CITY OF RENTON
v. PLAYTIME
THEATRES, INC.
475 U.S.
41 (1986)
JUSTICE
REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves a constitutional challenge to a zoning
ordinance,
enacted by Appellant city of Renton, Washington,
that
prohibits adult motion picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet
of any
residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or
school.
. . .
In
May 1980, the Mayor of Renton, a city of approximately 32,000 people
located
just south of Seattle, suggested to the
Renton City Council that it consider the advisability of enacting
zoning
legislation dealing with adult entertainment uses. No such uses existed
in the
city at that time. Upon the Mayor's suggestion, the City Council
referred the
matter to the city's Planning and Development Committee. The Committee
held
public hearings, reviewed the experiences of Seattle and other cities, and
received a
report from the City Attorney's Office advising as to developments in
other
cities. . . .
In
April 1981, acting on the basis of the Planning and Development
Committee's
recommendation, the City Council enacted Ordinance No. 3526. The
ordinance
prohibited any "adult motion picture theater" from locating within
1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family
dwelling,
church, or park, and within one mile of any school. The term "adult
motion
picture theater" was defined as "[a]n enclosed building used for
presenting motion picture films, video cassettes, cable television, or
any
other such visual media, distinguished or characteri[zed] by an
emphasis on
matter depicting, describing or relating to
specified sexual activities' or 'specified anatomical areas' . .
. for
observation by patrons therein."
In
early 1982, respondents acquired two
existing theaters in downtown Renton,
with the intention of using them to exhibit feature-length adult films.
The
theaters were located within the area proscribed by Ordinance No. 3526.
At
about the same time, respondents filed [a lawsuit challenging the
ordinance on
First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds]. While the federal action was
pending,
the City Council amended the ordinance in several respects, adding a
statement
of reasons for its enactment and reducing the minimum distance from any
school
to 1,000 feet. . . .
In our
view, the resolution of this case is
largely dictated by our decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427
U.S. 50 (1976). There, although five Members of the Court did not agree
on a
single rationale for the decision, we held that the city of Detroit's zoning
ordinance, which prohibited
locating an adult theater within 1,000 feet of any two other "regulated
uses" or within 500 feet of any residential zone, did not violate the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Renton ordinance, like the one in
American
Mini Theatres, does not ban adult theaters altogether, but merely
provides that
such theaters may not be located within 1,000 feet of any residential
zone,
single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school. The
ordinance is
therefore properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner
regulation.
Describing
the ordinance as a time, place, and manner regulation is, of course,
only the
first step in our inquiry. This Court
has long held that regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining
speech on
the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment. On
the
other hand, so-called "content-neutral" time, place, and manner
regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a
substantial
governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues
of
communication.
At
first glance, the Renton
ordinance, like the ordinance in American Mini Theatres, does not
appear to fit
neatly into either the "content-based" or the "content-
neutral" category. To be sure, the ordinance treats theaters that
specialize in adult films differently from other kinds of theaters.
Nevertheless, as the District Court concluded, the Renton ordinance is aimed not at the
content
of the films shown at "adult motion picture theatres," but rather at
the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community.
The
District Court found that the City Council's "predominate concerns"
were with the secondary effects of adult theaters, and not with the
content of
adults films themselves. But the Court of Appeals concluded that
this was not enough to sustain the ordinance. According to the Court of
Appeals, if "a motivating factor" in enacting the ordinance was to
restrict respondents' exercise of First Amendment rights the ordinance
would be
invalid, apparently no matter how small a part this motivating factor
may have
played in the City Council's decision. This view of the
law was rejected in United
States v. O 'Brien, the very case that
the
Court of Appeals said it was applying:
"It
is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not
strike
down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged
illicit
legislative motive. . . . What motivates one legislator to make a
speech about
a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact
it, and
the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork."
The
District Court's finding as to "predominate" intent, left undisturbed
by the Court of Appeals, is more than adequate to establish that the
city's
pursuit of its zoning interests here was unrelated to the suppression
of free
expression. The ordinance by its terms is designed to prevent crime,
protect
the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and generally
"protect and preserve the
quality of neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of
urban life," not to suppress the expression of unpopular views. As
Justice
Powell observed, "if the city had been
concerned with restricting the message purveyed by adult theaters, it
would
have tried to close them or restrict their number rather than
circumscribe
their choice as to location."
