Supreme Court interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause has come full circle. From its narrow reading of the clause in 1878 in Reynolds, to its much broader reading of the clause in the Warren and Burger Court years, the Court returned to its narrow interpretation in the controversial 1990 case of Employment Division of Oregon v Smith. The story of this circular migration is an interesting one, and may provide lessons for other areas of constitutional interpretation.
The Court's decision in Smith provoked almost unanimous criticism on Capitol Hill, and Congress quickly responded by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, designed to restore the test abandoned in Smith. This effort, however, largely was to fail, as the Supreme Court ruled that Congress lacked the power to compel state accomodation of significantly burdened religious beliefs and practices.
The Supreme Court's first encounter with a Free Exercise Clause claim came when a Mormon polygamist in the Utah Territory challenged his conviction under a federal anti-polygamy law. The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's claim that his religious beliefs necessitated, and therefore excused, his violation of federal law. The Court read the Free Exercise Clause as protecting religious beliefs, not religious practices that run counter to neutrally enforced criminal laws.
By the Warren Court years of the 1960s, the Court had adopted a much more expansive view of the Free Exercise Clause, reading it to compel governmental accomodation of religiously-motivated conduct in the absence of a compelling state interest and the use of means that least burdened religious practices. Applying this strict scutiny to laws that significantly burdened religious exercise, the Court found unconstitutional South Carolina's law denying unemployment benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who turned down a job opportunity that included Saturday work (Sherbert).
The Burger Court continued to apply this test, using it in 1972 to find unconstitutional (as applied to Amish families) Wisconsin's law mandating attendance in schools until age 17 (Yoder). State and lower federal courts, of course, applied strict scrutiny to enjoin a variety of criminal laws in the 1970s and 80s. For example, in 1979 in Frank v Alaska, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the state could not enforce its hunting laws against Athabascans who were religiously-motivated to hunt moose out of season--moose being a key ingredient in a religiously proper funeral potlatch.
By the mid-80s, the Supreme Court, while still using heightened scutiny, began to take a more skeptical view of Free Exercise claims. The close division of the Court on these claims was revealed in its 1985 affirmance (by an equally divided Court, Justice Marshall not participating) of an Eighth Circuit decision enjoining Nebraska from enforcing a state law requiring photo identification on driver's licenses against a Nebraska motorist who believed that such pictures violated the Second Commandment's warning against worshipping graven images (Quaring v Nebraska). The next year, the tide turned against Free Exercise claimants when the Court rejected, 5 to 4, the seemingly sympathetic request of an Orthodox Jewish army psychiatrist who felt religiously-compelled to wear a yamulke on duty, and who asked to be exempted from the military's ban on such headwear (Goldman).
Lyng v Northwest Protective Cemetery Association in 1988 provided a major hint of the revolution in Free Exercise law to come by adopting a per se rule that the government need not concern itself with the impact that its land use decisions might have on religious practices. Based on this newly announced principle, the Court permitted the United States to proceed with construction of a road through a national forest that would concededly have severe consequences for the practitioners of a Native American religion who considered the area sacred.
The big development--shocking to some--in Free Exercise jurisprudence came in Employment Division v Smith in 1990. Reinterpreting and, in some cases, throwing out decades of caselaw, five members of the Supreme Court concluded that a generally applicable criminal law raises no Free Exercise issues at all, ending what had long been the obligation of states to demonstrate at least an important state interest and narrow tailoring when they enforced laws that significantly burdened religious practice. The Court reinterpreted some Free Exercise cases such as Yoder as "hybrid" cases, raising both Free Exercise and substantive due process issues. Other cases such as Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie were placed in the special category of "unemployment compensation rules" --and left undisturbed. From now on, the five-member majority proclaimed, states will have to satisfy heightened scrutiny (except for hybrid cases and unemployment cases) only when a law specifically targets religious practice.
