June 1, 1787:
The next clause in Resolution 7,relating to the mode of appointing,
& the duration of, the Executive being under consideration,
Mr. WILSON
said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he wished to take
place,
being apprehensive that it might appear chimerical.
He would say however at least that in theory he was
for an election by the people. Experience, particularly
in N. York & Massts., shewed that an election of
the first magistrate by the people at large,
was both a convenient & successful mode. The objects of
choice in such cases must be persons whose merits
have general notoriety.
Mr. SHERMAN was
for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making him absolutely
dependent on that body, as it was the will of
that which was to be executed. An independence of the
Executive on the supreme Legislature, was in
his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there was any
such thing....
Mr. WILSON
renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the people. He wished
to
derive not only both branches of the Legislature
from the people, without the intervention of the State
Legislatures but the Executive also; in order
to make them as independent as possible of each other, as
well as of the States;
Col. MASON favors the
idea, but thinks it impracticable. He wishes however that Mr. Wilson
might have time to digest it into his own form.-the
clause "to be chosen by the National Legislature"-was
accordingly postponed.-
Mr. RUTLIDGE suggests
an election of the Executive by the second branch only of the national
Legislature.
The Committee then rose and the House Adjourned.
July 17
9th Resol: "that Natl. Executive consist of a single person." Agd. to nem. con.
"To be chosen by the National Legisl:"
Mr. GOVERNR.
MORRIS was pointedly agst. his being so chosen. He will be the mere creature
of the Legisl: if appointed & impeachable
by that body. He ought to be elected by the people at large, by
the freeholders of the Country. That difficulties
attend this mode, he admits. But they have been found
superable in N. Y. & in Cont. and would he
believed be found so, in the case of an Executive for the U.
States. If the people should elect, they will
never fail to prefer some man of distinguished character, or
services; some man, if he might so speak, of
continental reputation. -If the Legislature elect, it will be
the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction;
it will be like the election of a pope by a conclave of
cardinals; real merit will rarely be the title
to the appointment. He moved to strike out "National
Legislature" & insert "citizens of U.S."
Mr.
SHERMAN thought that the sense of the Nation would be better expressed
by the
Legislature, than by the people at large. The
latter will never be sufficiently informed of characters, and
besides will never give a majority of votes to
any one man. They will generally vote for some man in
their own State, and the largest State will have
the best chance for the appointment. If the choice be
made by the Legislre. A majority of voices may
be made necessary to constitute an election.
Mr. WILSON.
two arguments have been urged agnt. an election of the Executive Magistrate
by the
people. I the example of Poland where an
Election of the supreme Magistrate is attended with
the most dangerous commotions. The cases he observed
were totally dissimilar. The Polish nobles have
resources & dependents which enable them
to appear in force, and to threaten the Republic as well as
each other. In the next place the electors all
assemble in one place: which would not be the case
with us. The 2d. argt. is that a majority of
the people would never concur. It might be answered
that the concurrence of a majority of people
is not a necessary principle of election, nor
required as such in any of the States. But allowing
the objection all its force, it may be obviated by the
expedient used in Masts. where the Legislature
by majority of voices, decide in case a majority
of people do not concur in favor of one of the
candidates. This would restrain the choice to a good
nomination at least, and prevent in a great degree
intrigue & cabal. A particular objection with him agst.
an absolute election by the Legislre. was that
the Exec: in that case would be too dependent to stand the
mediator between the intrigues & sinister
views of the Representatives and the general liberties &
interests of the people.
Mr. PINKNEY
did not expect this question would again have been brought forward; An
Election
by the people being liable to the most obvious
& striking objections. They will be led by a few active &
designing men. The most populous States by combining
in favor of the same individual will be able to
carry their points. The Natl. Legislature being
most immediately interested in the laws made by
themselves, will be most attentive to the choice
of a fit man to carry them properly into execution.
Mr. Govr.
