CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY CHAPTER
OF THE UNI-
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[June 28, 2010]
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
In a series of decisions, this Court has emphasized that the First Amendment generally precludes public universities from denying student organizations access to school-sponsored forums because of the groups' viewpoints. This case concerns a novel question regarding student activities at public universities: May a public law school condition its official recognition of a student group--and the attendant use of school funds and facilities--on the organization's agreement to open eligibility for membership and leadership to all students?
In the view of petitioner Christian Legal Society (CLS), an accept-all-comers policy impairs its First Amendment rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion by prompting it, on pain of relinquishing the advantages of recognition, to accept members who do not share the organization's core beliefs about religion and sexual orientation. From the perspective of respondent Hastings College of the Law (Hastings or the Law School), CLS seeks special dispensation from an across-the-board open-access requirement designed to further the reasonable educational purposes underpinning the school's student-organization program.
In accord with the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we reject CLS's First Amendment challenge. Compliance with Hastings' all-comers policy, we conclude, is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student-organization forum. In requiring CLS--in common with all other student organizations--to choose between welcoming all students and forgoing the benefits of official recognition, we hold, Hastings did not transgress constitutional limitations. CLS, it bears emphasis, seeks not parity with other organizations, but a preferential exemption from Hastings' policy. The First Amendment shields CLS against state prohibition of the organization's expressive activity, however exclusionary that activity may be. But CLS enjoys no constitutional right to state subvention of its selectivity.
Founded in 1878, Hastings was the first law school in the University of California public-school system. Like many institutions of higher education, Hastings encourages students to form extracurricular associations that "contribute to the Hastings community and experience." These groups offer students "opportunities to pursue academic and social interests outside of the classroom [to] further their education" and to help them "develo[p] leadership skills."
Through its "Registered Student Organization" (RSO) program, Hastings extends official recognition to student groups. Several benefits attend this school-approved status. RSOs are eligible to seek financial assistance from the Law School, which subsidizes their events using funds from a mandatory student-activity fee imposed on all students. RSOs may also use Law-School channels to communicate with students: They may place announcements in a weekly Office-of-Student-Services newsletter, advertise events on designated bulletin boards, send e-mails using a Hastings-organization address, and participate in an annual Student Organizations Fair designed to advance recruitment efforts. In addition, RSOs may apply for permission to use the Law School's facilities for meetings and office space....
In exchange for these benefits, RSOs must abide by certain conditions. Only a "non-commercial organization whose membership is limited to Hastings students may become [an RSO]".....Critical here, all RSOs must undertake to comply with Hastings' "Policies and Regulations Applying to College Activities, Organizations and Students."
The Law School's Policy on Nondiscrimination (Nondiscrimination Policy), which binds RSOs, states:
Hastings interprets the
Nondiscrimination Policy, as it relates to the RSO program, to mandate
acceptance of all comers: School-approved groups must "allow any
student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions
in the organization, regardless of [her] status or beliefs." Other
law schools have adopted similar all-comers policies....
From Hastings' adoption of its Nondiscrimination Policy in 1990 until the events stirring this litigation, "no student organization at Hastings ... ever sought an exemption from the Policy." In 2004, CLS became the first student group to do so. At the beginning of the academic year, the leaders of a predecessor Christian organization--which had been an RSO at Hastings for a decade--formed CLS by affiliating with the national Christian Legal Society (CLS-National). CLS-National, an association of Christian lawyers and law students, charters student chapters at law schools throughout the country. CLS chapters must adopt bylaws that, inter alia, require members and officers to sign a "Statement of Faith" and to conduct their lives in accord with prescribed principles. Among those tenets is the belief that sexual activity should not occur outside of marriage between a man and a woman; CLS thus interprets its bylaws to exclude from affiliation anyone who engages in "unrepentant homosexual conduct." CLS also excludes students who hold religious convictions different from those in the Statement of Faith.
On September 17, 2004, CLS submitted to Hastings an application for RSO status, accompanied by all required documents, including the set of bylaws mandated by CLS-National. Several days later, the Law School rejected the application; CLS's bylaws, Hastings explained, did not comply with the Nondiscrimination Policy because CLS barred students based on religion and sexual orientation.
