JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Part III-B, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE THOMAS join.
This case involves a challenge to a rule promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior interpreting 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) in such fashion as to render it applicable only to actions within the United States or on the high seas. The preliminary issue, and the only one we reach, is whether respondents here, plaintiffs below, have standing to seek judicial review of the rule.
Shortly thereafter, respondents, organizations dedicated to wildlife
conservation and other environmental causes, filed this action against
the Secretary of the Interior, seeking a declaratory judgment that the
new regulation is in error as to the geographic scope of 7(a)(2) and an
injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation restoring
the initial interpretation....
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" - an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical'" . Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of - the injury has to be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing
these elements.... At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of
injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion
to dismiss, we "presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific
facts that are necessary to support the claim." In response to a
summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such
"mere allegations," but must "set forth" by affidavit or other evidence
"specific facts," which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will
be taken to be true. And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted)
must be "supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial."
With respect to this aspect of the case, the Court of Appeals focused on the affidavits of two Defenders' members - Joyce Kelly and Amy Skilbred. Ms. Kelly stated that she traveled to Egypt in 1986 and observed the traditional habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile there and intend[s] to do so again, and hope[s] to observe the crocodile directly, and that she will suffer harm in fact as the result of [the] American . . . role . . . in overseeing the rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile . . . and [in] develop[ing] . . . Egypt's . . . Master Water Plan. Ms. Skilbred averred that she traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981 and "observed th[e] habitat" of "endangered species such as the Asian elephant and the leopard" at what is now the site of the Mahaweli project funded by the Agency for International Development (AID), although she "was unable to see any of the endangered species"; "this development project," she continued, will seriously reduce endangered, threatened, and endemic species habitat including areas that I visited . . . [, which] may severely shorten the future of these species"; that threat, she concluded, harmed her because she "intend[s] to return to Sri Lanka in the future and hope[s] to be more fortunate in spotting at least the endangered elephant and leopard." When Ms. Skilbred was asked at a subsequent deposition if and when she had any plans to return to Sri Lanka, she reiterated that "I intend to go back to Sri Lanka," but confessed that she had no current plans: "I don't know [when]. There is a civil war going on right now. I don't know. Not next year, I will say. In the future."
We shall assume for the sake of argument that these affidavits contain facts showing that certain agency-funded projects threaten listed species - though that is questionable. They plainly contain no facts, however, showing how damage to the species will produce "imminent" injury to Mses. Kelly and Skilbred. That the women "had visited" the areas of the projects before the projects commenced proves nothing. As we have said in a related context, "Past exposure to illegal conduct does not, in itself, show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." And the affiants' profession of an "inten[t]" to return to the places they had visited before - where they will presumably, this time, be deprived of the opportunity to observe animals of the endangered species - is simply not enough. Such "some day" intentions - without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be - do not support a finding of the "actual or imminent" injury that our cases require.
Besides relying upon the Kelly and Skilbred affidavits, respondents propose a series of novel standing theories. The first, inelegantly styled "ecosystem nexus," proposes that any person who uses any part of a "contiguous ecosystem" adversely affected by a funded activity has standing even if the activity is located a great distance away. To say that the Act protects ecosystems is not to say that the Act creates (if it were possible) rights of action in persons who have not been injured in fact, that is, persons who use portions of an ecosystem not perceptibly affected by the unlawful action in question.
Respondents' other theories are called, alas, the "animal nexus" approach,
whereby anyone who has an interest in studying or seeing the endangered
animals anywhere on the globe has standing; and the "vocational nexus"
approach, under which anyone with a professional interest in such animals
can sue. Under these theories, anyone who goes to see Asian elephants in
the Bronx Zoo, and anyone who is a keeper of Asian elephants in the Bronx
Zoo, has standing to sue because the Director of Agency for International
Development did not consult with the Secretary regarding the AID-funded
project in Sri Lanka. This is beyond all reason. Standing is not "an ingenious
academic exercise in the conceivable," but, as we have said, requires,
at the summary judgment stage, a factual showing of perceptible harm. It
is clear that the person who observes or works with a particular animal
threatened by a federal decision is facing perceptible harm, since the
very subject of his interest will no longer exist. It is even plausible
- though it goes to the outermost limit of plausibility - to think that
a person who observes or works with animals of a particular species in
the very area of the world where that species is threatened by a federal
decision is facing such harm, since some animals that might have been the
subject of his interest will no longer exist. It goes beyond the limit,
however, and into pure speculation and fantasy, to say that anyone who
observes or works with an endangered species, anywhere in the world, is
appreciably harmed by a single project affecting some portion of that species
with which he has no more specific connection.
The most obvious problem in the present case is redressability. Since the agencies funding the projects were not parties to the case, the District Court could accord relief only against the Secretary: he could be ordered to revise his regulation to require consultation for foreign projects. But this would not remedy respondents' alleged injury unless the funding agencies were bound by the Secretary's regulation, which is very much an open question.....
A further impediment to redressability is the fact that the agencies
generally supply only a fraction of the funding for a foreign project.
AID, for example, has provided less than 10% of the funding for the Mahaweli
project. Respondents have produced nothing to indicate that the projects
they have named will either be suspended, or do less harm to listed species,
if that fraction is eliminated. It is entirely conjectural whether the
nonagency activity that affects respondents will be altered or affected
by the agency activity they seek to achieve. There is no standing.
We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government - claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large - does not state an Article III case or controversy....
To be sure, our generalized-grievance cases have typically involved Government violation of procedures assertedly ordained by the Constitution, rather than the Congress. But there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right. Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch - one of the essential elements that identifies those "Cases" and "Controversies" that are the business of the courts, rather than of the political branches.... If the concrete injury requirement has the separation of powers significance we have always said, the answer must be obvious: to permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an "individual right" vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
We hold that respondents lack standing to bring this action...