MORRIS. It is said that in case of an election by the people the populous
States will
combine & elect whom they please. Just the
reverse. The people of such States cannot combine. If their
be any combination it must be among their representatives
in the Legislature. It is said the people will be
led by a few designing men. This might happen
in a small district. It can never happen throughout the
continent. In the election of a Govr. of N. York,
it sometimes is the case in particular spots, that the
activity & intrigues of little partizans
are successful, but the general voice of the State is never
influenced by such artifices. It is said the
multitude will be uninformed. It is true they would be
uninformed of what passed in the Legislative
Conclave, if the election were to be made there; but they
will not be uninformed of those great & illustrious
characters which have merited their esteem &
confidence. If the Executive be chosen by the
Natl. Legislature, he will not be independent on [FN27] it;
and if not independent, usurpation & tyranny
on the part of the Legislature will be the consequence. This
was the case in England in the last Century.
It has been the case in Holland, where their Senates have
engrossed all power. It has been the case every
where. He was surprised that an election by the people at
large should ever have been likened to the polish
election of the first Magistrate. An election by the
Legislature will bear a real likeness to the
election by the Diet of Poland. The great must be the electors
in both cases, and the corruption & cabal
wch. are known to characterise the one would soon find their
way into the other. Appointments made by numerous
bodies, are always worse than those made by single
responsible individuals, or by the people at
large.
Col.
MASON. It is curious to remark the different language held at different
times. At one
moment we are told that the Legislature is entitled
to thorough confidence, and to indifinite power. At
another, that it will be governed by intrigue
& corruption, and cannot be trusted at all. But not to dwell
on this inconsistency he would observe that a
Government which is to last ought at least to be
practicable. Would this be the case if the proposed
election should be left to the people at large. He
conceived it would be as unnatural to refer the
choice of a proper character for chief Magistrate to the
people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours
to a blind man. The extent of the Country renders it
impossible that the people can have the requisite
capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of the
Candidates.
Mr. WILSON. could
not see the contrariety stated [by Col. Mason] The Legislre. might deserve
confidence in some respects, and distrust in
others. In acts which were to affect them & yr. Constituents
precisely alike confidence was due. In others
jealousy was warranted. The appointment to great offices,
where the Legislre. might feel many motives,
not common to the public confidence was surely
misplaced. This branch of business it was notorious
was most corruptly managed of any that had
been committed to legislative bodies.
Mr. WILLIAMSON,
conceived that there was the same difference between an election in this
case, by the people and by the legislature, as
between an appt. by lot, and by choice. There are at present
distinguished characters, who are known perhaps
to almost every man. This will not always be the case.
The people will be sure to vote for some man
in their own State, and the largest State will be sure to
succeed. This will not be Virga. however. Her
slaves will have no suffrage. As the Salary of the
Executive will be fixed, and he will not be eligible
a 2d. time, there will not be such a dependence on the
Legislature as has been imagined.
Question on an election
by the people instead of the Legislature; which passed in
the negative.
Mas. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.C. no. S.C.no. Geo.no.
Mr. L. MARTIN moved
that the Executive be chosen by Electors appointed by the several
Legislatures of the individual States.
Mr. BROOME 2ds. On the Question, it passed in the negative.
Mas. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.C.no. S.C.no. Geo.no.
On the question
on the words "to be chosen by the Nationl. Legislature" it passed unanimously
in
the affirmative.
July 19, 1787
Mr.
GOVERNEUR MORRIS. It is necessary to take into one view all that relates
to the
establishment of the Executive; on the due formation
of which must depend the efficacy & utility of the
Union among the present and future States. It
has been a maxim in Political Science that Republican
Government is not adapted to a large extent of
Country, because the energy of the Executive Magistracy
can not reach the extreme parts of it. Our Country
is an extensive one. We must either then renounce the
blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive
with sufficient vigor to pervade every part of it. This
subject was of so much importance that he hoped
to be indulged in an extensive view of it. One great
object of the Executive is to controul the Legislature.
The Legislature will continually seek to
aggrandize & perpetuate themselves; and will
seize those critical moments produced by war, invasion or
convulsion for that purpose. It is necessary
then that the Executive Magistrate should be the guardian of
the people, even of the lower classes, agst.
Legislative tyranny, against the Great & the wealthy who in
the course of things will necessarily compose
the Legislative body. Wealth tends to corrupt the mind &
to nourish its love of power, and to stimulate
it to oppression. History proves this to be the spirit
of the opulent. The check provided in the 2d.
branch was not meant as a check on Legislative usurpations
of power, but on the abuse of lawful powers,
on the propensity in the 1st. branch to legislate too
much to run into projects of paper money &
similar expedients. It is no check on Legislative tyranny.