CLS formally requested an exemption from the Nondiscrimination Policy,but Hastings declined to grant one. "[T]o be one of our student-recognized organizations," Hastings reiterated, "CLS must open its membership to all students irrespective of their religious beliefs or sexual orientation." If CLS instead chose to operate outside the RSO program, Hastings stated, the school "would be pleased to provide [CLS] the use of Hastings facilities for its meetings and activities." CLS would also have access to chalkboards and generally available campus bulletin boards to announce its events. In other words, Hastings would do nothing to suppress CLS's endeavors, but neither would it lend RSO-level support for them....
On October 22, 2004, CLS filed
suit against various Hastings officers and administrators under 42
U. S. C. Â§1983. Its complaint alleged that
Hastings' refusal to grant the organization RSO status violated CLS's
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech, expressive
association, and free exercise of religion....
Before considering the merits of CLS's constitutional arguments, we must resolve a preliminary issue: CLS urges us to review the Nondiscrimination Policy as written--prohibiting discrimination on several enumerated bases, including religion and sexual orientation--and not as a requirement that all RSOs accept all comers. The written terms of the Nondiscrimination Policy, CLS contends, "targe[t] solely those groups whose beliefs are based on religion or that disapprove of a particular kind of sexual behavior," and leave other associations free to limit membership and leadership to individuals committed to the group's ideology. For example, "[a] political ... group can insist that its leaders support its purposes and beliefs," CLS alleges, but "a religious group cannot."
CLS's assertion runs headlong into the stipulation of facts it jointly submitted with Hastings at the summary-judgment stage. In that filing, the parties specified:
In light of the joint stipulation, both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit trained their attention on the constitutionality of the all-comers requirement, as described in the parties' accord. We reject CLS's unseemly attempt to escape from the stipulation and shift its target to Hastings' policy as written. This opinion, therefore, considers only whether conditioning access to a student-organization forum on compliance with an all-comers policy violates the Constitution.10
....This Court has rigorously reviewed laws and regulations that constrain associational freedom. In the context of public accommodations, we have subjected restrictions on that freedom to close scrutiny; such restrictions are permitted only if they serve "compelling state interests" that are "unrelated to the suppression of ideas"--interests that cannot be advanced "through ... significantly less restrictive [means]." "Freedom of association," we have recognized, "plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate." Insisting that an organization embrace unwelcome members, we have therefore concluded, "directly and immediately affects associational rights...."
Three observations lead us to conclude that our limited-public-forum precedents supply the appropriate framework for assessing both CLS's speech and association rights.
First, the same considerations
that have led us to apply a less restrictive level of scrutiny to
speech in limited public forums as compared to other environments, apply
with equal force to expressive association occurring in limited public
forums. As just noted, speech and expressive-association rights are
closely linked. When these intertwined rights arise in exactly the same
context, it would be anomalous for a restriction on speech to survive
constitutional review under our limited-public-forum test only to be
invalidated as an impermissible infringement of expressive
Second, and closely related, the strict scrutiny we have applied in some settings to laws that burden expressive association would, in practical effect, invalidate a defining characteristic of limited public forums--the State may "reserv[e] [them] for certain groups...."
Third, this case fits comfortably
within the limited-public-forum category, for CLS, in seeking what is
effectively a state subsidy, faces only indirect pressure to modify its
membership policies; CLS may exclude any person for any reason if it
forgoes the benefits of official recognition. The
expressive-association precedents on which CLS relies, in contrast,
involved regulations that compelled a group to include
unwanted members, with no choice to opt out.
In diverse contexts, our decisions have distinguished between policies that require action and those that withhold benefits. Application of the less-restrictive limited-public-forum analysis better accounts for the fact that Hastings, through its RSO program, is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of prohibition.
In sum, we are persuaded that our limited-public-forum precedents adequately respect both CLS's speech and expressive-association rights, and fairly balance those rights against Hastings' interests as property owner and educational institution. We turn to the merits of the instant dispute, therefore, with the limited-public-forum decisions as our guide.