In short,
the Renton
ordinance is completely consistent
with our definition of "content-neutral" speech regulations as those
that "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech." The ordinance does not contravene the
fundamental principle that underlies our concern about "content-
based" speech regulations: that "government may not grant the use of
a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to
those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views."
It
was with this understanding in mind that,
in American Mini Theatres, a majority of this Court decided that, at
least with
respect to businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials, zoning
ordinances designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of such
businesses are to be reviewed under the standards applicable to
"content-neutral" time, place, and manner regulations. Justice
Stevens, writing for the plurality, concluded that the city of Detroit
was
entitled to draw a distinction between adult theaters and other kinds
of
theaters "without violating the government's paramount obligation of
neutrality in its regulation of protected communication," noting that
"[i]t is th[e] secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt
to
avoid, not the dissemination of 'offensive' speech." Justice Powell, in
concurrence, elaborated: "[The]
dissent misconceives the issue in this case by insisting that it
involves an
impermissible time, place, and manner restriction based on the content
of
expression. It involves nothing of the kind. We have here merely a
decision by
the city to treat certain movie theaters differently because they have
markedly
different effects upon their surroundings. . . . Moreover, even if this
were a
case involving a special governmental response to the content of one
type of
movie, it is possible that the result would be supported by a line of
cases recognizing
that the government can tailor its reaction to different types of
speech
according to the degree to which its special and overriding interests
are
implicated."
The
appropriate inquiry in this case, then, is
whether the Renton ordinance is designed to serve a substantial
governmental
interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of
communication. It is
clear that the ordinance meets such a standard. As a majority of this
Court
recognized in American Mini Theatres, a city's "interest in attempting
to
preserve the quality of urban life IS one that must be accorded high
respect." Exactly the same vital governmental interests are at stake
here.
The
Court of Appeals ruled, however, that because the Renton
ordinance was enacted without the benefit of studies specifically
relating to
"the particular problems or needs of Renton,"
the city's justifications for the ordinance were "conclusory and
speculative." We think the Court of Appeals imposed on the city an
unnecessarily rigid burden of proof. The record in this case reveals
that Renton relied heavily on the
experience of, and studies
produced by, the city of Seattle.
In Seattle, as in Renton, the adult theater-zoning
ordinance
was aimed at preventing the secondary effects caused by the presence of
even
one such theater in a given neighborhood.
[In that
case the trial court] "heard
expert testimony on the adverse effects of the presence of adult motion
picture
theaters on neighborhood children and community improvement efforts.
The
court's detailed findings, which include a finding that the location of
adult
theaters has a harmful effect on the area and contribute to
neighborhood blight, are supported by substantial evidence in the
record." . . .
We
hold that Renton was entitled to rely
on the
experiences of Seattle
and other cities in
enacting its adult theater zoning ordinance. The First Amendment does
not
require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new
studies or
produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities,
so long
as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be
relevant
to the problem that the city addresses. That was the case here. Nor is
our
holding affected by the fact that Seattle ultimately chose a different
method
of adult theater zoning than that chosen by Renton, since Seattle's
choice of a different remedy to combat the secondary effects of adult
theaters
does not call into question either Seattle's identification of those
secondary
effects or the relevance of Seattle's experience to Renton.
We
also find no constitutional defect in the method chosen by Renton to
further its substantial interests.
Cities may regulate adult theaters by dispersing them, as in Detroit,
or by effectively concentrating them, as in Renton. . . . Moreover, the Renton
ordinance
is "narrowly tailored" to affect only that category of theaters shown
to produce the unwanted secondary effects....
Respondents
contend that the Renton
ordinance is "under-inclusive," in that it fails to regulate other
kinds of adult businesses that are likely to produce secondary effects
similar
to those produced by adult theaters. On this record the contention must
fail.
There is no evidence that, at the time the Renton
ordinance was enacted, any other adult business was located in, or was
contemplating moving into, Renton.