On the contrary it may favor it, and if the 1st.
branch can be seduced may find the means of success. The
Executive therefore ought to be so constituted
as to be the great protector of the Mass of the people. -It
is the duty of the Executive to appoint the officers
& to command the forces of the Republic: to appoint
1. ministerial officers for the administration
of public affairs. 2. officers for the
dispensation of Justice. Who will be the best
Judges whether these appointments be well made? The
people at large, who will know, will see, will
feel the effects of them. Again who can judge so well of
the discharge of military duties for the protection
& security of the people, as the people themselves
who are to be protected & secured? -He finds
too that the Executive is not to be re-eligible. What effect
will this have?
Mr. RANDOLPH thought an election by the Legislature with an incapacity
to be elected a
second time would be more acceptable to the people
that the plan suggested by Mr. Govr.
Morris.
Mr.
KING. did not like the ineligibility. He thought there was great force
in the remark [FN8] of
Mr. Sherman, that he who has proved himself to
be [FN9] most fit for an Office, ought not to be
excluded by the constitution from holding it.
He would therefore prefer any other reasonable plan that
could be substituted. He was much disposed to
think that in such cases the people at large would chuse
wisely. There was indeed some difficulty arising
from the improbability of a general concurrence of the
people in favor of any one man. On the whole
he was of opinion that an appointment by electors chosen
by the people for the purpose, would be liable
to fewest objections.
Mr. PATTERSON's
ideas nearly coincided he said with those of Mr. King. He proposed that
the
Executive should be appointed by Electors to
be chosen by the States in a ratio that would allow one
elector to the smallest and three to the largest
States. Mr. WILSON. It seems to be the unanimous sense
that the Executive should not be appointed by
the Legislature, unless he be rendered in-eligible a 2d.
time: he perceived with pleasure that the idea
was gaining ground, of an election mediately or
immediately by the people.
Mr. MADISON. If
it be a fundamental principle of free Govt. that the Legislative, Executive
&
Judiciary powers should be separately exercised,
it is equally so that they be independently exercised.
There is the same & perhaps greater reason
why the Executive shd. be independent of the Legislature,
than why the Judiciary should: A coalition of
the two former powers would be more immediately &
certainly dangerous to public liberty. It is
essential then that the appointment of the Executive should
either be drawn from some source, or held by
some tenure, that will give him a free agency with regard
to the Legislature. This could not be if he was
to be appointable from time to time by the Legislature. It
was not clear that an appointment in the 1st.
instance even with an eligibility afterwards would not
establish an improper connection between the
two departments. Certain it was that the appointment
would be attended with intrigues and contentions
that ought not to be unnecessarily admitted. He was
disposed for these reasons to refer the appointment
to some other source. The people at large was in his
opinion the fittest in itself. It would be as
likely as any that could be devised to produce an Executive
Magistrate of distinguished Character. The people
generally could only know & vote for some Citizen
whose merits had rendered him an object of general
attention & esteem. There was one difficulty
however of a serious nature attending an immediate
choice by the people. The right of suffrage was
much more diffusive in the Northern than the
Southern States; and the latter could have no influence in
the election on the score of the Negroes. The
substitution of electors obviated this difficulty and
seemed on the whole to be liable to fewest objections.
Mr. GERRY. If the
Executive is to be elected by the Legislature he certainly ought not to
be
re-eligible. This would make him absolutely dependent.
He was agst. a popular election. The people are
uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing
men. He urged the expediency of an appointment of
the Executive by Electors to be chosen by the
State Executives. The people of the States will then
choose the 1st. branch: The legislatures of the
States the 2d. branch of the National Legislature, and the
Executives of the States, the National Executive.
This he thought would form a strong attachnt. in the
States to the National System. The popular mode
of electing the chief Magistrate would certainly be the
worst of all. If he should be so elected &
should do his duty, he will be turned out for it like Govr.
Bowdoin in Massts. & President Sullivan in
N. Hamshire.
On the question
on Mr. Govr. Morris motion to reconsider generally the constitution of
the
Executive. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay & all
the others ay.