As earlier pointed out, we do not write on a blank slate; we have three times before considered clashes between public universities and student groups seeking official recognition or its attendant benefits. First, in Healy, a state college denied school affiliation to a student group that wished to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Characterizing SDS's mission as violent and disruptive, and finding the organization's philosophy repugnant, the college completely banned the SDS chapter from campus; in its effort to sever all channels of communication between students and the group, university officials went so far as to disband a meeting of SDS members in a campus coffee shop. The college, we noted, could require "that a group seeking official recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law," including "reasonable standards respecting conduct." But a public educational institution exceeds constitutional bounds, we held, when it "restrict[s] speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by [a] group to be abhorrent."
We later relied on Healy in Widmar. In that case, a public university, in an effort to avoid state support for religion, had closed its facilities to a registered student group that sought to use university space for religious worship and discussion. "A university's mission is education," we observed, "and decisions of this Court have never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities." But because the university singled out religious organizations for disadvantageous treatment, we subjected the university's regulation to strict scrutiny. The school's interest "in maintaining strict separation of church and State," we held, was not "sufficiently compelling to justify ... [viewpoint] discrimination against ... religious speech."
Most recently and comprehensively, in Rosenberger, we reiterated that a university generally may not withhold benefits from student groups because of their religious outlook. The officially recognized student group in Rosenberger was denied student-activity-fee funding to distribute a newspaper because the publication discussed issues from a Christian perspective. By "select[ing] for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints," we held, the university had engaged in "viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations."
In all three cases, we ruled
that student groups had been unconstitutionally singled out because of
their points of view. "Once it has opened a limited [public] forum," we
emphasized, "the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself
set." The constitutional constraints on the boundaries the
State may set bear repetition here: "The State may not exclude speech
where its distinction is not reasonable in light of the purpose served
by the forum, ... nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis
of ... viewpoint."
We first consider whether Hastings' policy is reasonable taking into account the RSO forum's function and "all the surrounding circumstances."
Our inquiry is shaped by the educational context in which it arises: "First Amendment rights," we have observed, "must be analyzed in light of the special characteristics of the school environment." This Court is the final arbiter of the question whether a public university has exceeded constitutional constraints, and we owe no deference to universities when we consider that question. Cognizant that judges lack the on-the-ground expertise and experience of school administrators, however, we have cautioned courts in various contexts to resist "substitut[ing] their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review."
With appropriate regard for school
administrators' judgment, we review the justifications Hastings offers
in defense of its all-comers requirement. First, the open-access policy
"ensures that the leadership, educational, and social opportunities
afforded by [RSOs] are available to all students." Just as
"Hastings does not allow its professors to host classes open only to
those students with a certain status or belief," so the Law School may
decide, reasonably in our view, "that the ... educational experience is
best promoted when all participants in the forum must provide equal
access to all students."
Second, the all-comers requirement helps Hastings police the written terms of its Nondiscrimination Policy without inquiring into an RSO's motivation for membership restrictions. To bring the RSO program within CLS's view of the Constitution's limits, CLS proposes that Hastings permit exclusion because of belief but forbid discrimination due to status. But that proposal would impose on Hastings a daunting labor. How should the Law School go about determining whether a student organization cloaked prohibited status exclusion in belief-based garb? If a hypothetical Male-Superiority Club barred a female student from running for its presidency, for example, how could the Law School tell whether the group rejected her bid because of her sex or because, by seeking to lead the club, she manifested a lack of belief in its fundamental philosophy?
This case itself is instructive in this regard. CLS contends that it does not exclude individuals because of sexual orientation, but rather "on the basis of a conjunction of conduct and the belief that the conduct is not wrong." Our decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this context. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 575 (2003) ("When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination.").
Third, the Law School reasonably adheres to the view that an all-comers policy, to the extent it brings together individuals with diverse backgrounds and beliefs, "encourages tolerance, cooperation, and learning among students." And if the policy sometimes produces discord, Hastings can rationally rank among RSO-program goals development of conflict-resolution skills, toleration, and readiness to find common ground.
Fourth, Hastings' policy, which incorporates--in fact, subsumes--state-law proscriptions on discrimination, conveys the Law School's decision "to decline to subsidize with public monies and benefits conduct of which the people of California disapprove." State law, of course, may not command that public universities take action impermissible under the First Amendment. But so long as a public university does not contravene constitutional limits, its choice to advance state-law goals through the school's educational endeavors stands on firm footing.