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
Although I agree with the essential parts of the Court's analysis, I write separately to make several observations.
I agree with the Court's conclusion in Part III-A that, on the record before us, respondents have failed to demonstrate that they themselves are "among the injured." While it may seem trivial to require that Mses. Kelly and Skilbred acquire airline tickets to the project sites or announce a date certain upon which they will return, this is not a case where it is reasonable to assume that the affiants will be using the sites on a regular basis, nor do the affiants claim to have visited the sites since the projects commenced. With respect to the Court's discussion of respondents' "ecosystem nexus," "animal nexus," and "vocational nexus" theories, I agree that, on this record, respondents' showing is insufficient to establish standing on any of these bases. I am not willing to foreclose the possibility, however, that, in different circumstances, a nexus theory similar to those proffered here might support a claim to standing.....
In light of the conclusion that respondents have not demonstrated a concrete injury here sufficient to support standing under our precedents, I would not reach the issue of redressability that is discussed by the plurality in Part III-B.....
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
Because I am not persuaded that Congress intended the consultation requirement in 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), to apply to activities in foreign countries, I concur in the judgment of reversal. I do not, however, agree with the Court's conclusion that respondents lack standing because the threatened injury to their interest in protecting the environment and studying endangered species is not "imminent." Nor do I agree with the plurality's additional conclusion that respondents' injury is not "redressable" in this litigation.....
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom Justice O'CONNOR joins, dissenting.
I part company with the Court in this case in two respects. First, I believe that respondents have raised genuine issues of fact - sufficient to survive summary judgment - both as to injury and as to redressability. Second, I question the Court's breadth of language in rejecting standing for "procedural" injuries. I fear the Court seeks to impose fresh limitations on the constitutional authority of Congress to allow citizen suits in the federal courts for injuries deemed "procedural" in nature. I dissent....
Were the Court to apply the proper standard for summary judgment, I believe it would conclude that the sworn affidavits and deposition testimony of Joyce Kelly and Amy Skilbred advance sufficient facts to create a genuine issue for trial concerning whether one or both would be imminently harmed by the Aswan and Mahaweli projects. In the first instance, as the Court itself concedes, the affidavits contained facts making it at least "questionable" (and therefore within the province of the factfinder) that certain agency-funded projects threaten listed species.The only remaining issue, then, is whether Kelly and Skilbred have shown that they personally would suffer imminent harm.
I think a reasonable finder of fact could conclude from the information in the affidavits and deposition testimony that either Kelly or Skilbred will soon return to the project sites, thereby satisfying the "actual or imminent" injury standard....
The Court also concludes that injury is lacking, because respondents' allegations of "ecosystem nexus" failed to demonstrate sufficient proximity to the site of the environmental harm. One cannot suffer from the sight of a ruined landscape without being close enough to see the sites actually being mined. Many environmental injuries, however, cause harm distant from the area immediately affected by the challenged action. Environmental destruction may affect animals traveling over vast geographical ranges. It cannot seriously be contended that a litigant's failure to use the precise or exact site where animals are slaughtered or where toxic waste is dumped into a river means he or she cannot show injury.
The Court also rejects respondents' claim of vocational or professional injury. The Court says that it is "beyond all reason" that a zoo "keeper" of Asian elephants would have standing to contest his government's participation in the eradication of all the Asian elephants in another part of the world. I am unable to see how the distant location of the destruction necessarily mitigates the harm to the elephant keeper. If there is no more access to a future supply of the animal that sustains a keeper's livelihood, surely there is harm.
I have difficulty imagining this Court applying its rigid principles of geographic formalism anywhere outside the context of environmental claims. As I understand it, environmental plaintiffs are under no special constitutional standing disabilities. Like other plaintiffs, they need show only that the action they challenge has injured them, without necessarily showing they happened to be physically near the location of the alleged wrong. The Court's decision today should not be interpreted to foreclose the possibility that, in different circumstances, a nexus theory similar to those proffered here might support a claim to standing....
I find myself unable to agree with the plurality's analysis of redressability, based as it is on its invitation of executive lawlessness, ignorance of principles of collateral estoppel, unfounded assumptions about causation, and erroneous conclusions about what the record does not say. In my view, respondents have satisfactorily shown a genuine issue of fact as to whether their injury would likely be redressed by a decision in their favor....
Only later cases will tell just what the Court means by its intimation that "procedural" injuries are not constitutionally cognizable injuries. In the meantime, I have the greatest of sympathy for the courts across the country that will struggle to understand the Court's standardless exposition of this concept today....
Under the Court's anachronistically formal view of the separation of powers, Congress legislates pure, substantive mandates, and has no business structuring the procedural manner in which the Executive implements these mandates. To be sure, in the ordinary course, Congress does legislate in black-and-white terms of affirmative commands or negative prohibitions on the conduct of officers of the Executive Branch. In complex regulatory areas, however, Congress often legislates, as it were, in procedural shades of gray. That is, it sets forth substantive policy goals and provides for their attainment by requiring Executive Branch officials to follow certain procedures, for example, in the form of reporting, consultation, and certification requirements.
The Court recently has considered two such procedurally oriented statutes. In Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Society (1986), the Court examined a statute requiring the Secretary of Commerce to certify to the President that foreign nations were not conducting fishing operations or trading which "diminis[h] the effectiveness" of an international whaling convention. The Court expressly found standing to sue.
The consultation requirement of 7 of the Endangered Species Act is a similar, action-forcing statute....
In conclusion, I cannot join the Court on what amounts to a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of environmental standing. I dissent.
Exploring Constitutional Conflicts