Mr. ELSEWORTH moved
to strike out the appointmt. by the Natl. Legislature, and insert
"to be chosen by electors appointed, by the Legislatures
of the States in the following ratio; towit-one
for each State not exceeding 200,000 inhabts.
two for each above yt. number & not exceeding 300,000.
and three for each State exceeding 300,000.
Mr. BROOME 2ded. the motion
Mr. RUTLIDGE was
opposed to all the modes except the appointmt. by the Natl. Legislature.
He
will be sufficiently independent, if he be not
re-eligible.
Mr. GERRY preferred
the motion of Mr. Elseworth to an appointmt. by the Natl. Legislature,
or
by the people; tho' not to an appt. by the State
Executives. He moved that the electors proposed by Mr.
E. should be 25 in number, and allotted in the
following proportion. to N. H. 1. to Mas. 3. to R. I. 1. to
Cont. 2. to N. Y. 2. N. J. 2. Pa. 3. Del.
1. Md. 2. Va. 3. N. C. 2. S. C. 2. Geo. 1.
The question as
moved by Mr. Elseworth being divided, on the 1st. part shall ye. Natl.
Executive be
appointed by Electors? Mas. divd. Cont. ay. N.
J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.
On 2d. part
shall the Electors be chosen by State Legislatures? Mas. ay. Cont.
ay.
N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The part relating to the ratio in which the States sd. chuse electors was postponed nem. con.
Mr. ELSEWORTH supposed
any persons might be appointed Electors, excepting solely,
members of the Natl. Legislature.
September 4, 1787
Mr. BREARLY from the Committee of eleven made a further partial Report as follows....
(4) After the word 'Excellency' in sect. 1. art.
10. to be inserted. 'He shall hold his office during
the term of four years, and together with the
vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected in the
following manner, viz. Each State shall appoint
in such manner as its Legislature may direct, a number of
electors equal to the whole number of Senators
and members of the House of Representatives to which
the State may be entitled in the Legislature.
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote
by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least
shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with
themselves; and they shall make a list of all
the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each,
which list they shall sign and certify and transmit
sealed to the Seat of the Genl. Government, directed
to the President of the Senate-The President
of the Senate shall in that House open all the certificates;
and the votes shall be then & there counted.
The Person having the greatest number of votes shall be the
President, if such number be a majority of that
of the electors; and if there be more than one who have
such majority, and have an equal number of votes,
then the Senate shall immediately choose by ballot
one of them for President: but if no person have
a majority, then from the five highest on the list, the
Senate shall choose by ballot the President.
And in every case after the choice of the President, the
person having the greatest number of votes shall
be vice- president: but if there should remain two or
more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose
from them the vice-President. The Legislature may
determine the time of choosing and assembling
the Electors, and the manner of certifying and
transmitting their votes....'
The (4) clause was accordingly taken up.
Mr. GORHAM disapproved
of making the next highest after the President, the vice-President,
without referring the decision to the Senate
in case the next highest should have less than a majority of
votes. as the regulation stands a very obscure
man with very few votes may arrive at that appointment
Mr. SHERMAN said
the object of this clause of the report of the Committee was to get rid
of the
ineligibility, which was attached to the mode
of election by the Legislature, & to render the Executive
independent of the Legislature. As the choice
of the President was to be made out of the five highest,
obscure characters were sufficiently guarded
against in that case; and he had no objection to requiring
the vice-President to be chosen in like manner,
where the choice was not decided by a majority in the
first instance
Mr. MADISON was
apprehensive that by requiring both the President & vice President
to be
chosen out of the five highest candidates, the
attention of the electors would be turned too much to
making candidates instead of giving their votes
in order to a definitive choice. Should this turn be given
to the business, the election would, in fact
be consigned to the Senate altogether. It would have the
effect at the same time, he observed, of giving
the nomination of the candidates to the largest States.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS concurred in, & enforced the remarks of Mr. Madison.