In sum, the several justifications Hastings asserts in support of its all-comers requirement are surely reasonable in light of the RSO forum's purposes.
The Law School's policy is all
the more creditworthy in view of the "substantial alternative channels
that remain open for [CLS-student] communication to take place."
If restrictions on access to a limited public forum are viewpoint
discriminatory, the ability of a group to exist outside the forum would
not cure the constitutional shortcoming. But when access barriers are
viewpoint neutral, our decisions have counted it significant that other
available avenues for the group to exercise its First Amendment rights
lessen the burden created by those barriers.
In this case, Hastings offered
CLS access to school facilities to conduct meetings and the use of
chalkboards and generally available bulletin boards to advertise
events. Although CLS could not take advantage of RSO-specific
methods of communication, the advent of electronic media and
social-networking sites reduces the importance of those channels....
It is beyond dissenter's license, constantly to maintain that nonrecognition of a student organization is equivalent to prohibiting its members from speaking.
CLS nevertheless deems Hastings' all-comers policy "frankly absurd." "There can be no diversity of viewpoints in a forum," it asserts, "if groups are not permitted to form around viewpoints." This catchphrase confuses CLS's preferred policy with constitutional limitation--the advisability of Hastings' policy does not control its permissibility. Instead, we have repeatedly stressed that a State's restriction on access to a limited public forum "need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation."
CLS also assails the reasonableness of the all-comers policy in light of the RSO forum's function by forecasting that the policy will facilitate hostile takeovers; if organizations must open their arms to all, CLS contends, saboteurs will infiltrate groups to subvert their mission and message. This supposition strikes us as more hypothetical than real. CLS points to no history or prospect of RSO-hijackings at Hastings. Students tend to self-sort and presumably will not endeavor en masse to join--let alone seek leadership positions in--groups pursuing missions wholly at odds with their personal beliefs. And if a rogue student intent on sabotaging an organization's objectives nevertheless attempted a takeover, the members of that group would not likely elect her as an officer.
RSOs, moreover, in harmony with
the all-comers policy, may condition eligibility for membership and
leadership on attendance, the payment of dues, or other neutral
requirements designed to ensure that students join because of their
commitment to a group's vitality, not its demise....
Hastings, furthermore, could
reasonably expect more from its law students than the disruptive
behavior CLS hypothesizes--and to build this expectation into its
educational approach. A reasonable policy need not anticipate and
preemptively close off every opportunity for avoidance or manipulation.
If students begin to exploit an all-comers policy by hijacking
organizations to distort or destroy their missions, Hastings presumably
would revisit and revise its policy.
Finally, CLS asserts that the Law School lacks any legitimate interest--let alone one reasonably related to the RSO forum's purposes--in urging "religious groups not to favor co-religionists for purposes of their religious activities. CLS's analytical error lies in focusing on the benefits it must forgo while ignoring the interests of those it seeks to fence out: Exclusion, after all, has two sides. Hastings, caught in the crossfire between a group's desire to exclude and students' demand for equal access, may reasonably draw a line in the sand permitting all organizations to express what they wish but no group to discriminate in membership.
....It is hard to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral policy than one requiring all student groups to accept all comers.....Finding Hastings' open-access condition on RSO status reasonable and viewpoint neutral, we reject CLS' free-speech and expressive-association claims.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' ruling that the all-comers policy is constitutional and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justice Alito, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
The proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express "the thought that we hate." Today's decision rests on a very different principle: no freedom for expression that offends prevailing standards of political correctness in our country's institutions of higher learning.
The Hastings College of the Law, a state institution, permits student organizations to register with the law school and severely burdens speech by unregistered groups. Hastings currently has more than 60 registered groups and, in all its history, has denied registration to exactly one: the Christian Legal Society (CLS). CLS claims that Hastings refused to register the group because the law school administration disapproves of the group's viewpoint and thus violated the group's free speech rights.