In 1993, in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v Hialeah, the Supreme Court took a case which it concluded showed an attempt by government to specifically target an unpopular religious practice, and struck down the laws in question--all designed to deal with animal sacrifice practiced by a large but largely clantestine religion of mostly ex-Cubans. The Court unanimously concluded that the ordinances of Hialeah violated the Free Exercise Clause.
proved as unpopular with Congress as it did with many within the
community. Congress in 1993 responded to the Smith
by voting overwhelmingly to pass the Religious Freedom Restoratation
of 1993 designed to return religious exercise cases to the pre-Smith
for laws burdening religious practices. Under RFRA, federal,
and local laws interfering with religious exercise would have to be
by a compelling state interest and be a least restrictive of religious
freedom as possible. The Supreme Court, however, gets the last
on issues of constitutional interpretation. In 1997, in City of Boerne
v Flores, the Court ruled that RFRA was unconstitutional, at least
as applied to state and local governments. The Court concluded
the Constitution, and in particular Section 5 of the Fourteenth
gave no power to Congress to do more than adopt remedial measures
with Fourteenth Amendment interpretations of the Court, and that
had instead tried to changed the substantive law--substituting its
of the Free Exercise Clause for that of the Supreme Court.
Joshua Davey (American Bar Journal photo)
In 2004, the
Supreme Court in Locke v Davey
considered the reach of Lukumi Babalu
in a case involving a Washington State scholarship program for gifted
students. The program allowed students receiving a state
scholarship to pursue any major, with one exception: a degree in
devotional theology. When Joshua Davey, a scholarship recipient,
was denied funding to pursue a theology program at Northwest, a private
religious college, he sued, alleging that Washington had violated his
Free Exercise right. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 7 to
2 majority, found that the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment
Clause, read together, offered enough "play in the joints" to allow
Washington to exclude a major in devotional theology, "a religious
calling" as much as "an academic pursuit," from the list of endeavors
it will support with taxpayer funds. Justices Scalia and Thomas
disagreed, finding the exclusion to be a clear violation of Free
Exercise principles laid down in Lukumi
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
thereof. (Amendment 1)
United States v Ballard (1944)
Sherbert v. Verner (1963)
Yoder v.Wisconsin (1972)
Frank v. Alaska (1979)
Goldman v. Weinberger (1986)
Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Prot. Ass'n (1988)
Employment Div. of Oregon v, Smith (1990)
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993)
City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)
Locke v Davey (2004)
2. Is the Court's conclusion in Smith that the law imposes no limitations on government's ability to enforce criminal laws of general applicability consistent with the framers' original understanding? Why did the Court in Smith pay so little attention to the historical record on this matter?
3. Yoder holds that the Amish are exempt from state compulsory education laws because public education beyond a certain age threatens the religious values of the Amish. Does this case suggest that Christian Fundamentalists have a free exercise right to be exempted from, say, biology classes in which evolution is taught or requirements in a literature course that they read religiously-objectionable works?
4. After Smith, it would be possible for a state to prosecute a priest or minister who offers communion wine for distributing alcohol to a minor. Is such a prosecution likely to occur? Why not? Does this suggest that the real losers in Smith are religions that have relatively few adherents, and especially those that are unpopular?
5. What in the Constitution supports applying a different and more deferential standard when it is a military regulation, rather than a civilian regulation, that is alleged to impinge upon constitutional liberties (as the Court suggested in Goldman)? Would it be better to apply the same standard, recognizing (of course) that national security is an interest of the highest order?
6. Lukumi Bababu Aye holds that government may not target a religious practice for prosecution. Suppose a state where concerned about a religious sect that practiced the handling of poisonous snakes in its worship services. How might the state draft a law that would avoid the constitutional problems that Hialeah encountered with its law attempting to deal with animal sacrifice?
7. What do you think about the argument of Justice Stevens in the Boerne case: that to grant the Catholic Church an exemption from zoning laws that would not be given to a non-religious institution violates the Establishment Clause? How would you resolve the tension between the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause?
8. Justice Scalia argues in Smith that an honest application of the compelling state interest test in free exercise cases involving neutral laws would lead to anarchy and chaos, with religions of all sorts getting exemptions from a wide variety of laws and programs. Is he right? Has the Court been using a "watered down" compelling state interest test in free exercise cases?
9. If the compelling state interest teest were to be applied in Smith, would Oregon have been able to satisfy it? How strong is the state's interest in prohibiting the use of peyote in the religious ceremonies of Native Americans?
10. The Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993 passed in the Senate on a vote of 96 to 3. Does that vote suggest that support for the weakened free exercise test of Smith is diffuse at best?
11. Could you suggest a way in which Hialeah could redraft its ordinances to effectively prohibit animal sacrifice without violating the Free Exercise Clause or criminalizing widely accepted forms of animal killing?