Mr. RANDOLPH &
Mr. PINKNEY wished for a particular explanation & discussion of the
reasons for changing the mode of electing the
Executive.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS
said he would give the reasons of the Committee and his own. The 1st. was
the danger of intrigue & faction if the appointmt.
should be made by the Legislature. 2. the
inconveniency of an ineligibility required by
that mode in order to lessen its evils. 3. The
difficulty of establishing a Court of Impeachments,
other than the Senate which would not be so proper
for the trial nor the other branch for the impeachment
of the President, if appointed by the Legislature,
4. No body had appeared to be satisfied with
an appointment by the Legislature. 5. Many
were anxious even for an immediate choice by
the people. 6. the indispensible necessity of
making the Executive independent of the Legislature.
-As the Electors would vote at the same time
throughout the U. S. and at so great a distance
from each other, the great evil of cabal was avoided. It
would be impossible also to corrupt them. A conclusive
reason for making the Senate instead of the
Supreme Court the Judge of impeachments, was
that the latter was to try the President after the trial of
the impeachment.
Col: MASON confessed
that the plan of the Committee had removed some capital objections,
particularly the danger of cabal and corruption.
It was liable however to this strong objection, that
nineteen times in twenty the President would
be chosen by the Senate, an improper body for the purpose
Mr. BUTLER thought
the mode not free from objections, but much more so than an election by
the Legislature, where as in elective monarchies,
cabal faction & violence would be sure to prevail.
Mr. PINKNEY stated
as objections to the mode 1. that it threw the whole appointment in
fact into the hands of the Senate. 2. The Electors
will be strangers to the several candidates and
of course unable to decide on their comparative
merits. 3. It makes the Executive reeligible
which will endanger the public liberty. 4. It
makes the same body of men which will in fact elect
the President his Judges in case of an impeachment.
Mr. WILLIAMSON had
great doubts whether the advantage of reeligibility would balance the
objection to such a dependence of the President
on the Senate for his reappointment. He thought at least
the Senate ought to be restrained to the two
highest on the list
Mr. Govr. MORRIS
said the principal advantage aimed at was that of taking away the opportunity
for cabal. The President may be made if thought
necessary ineligible on this as well as on any other
mode of election. Other inconveniences may be
no less redressed on this plan than any other.
Mr. BALDWIN thought
the plan not so objectionable when well considered, as at first view. The
increasing intercourse among the people of the
States, would render important characters less & less
unknown; and the Senate would consequently be
less & less likely to have the eventual appointment
thrown into their hands.
Mr. WILSON. This
subject has greatly divided the House, and will also divide people out
of doors. It is in truth the most difficult of
all on which we have had to decide. He had never made up an
opinion on it entirely to his own satisfaction.
He thought the plan on the whole a valuable improvement
on the former. It gets rid of one great evil,
that of cabal & corruption; & Continental Characters will
multiply as we more & more coalesce, so as
to enable the electors in every part of the Union to know &
judge of them. It clears the way also for a discussion
of the question of reeligibility on its own merits,
which the former mode of election seems to forbid.
He thought it might be better however to refer the
eventual appointment to the Legislature than
to the Senate, and to confine it to a smaller number than
five of the Candidates. The eventual election
by the Legislature wd. not open cabal anew, as it would be
restrained to certain designated objects of choice,
and as these must have had the previous sanction of a
number of the States: and if the election be
made as it ought as soon as the votes of the electors are
opened & it is known that no one has a majority
of the whole, there can be little danger of corruption.
Another reason for preferring the Legislature
to the Senate in this business, was that the House of Reps.
will be so often changed as to be free from the
influence & faction to which the permanence of the
Senate may subject that branch.
Mr. RANDOLPH preferred
the former mode of constituting the Executive, but if the change was
to be made, he wished to know why the eventual
election was referred to the Senate and not to the
Legislature? He saw no necessity for this and
many objections to it. He was apprehensive also that the
advantage of the eventual appointment would fall
into the hands of the States near the Seat of
Government.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS
said the Senate was preferred because fewer could then, say to the
President, you owe your appointment to us. He
thought the President would not depend so much on the
Senate for his re-appointment as on his general
good conduct.
The further consideration
of the Report was postponed that each member might take a copy of the
remainder of it....
September 5, 1787
The Report made yesterday as to the appointment of the Executive being taken up.
Mr. PINKNEY renewed
his opposition to the mode, arguing 1. that the electors will not
have sufficient knowledge of the fittest men,
& will be swayed by an attachment to the eminent men of
their respective States. Hence 2dly. the dispersion
of the votes would leave the appointment with the
Senate, and as the President's reappointment
will thus depend on the Senate he will be the mere creature
of that body. 3. He will combine with the Senate
agst. the House of Representatives.