Rejecting this argument, the Court finds that it has been Hastings' policy for 20 years that all registered organizations must admit any student who wishes to join. Deferring broadly to the law school's judgment about the permissible limits of student debate, the Court concludes that this "accept-all-comers" policy, is both viewpoint-neutral and consistent with Hastings' proclaimed policy of fostering a diversity of viewpoints among registered student groups.
The Court's treatment of this case is deeply disappointing. The Court does not address the constitutionality of the very different policy that Hastings invoked when it denied CLS's application for registration. Nor does the Court address the constitutionality of the policy that Hastings now purports to follow. And the Court ignores strong evidence that the accept-all-comers policy is not viewpoint neutral because it was announced as a pretext to justify viewpoint discrimination. Brushing aside inconvenient precedent, the Court arms public educational institutions with a handy weapon for suppressing the speech of unpopular groups--groups to which, as Hastings candidly puts it, these institutions "do not wish to ... lend their name[s]...."To appreciate how far the Court has strayed, it is instructive to compare this case with Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 (1972), our only First Amendment precedent involving a public college's refusal to recognize a student group. The group in Healy was a local chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). When the students who applied for recognition of the chapter were asked by a college committee whether they would " 'respond to issues of violence as other S.D.S. chapters have,' " their answer was that their " 'action would have to be dependent upon each issue.' " They similarly refused to provide a definitive answer when asked whether they would be willing to "use any means possible" to achieve their aims. The president of the college refused to allow the group to be recognized, concluding that the philosophy of the SDS was "antithetical to the school's policies" and that it was doubtful that the local chapter was independent of the national organization, the " 'published aims and philosophy' " of which included " 'disruption and violence.' "
The effects of nonrecognition in Healy were largely the same as those present here. The SDS was denied the use of campus facilities, as well as access to the customary means used for communication among the members of the college community....[This] Court held that the denial of recognition substantially burdened the students' right to freedom of association. After observing that "[t]he primary impediment to free association flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes," the Court continued:
It is striking that all of these same burdens are now borne by CLS. CLS is prevented from using campus facilities--unless at some future time Hastings chooses to provide a timely response to a CLS request and allow the group, as a favor or perhaps in exchange for a fee, to set up a table on the patio or to use a room that would otherwise be unoccupied. And CLS, like the SDS in Healy, has been cut off from "the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students."
It is also telling that the Healy
Court, unlike today's majority, refused to defer to the college
president's judgment regarding the compatibility of "sound educational
policy" and free speech rights. The same deference arguments that the
majority now accepts were made in defense of the college president's
decision to deny recognition in Healy....
The Healy Court was true to the principle that when it comes to the interpretation and application of the right to free speech, we exercise our own independent judgment. We do not defer to Congress on such matters, and there is no reason why we should bow to university administrators....
Hastings' refusal to register CLS
pursuant to its Nondiscrimination Policy plainly fails. As previously
noted, when Hastings refused to register CLS, it claimed that the CLS
bylaws impermissibly discriminated on the basis of religion and sexual
orientation. As interpreted by Hastings and applied to CLS, both of
these grounds constituted viewpoint
The Hastings Nondiscrimination
Policy, as interpreted by the law school, ...discriminated on the basis
of viewpoint regarding sexual morality. CLS has a particular viewpoint
on this subject, namely, that sexual conduct outside marriage between a
man and a woman is wrongful. Hastings would not allow CLS to express
this viewpoint by limiting membership to persons willing to express a
sincere agreement with CLS's views. By contrast, nothing in the
Nondiscrimination Policy prohibited a group from expressing a contrary
viewpoint by limiting membership to persons willing to endorse that
group's beliefs. A Free Love Club could require members to affirm that
they reject the traditional view of sexual morality to which CLS
adheres. It is hard to see how this can be viewed as anything other
than viewpoint discrimination.....
I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that today's decision is a serious setback for freedom of expression in this country. Our First Amendment reflects a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Even if the United States is the only Nation that shares this commitment to the same extent, I would not change our law to conform to the international norm. I fear that the Court's decision marks a turn in that direction. Even those who find CLS's views objectionable should be concerned about the way the group has been treated--by Hastings, the Court of Appeals, and now this Court. I can only hope that this decision will turn out to be an aberration.