiny, the Court concluded that the State had failed to show that its classification advanced a substantial state interest. We have not extended this holding beyond the "unique circumstances" that provoked its "unique confluence of theories and rationales." Nor do we think that the case before us today is governed by the holding in Plyler. Unlike the children in that case, Sarita Kadrmas has not been penalized by the government for illegal conduct by her parents. On the contrary, Sarita was denied access to the school bus only because her parents would not agree to pay the same user fee charged to all other families that took advantage of the service. Nor do we see any reason to suppose that this user fee will "promot[e] the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime." The case before us does not resemble Plyler, and we decline to extend the rationale of that decision to cover this case.
Appellants contend, finally, that whatever label is placed on
the standard of review, this case is analogous to decisions in which we
have held that government may not withhold certain especially important
services from those who are unable to pay for them. Appellants cite
Griffin v. Illinois (1956) (right to appellate review of a criminal
conditioned on the purchase of a trial transcript); Boddie v.
Connecticut (1971) (action for dissolution of marriage could be pursued
upon payment of court fees and costs for service of process); and
Streater (1981) (fee for blood test in quasi-criminal paternity action
brought against the putative father of a child receiving public
Leaving aside other distinctions that might be found between
these cases and the one before us today, each involved a rule that
barred indigent litigants from using the judicial process in
circumstances where they had no alternative to that process. Decisions
invalidating such rules are inapposite here. In contrast to the "utter
exclusiveness of court access and court remedy," North Dakota does not
maintain a legal or a practical monopoly on the means of transporting
school. Thus, unlike the complaining parties in all the
cited by appellants, the Kadrmas family could and did find a private
alternative to the public school bus service for which Dickinson
charged a fee. That alternative was more expensive, to be sure, and we
have no reason to doubt that genuine hardships were endured by the
Kadrmas family when Sarita was denied access to the bus. Such facts,
however, do not imply that the Equal Protection Clause has been
Applying the appropriate test - under which a statute is upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate government objective - we think it is quite clear that a State's decision to allow local school boards the option of charging patrons a user fee for bus service is constitutionally permissible. The Constitution does not require that such service be provided at all, and it is difficult to imagine why choosing to offer the service should entail a constitutional obligation to offer it for free. No one denies that encouraging local school districts to provide school bus service is a legitimate state purpose or that such encouragement would be undermined by a rule requiring that general revenues be used to subsidize an optional service that will benefit a minority of the district's families. It is manifestly rational for the State to refrain from undermining its legitimate objective with such a rule.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting.
....Today, the Court continues the retreat from the promise of equal educational opportunity by holding that a school district's refusal to allow an indigent child who lives 16 miles from the nearest school to use a school-bus service without paying a fee does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Because I do not believe that this Court should sanction discrimination against the poor with respect to "perhaps the most important function of state and local governments," I dissent.....
As I have stated on prior occasions, proper analysis of equal protection claims depends less on choosing the "formal label" under which the claim should be reviewed than upon identifying and carefully analyzing the real interests at stake. In particular, the Court should focus on "the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classification." Viewed from this perspective, the discrimination inherent in the North Dakota statute fails to satisfy the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause.
The North Dakota statute discriminates on the basis of economic status. This Court has determined that classifications based on wealth are not automatically suspect. Such classifications, however, have a measure of special constitutional significance. This Court repeatedly has invalidated statutes, on their face or as applied, that discriminated against the poor. The Court has proved most likely to take such action when the laws in question interfered with the access of the poor to the political and judicial processes. One source of these decisions, in my view, is a deep distrust of policies that specially burden the access of disadvantaged persons to the governmental institutions and processes that offer members of our society an opportunity to improve their status and better their lives. The intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was to abolish caste legislation. When state action has the predictable tendency to entrap the poor and create a permanent underclass, that intent is frustrated. Thus, to the extent that a law places discriminatory barriers between indigents and the basic tools and opportunities that might enable them to rise, exacting scrutiny should be applied.
The statute at issue here burdens a poor person's interest in an education. The extraordinary nature of this interest cannot be denied....By denying equal opportunity to exactly those who need it most, the law not only militates against the ability of each poor child to advance herself or himself, but also increases the likelihood of the creation of a discrete and permanent underclass. Such a statute is difficult to reconcile with the framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.
This Court's decision in Plyler v. Doe supports these propositions. The Court in Plyler upheld the right of the children of illegal aliens to receive the free public education that the State of Texas made available to other residents. The Court made clear that the infirmity of the Texas law stemmed from its differential treatment of a discrete and disadvantaged group of children with respect to the provision of education. The Court stated that education is not "merely some governmental `benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation." The Court further commented that the state law "poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit." Finally, the Court called attention to the tendency of the Texas law to create a distinct underclass of impoverished illiterates who would be unable to participate in and contribute to society. The Plyler Court's reasoning is fully applicable here. As in Plyler, the State in this case has acted to burden the educational opportunities of a disadvantaged group of children, who need an education to become full participants in society....
Exempting indigent families from the busing fee would not require Dickinson to make any significant adjustments in either the operation or the funding of the bus service. Indeed, as the Court states, most school districts in the State provide full bus service without charging any fees at all. The state interest involved in this case is therefore insubstantial; it does not begin to justify the discrimination challenged here.
The Court's decision to the contrary "demonstrates once again a `callous indifference to the realities of life for the poor.'" These realities may not always be obvious from the Court's vantage point, but the Court fails in its constitutional duties when it refuses, as it does today, to make even the effort to see. For the poor, education is often the only route by which to become full participants in our society. In allowing a State to burden the access of poor persons to an education, the Court denies equal opportunity and discourages hope. I do not believe the Equal Protection Clause countenances such a result. I therefore dissent.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting.
When the sovereign applies different rules to different segments of its jurisdiction, it must have a rational basis for doing so. "The term `rational,' of course, includes a requirement that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class." In this case, JUSTICE MARSHALL accurately explicates the harm to certain members of the disadvantaged class. And since the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota has unequivocally identified the actual purpose of the geographic discrimination, I would not second-guess that conclusion and presume that the harm JUSTICE MARSHALL describes has been imposed for other reasons....
The State Supreme Court's explanation of the purpose of this discrimination does not include the "elements of legitimacy and neutrality that must always characterize the performance of the sovereign's duty to govern impartially." Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.