4. This change in the mode of election was meant
to get rid of the ineligibility of the President a second
time, whereby he will become fixed for life under
the auspices of the Senate
Mr. GERRY did not
object to this plan of constituting the Executive in itself, but should
be
governed in his final vote by the powers that
may be given to the President.
Mr. RUTLIDGE was
much opposed to the plan reported by the Committee. It would throw the
whole power into the Senate. He was also against
a re-eligibility. He moved to postpone the Report
under consideration & take up the original
plan of appointment by the Legislature, to wit. "He shall be
elected by joint ballot by the Legislature to
which election a majority of the votes of the members
present shall be required: He shall hold his
office during the term of seven years; but shall not be
elected a second time."
On this motion to postpone
N. H. divd. Mas.
no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. no.
Col. MASON admitted
that there were objections to an appointment by the Legislature as
originally planned. He had not yet made up his
mind, but would state his objections to the mode
proposed by the Committee. 1. It puts the appointment
in fact into the hands of the Senate, as it
will rarely happen that a majority of the whole
votes will fall on any one candidate: and as the Existing
President will always be one of the 5 highest,
his reappointment will of course depend on the Senate. 2.
Considering the powers of the President &
those of the Senate, if a coalition should be
established between these two branches, they
will be able to subvert the Constitution-The great
objection with him would be removed by depriving
the Senate of the eventual election. He accordingly
moved to strike out the words "if such number
be a majority of that of the electors."
Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded.
the motion. He could not agree to the clause without some such
modification. He preferred making the highest
tho' not having a majority of the votes, President, to a
reference of the matter to the Senate. Referring
the appointment to the Senate lays a certain foundation
for corruption & aristocracy.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS
thought the point of less consequence than it was supposed on both sides.
It
is probable that a majority of votes will fall
on the same man. As each elector is to give two votes, more
than 1/4 will give a majority. Besides as one
vote is to be given to a man out of the State, and as this vote
will not be thrown away, 1/2 the votes will fall
on characters eminent & generally known. Again if the
President shall have given satisfaction, the
votes will turn on him of course, and a majority of them will
reappoint him, without resort to the Senate:
If he should be disliked, all disliking him, would take care to
unite their votes so as to ensure his being supplanted.
Col. MASON those
who think there is no danger of there not being a majority for the same
person
in the first instance, ought to give up the point
to those who think otherwise.
Mr. SHERMAN reminded
the opponents of the new mode proposed that if the small states had
the advantage in the Senate's deciding among
the five highest candidates, the large States would have in
fact the nomination of these candidates
On the motion of Col: Mason
N. H. no. Mas. no.
Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo.
no.
Mr. WILSON moved to strike out "Senate" and insert the word "Legislature"
Mr. MADISON considered
it as a primary object to render an eventual resort to any part
of the Legislature improbable. He was apprehensive
that the proposed alteration would turn the attention
of the large States too much to the appointment
of candidates, instead of aiming at an effectual
appointment of the officer, as the large States
would predominate in the Legislature which would have
the final choice out of the Candidates. Whereas
if the Senate in which the small States predominate
should have this [FN14] final choice, the concerted
effort of the large States would be to make the
appointment in the first instance conclusive.
Mr. RANDOLPH. We
have in some revolutions of this plan made a bold stroke for Monarchy.
We are now doing the same for an aristocracy.
He dwelt on the tendency of such an influence in the
Senate over the election of the President in
addition to its other powers, to convert that body into a real
& dangerous Aristocracy.
Mr. DICKINSON was
in favor of giving the eventual election to the Legislature, instead of
the
Senate. It was too much influence to be superadded
to that body.
On the question moved by Mr. Wilson
N. H. divd. Mas.
no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C.
ay. Geo. no.
Mr. MADISON &
Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to strike out the word "majority" and insert "one
third" so that the eventual power might not be
exercised if less than a majority, but not less than 1/3 of
the Electors should vote for the same person.
Mr. GERRY objected
that this would put it in the power of three or four States to put in whom
they pleased.
Mr. WILLIAMSON.
