In some
cases,
however,
when the disadvantaged group is a sympathetic one
and the individual
interest
affected is especially strong, the rational basis
test is applied
differently.
The cases linked to this page are
illustrative. Plyler v Doe
(1982)
involved a challenge to a Texas law that denied to
the children of
illegal
aliens a public education. Cleburne v
Cleburne Living Center
(1985)
concerned a challenge to a local zoning decision
that denied a permit
to
construct a home for the mentally retarded.
In both Plyler and
Cleburne, the Court compared the weight of the
state's asserted
interests--which it found to be very weak--against
the substantial harm
to the plaintiffs, and determined the laws in
question to violate the
equal protection clause.
The
Court had
an opportunity to apply this somewhat heightened
scrutiny in a 1988
case, Kadrmas v
Dickinson Public
Schools, but declined to do so by a 5 to
4 vote. In Kadrmas, the Court concluded
that a
North Dakota law that charged indigent rural
parents a fee to transport
their children to public schools did not violate
the equal protection
clause. The Court applied the traditional
rational basis
test. The four dissenters, noting the
important right at stake
and the potentially significant barrier the fee
posed to indigent
parents seeking an education for their children,
would have followed Plyler and applied a higher
level
of scrutiny. Romer
v
Evans
(1996) involved a challenge to a Colorado
constitutional amendment
that deprived gay rights activists to meaningfully
lobby for
legislation
that would extend the protections of civil rights
laws to
homosexuals.
As in Plyler
and Cleburne,
the Court struck down the
challenged law
using
what it called a rational basis test. In an
angry dissent,
Justice Scalia said the answer to the question of
whether a rational
basis supported the law was "obviously yes." Although vague about exactly what standard of review it was employing, the Court in 2013 in United States v Windsor struck down a key provision of the federal Defense of Marriage Act that denied federal recognition to same-sex marriages even in states where such marriages were lawful. Writing for a 5 to 4 majority, Justice Kennedy said that Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause "containing within it the prohibition against denying any person the equal protection of the laws...withdraws from Government the power to degrade or demean in the way this law does." The Court held the law invalid "for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity." The
actual
application of
the
rational test in Plyler, Cleburne, Romer, and Windsor
differed from that
traditionally used in cases where no suspect
classification or
fundamental right was involved in at least one
important
respect: the Court in all three cases weighed
the state's
asserted
interests and compared them to the strong
individual interests at
stake.
Some commentators have referred to the test used
in cases such as these
as "rational basis with bite."
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Plyler v Doe (1982) Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (1985) Kadrmas v Dickinson Public Schools (1988) Romer v Evans (1996) United States v Windsor (2013)
Questions 1. Why
isn't
Texas's interest
in discouraging illegal immigration sufficient to
support its decision
to deny taxpayer-funded schooling to the children of
illegal
aliens?
Why isn't its interest in saving the expense of
educating 20,000
children
of illegal alines sufficient? |