. . .That Renton chose first to address the potential problems created
by one
particular kind of adult business in no way suggests that the city has
"singled out" adult theaters for discriminatory treatment. We simply
have no basis on this record for assuming that Renton will not, in the future, amend
its
ordinance to include other kinds of adult businesses that have been
shown to
produce the same kinds of secondary effects as adult theaters.
Finally,
turning to the question whether the Renton
ordinance allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication,
we note
that the ordinance leaves some 520 acres, or more than five percent of
the
entire land area of Renton,
open to use as adult theater sites. . . . Respondents argue, however,
that some
of the land in question is already occupied by existing businesses,
that
"practically none" of the undeveloped land is currently for sale or
lease, and that in general there are no "commercially viable" adult
theater sites within the 520 acres left open by the Renton ordinance. The Court of
Appeals
accepted these arguments, concluded that the 520 acres was not truly
"available" land, and therefore held that the Renton ordinance "would result in a
substantial restriction" on speech.
We
disagree with both the reasoning and the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals.
That respondents must fend for themselves in the real estate market, on
an
equal footing with other prospective purchasers and lessees, does not
give rise
to a First Amendment violation. And although we have cautioned against
the
enactment of zoning regulations that have "the effect of suppressing,
or
greatly restricting access to, lawful speech," we have never suggested
that the First Amendment compels the Government to ensure that adult
theaters,
or any other kinds of speech-related businesses for that matter, will
be able
to obtain sites at bargain prices. In our view, the First Amendment
requires
only that Renton
refrain from effectively denying respondents a reasonable opportunity
to open
and operate an adult theater within the city, and the ordinance before
us
easily meets this requirement.
.
..The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
therefore [reversed].
JUSTICE
BRENNAN with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting.
Renton's
zoning ordinance selectively imposes limitations on the location of a
movie
theater based exclusively on the content of the films shown there. The
constitutionality of the ordinance is therefore not correctly analyzed
under
standards applied to content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions. But
even assuming that the ordinance may fairly be characterized as content
neutral, it is plainly unconstitutional under the standards established
by the
decisions of this Court. Although the
Court's analysis is limited to cases involving "businesses that purvey
sexually explicit materials," and thus does not affect our holdings in
cases involving state regulation of other kinds of speech, I dissent.
.
. . The Court asserts that the ordinance is "aimed not at the content
of
the films shown at 'adult motion picture theatres,' but rather at the
secondary
effects of such theaters on the surrounding community", and thus is
simply a time, place, and manner regulation. This
analysis is misguided.
The
fact that adult movie theaters may cause harmful "secondary" land-use
effects may arguably give Renton
a compelling reason to regulate such establishments; it does not mean,
however,
that such regulations are content neutral. . . . In this case, both the
language of the ordinance and its dubious legislative history belie the
Court's
conclusion that "the city's pursuit of its zoning interests herewas
unrelated to the suppression of free expression."
Prior
to [an amendment adopted after this lawsuit was commenced], there was
no
indication that the ordinance was designed to address any "secondary
effects" a single adult theater might create. In addition to the
suspiciously coincidental timing of the amendment, many of the City
Council's
"findings" do not relate to legitimate land-use concerns. As the
Court of Appeals observed, "both the magistrate and the district court
recognized that many of the stated reasons for the ordinance were no
more than expressions
of dislike for the subject matter.
Some
of the "findings" added by the
City Council do relate to supposed "secondary effects" associated
with adult movie theaters. However, the Court cannot, as it does,
merely accept
these post hoc statements at face value. . . . The Court allows Renton to
conceal its
illicit motives [by] reliance on the fact that other communities
adopted
similar restrictions. The Court's approach largely immunizes such
measures from
judicial scrutiny, since a municipality can readily find other
municipal
ordinances to rely upon, thus always retrospectively justifying special
zoning
regulations for adult theaters. Rather than speculate about Renton's motives
for adopting such measures,
our cases require the conclusion that the ordinance, like any other
content-based restriction on speech, is constitutional "only if the
[city]
can show that [it] is a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling
[governmental] interest." . . .
Applying
this standard to the facts of this case, the ordinance is patently
unconstitutional. Renton
has not shown that locating adult movie theaters in proximity to its
churches,
schools, parks, and residences will necessarily result in undesirable
"secondary effects," or that these problems could not be effectively
addressed by less intrusive restrictions. . . .