There are seven States which do not contain one third of the people. If
the
Senate are to appoint, less than one sixth of
the people will have the power.
On the question
N. H. no. Mas. no.
Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.
Mr. GERRY suggested
that the eventual election should be made by six Senators and seven
Representatives chosen by joint ballot of both
Houses.
Mr. KING observed
that the influence of the Small States in the Senate was somewhat balanced
by
the influence of the large States in bringing
forward the candidates; and also by the Concurrence
of the small States in the Committee in the clause
vesting the exclusive origination of Money bills in
the House of Representatives.
Col: MASON moved
to strike out the word "five" and insert the word "three" as the highest
candidates for the Senate to choose out of.
Mr. GERRY 2ded. the motion
Mr. SHERMAN would sooner give up the plan. He would prefer seven or thirteen.
On the question moved by Col: Mason & Mr. Gerry
N. H. no. Mas. no.
Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Delaware Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.
Mr. SPAIGHT and
Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to strike out "five" and insert "thirteen"- to which
all
the States disagreed-except N. C. & S. C.
Mr. MADISON &
Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to insert after "Electors" the words "who shall have
balloted" so that the non voting electors not
being counted might not increase the number necessary as a
majority of the whole, to decide the choice without
the agency of the Senate.
On this question
N. H. no. Mas. no.
Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.
Mr. DICKINSON moved,
in order to remove ambiguity from the intention of the clause as
explained by the vote, to add, after the words
"if such number be a majority of the whole number of the
electors" the word "appointed"
On this motion
N. H. ay. Mas. ay.
Con: ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Delaware Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.
Col: MASON. As the
mode of appointment is now regulated, he could not forbear expressing his
opinion that it is utterly inadmissible. He would
prefer the Government of Prussia to one which will put
all power into the hands of seven or eight men,
and fix an Aristocracy worse than absolute monarchy.
The words "and of their giving their votes" being
inserted on motion for that purpose, after the words
"The Legislature may determine the time of chusing
and assembling the electors."
The House adjourned
September 6, 1787
The Report made yesterday as to the appointment of the Executive being taken up.
Mr. PINKNEY renewed
his opposition to the mode, arguing 1. that the electors will not
have sufficient knowledge of the fittest men,
& will be swayed by an attachment to the eminent men of
their respective States. Hence 2dly. the dispersion
of the votes would leave the appointment with the
Senate, and as the President's reappointment
will thus depend on the Senate he will be the mere creature
of that body. 3. He will combine with the
Senate agst. the House of Representatives. 4.
This change in the mode of election was meant
to get rid of the ineligibility of the President a second
time, whereby he will become fixed for life under
the auspices of the Senate
Mr. GERRY did not
object to this plan of constituting the Executive in itself, but should
be
governed in his final vote by the powers that
may be given to the President.
Mr. RUTLIDGE was
much opposed to the plan reported by the Committee. It would throw the
whole power into the Senate. He was also against
a re-eligibility. He moved to postpone the Report
under consideration & take up the original
plan of appointment by the Legislature, to wit. "He shall be
elected by joint ballot by the Legislature to
which election a majority of the votes of the members
present shall be required: He shall hold his
office during the term of seven years; but shall not be
elected a second time."
On this motion to postpone
N. H. divd. Mas.
no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. no.
Col. MASON admitted
that there were objections to an appointment by the Legislature as
originally planned. He had not yet made up his
mind, but would state his objections to the mode
proposed by the Committee. 1. It puts the appointment
in fact into the hands of the Senate, as it
will rarely happen that a majority of the whole
votes will fall on any one candidate: and as the Existing
President will always be one of the 5 highest,
his reappointment will of course depend on the Senate. 2.
Considering the powers of the President &
those of the Senate, if a coalition should be
established between these two branches, they
will be able to subvert the Constitution-The great
objection with him would be removed by depriving
the Senate of the eventual election. He accordingly
moved to strike out the words "if such number
be a majority of that of the electors."
Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded.
the motion. He could not agree to the clause without some such
modification. He preferred making the highest
tho' not having a majority of the votes, President, to a
reference of the matter to the Senate. Referring
the appointment to the Senate lays a certain foundation
for corruption & aristocracy.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS
thought the point of less consequence than it was supposed on both sides.
It
is probable that a majority of votes will fall
on the same man. As each elector is to give two votes, more
than 1/4 will give a majority. Besides as one
vote is to be given to a man out of the State, and as this vote
will not be thrown away, 1/2 the votes will fall
on characters eminent & generally known. Again if the
President shall have given satisfaction, the
votes will turn on him of course, and a majority of them will
reappoint him, without resort to the Senate:
If he should be disliked, all disliking him, would take care to
unite their votes so as to ensure his being supplanted.
Col. MASON those
who think there is no danger of there not being a majority for the same
person
in the first instance, ought to give up the point
to those who think otherwise.
Mr. SHERMAN reminded
the opponents of the new mode proposed that if the small states had
the advantage in the Senate's deciding among
the five highest candidates, the large States would have in
fact the nomination of these candidates
On the motion of Col: Mason
N. H. no. Mas. no.
Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo.
no.
Mr. WILSON moved to strike out "Senate" and insert the word "Legislature"
Mr. MADISON considered
it as a primary object to render an eventual resort to any part
of the Legislature improbable. He was apprehensive
that the proposed alteration would turn the attention
of the large States too much to the appointment
of candidates, instead of aiming at an effectual
appointment of the officer, as the large States
would predominate in the Legislature which would have
the final choice out of the Candidates. Whereas
if the Senate in which the small States predominate
should have this final choice, the concerted
effort of the large States would be to make the
appointment in the first instance conclusive.
Mr. RANDOLPH. We
have in some revolutions of this plan made a bold stroke for Monarchy.
We are now doing the same for an aristocracy.
He dwelt on the tendency of such an influence in the
Senate over the election of the President in
addition to its other powers, to convert that body into a real
& dangerous Aristocracy.
Mr. DICKINSON was
in favor of giving the eventual election to the Legislature, instead of
the
Senate. It was too much influence to be superadded
to that body.
On the question moved by Mr. Wilson
N. H. divd. Mas.
no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C.
ay. Geo. no.
Mr. MADISON &
Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to strike out the word "majority" and insert "one
third" so that the eventual power might not be
exercised if less than a majority, but not less than 1/3 of
the Electors should vote for the same person.
Mr. GERRY objected
that this would put it in the power of three or four States to put in whom
they pleased.
Mr. WILLIAMSON.
There are seven States which do not contain one third of the people. If
the
Senate are to appoint, less than one sixth of
the people will have the power.
On the question
N. H. no. Mas. no.
Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.
Mr. GERRY suggested
that the eventual election should be made by six Senators and seven
Representatives chosen by joint ballot of both
Houses.
Mr. KING observed
that the influence of the Small States in the Senate was somewhat balanced
by
the influence of the large States in bringing
forward the candidates; and also by the Concurrence
of the small States in the Committee in the clause
vesting the exclusive origination of Money bills in
the House of Representatives.
Col: MASON moved
to strike out the word "five" and insert the word "three" as the highest
candidates for the Senate to choose out of.
Mr. GERRY 2ded. the motion
Mr. SHERMAN would sooner give up the plan. He would prefer seven or thirteen.
On the question moved by Col: Mason & Mr. Gerry
N. H. no. Mas. no.
Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Delaware Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.
Mr. SPAIGHT and
Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to strike out "five" and insert "thirteen"- to which
all
the States disagreed-except N. C. & S. C.
Mr. MADISON &
Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to insert after "Electors" the words "who shall have
balloted" so that the non voting electors not
being counted might not increase the number necessary as a
majority of the whole, to decide the choice without
the agency of the Senate.
On this question
N. H. no. Mas. no.
Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.
Mr. DICKINSON moved,
in order to remove ambiguity from the intention of the clause as
explained by the vote, to add, after the words
"if such number be a majority of the whole number of the
electors" the word "appointed"
On this motion
N. H. ay. Mas. ay.
Con: ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Delaware Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.
Col: MASON. As the
mode of appointment is now regulated, he could not forbear expressing his
opinion that it is utterly inadmissible. He would
prefer the Government of Prussia to one which will put
all power into the hands of seven or eight men,
and fix an Aristocracy worse than absolute monarchy.
The words "and of their giving their votes" being
inserted on motion for that purpose, after the words
"The Legislature may determine the time of chusing
and assembling the electors."
The House adjourned.