SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES OUR LADY
OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL, PETITIONER v. AGNES
MORRISSEY-BERRU, ST. JAMES SCHOOL, PETITIONER [July
8, 2020] Justice Alito
delivered the opinion of the Court. In the cases now before us, we
consider employment
discrimination claims brought by two elementary school
teachers at Catholic
schools whose teaching responsibilities are similar to
Perich’s. Although these
teachers were not given the title of “minister” and have
less religious
training than Perich, we hold that their cases fall
within the same rule that
dictated our decision in Hosanna-Tabor. The religious
education and formation
of students is the very reason for the existence of most
private religious
schools, and therefore the selection and supervision of
the teachers upon whom
the schools rely to do this work lie at the core of
their mission. Judicial
review of the way in which religious schools discharge
those responsibilities
would undermine the independence of religious
institutions in a way that the
First Amendment does not tolerate. The first of the two cases we now
decide involves Agnes
Morrissey-Berru, who was employed at Our Lady of
Guadalupe School (OLG), a Roman
Catholic primary school in the Archdiocese of Los
Angeles. For many years,
Morrissey-Berru was employed at OLG as a lay fifth or
sixth grade teacher. Like
most elementary school teachers, she taught all
subjects, and since OLG is a
Catholic school, the curriculum included religion. As a
result, she was her
students’ religion teacher. . . . Each year, Morrissey-Berru and OLG
entered into an
employment agreement, that set out the school’s
“mission” and Morrissey-Berru’s
duties. The agreement stated that the school’s mission
was “to develop and
promote a Catholic School Faith Community,”and it
informed Morrissey-Berru that
“[a]ll [her] duties and responsibilities as a Teache[r
were to] be performed
within this overriding commitment.”The agreement
explained that the school’s
hiring and retention decisions would be guided by its
Catholic mission, and the
agreement made clear that teachers were expected to
“model and promote”
Catholic “faith and morals.” Under the agreement,
Morrissey-Berru was required
to participate in “[s]chool liturgical activities, as
requested,” and the
agreement specified that she could be terminated “for
‘cause’ ” for failing to
carry out these duties or for “conduct that brings
discredit upon the School or
the Roman Catholic Church.” The pastor of the parish, a
Catholic priest, had to
approve Morrissey-Berru’s hiring each year. . . . In 2014, OLG asked Morrissey-Berru to
move from a full-time
to a part-time position, and the next year, the school
declined to renew her
contract. She filed a claim with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), received a right-to-sue letter, and then filed
suit under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, claiming that
the school had demoted
her and had failed to renew her contract so that it
could replace her with a
younger teacher. The school maintains that it based its
decisions on classroom
performance—specifically, Morrissey-Berru’s difficulty
in administering a new
reading and writing program, which had been introduced
by the school’s new
principal as part of an effort to maintain accreditation
and improve the
school’s academic program. Invoking the “ministerial exception”
that we recognized in
Hosanna-Tabor, OLG successfully moved for summary
judgment, but the Ninth
Circuit reversed in a brief opinion. . .
. II The independence of religious
institutions in matters of
“faith and doctrine” is closely linked to independence
in what we have termed
“‘matters of church government.’ ” This does not mean
that religious
institutions enjoy a general immunity from secular laws,
but it does protect
their autonomy with respect to internal management
decisions that are essential
to the institution’s central mission. And a component of
this autonomy is the
selection of the individuals who play certain key roles. The “ministerial exception” was based
on this insight. Under
this rule, courts are bound to stay out of employment
disputes involving those
holding certain important positions with churches and
other religious
institutions. The rule appears to have acquired the
label “ministerial
exception” because the individuals involved in
pioneering cases were described
as “ministers.” But it is instructive to consider why a
church’s independence
on matters “of faith and doctrine” requires the
authority to select, supervise,
and if necessary, remove a minister without interference
by secular
authorities. Without that power, a wayward minister’s
preaching, teaching, and
counseling could contradict the church’s tenets and lead
the congregation away
from the faith. The ministerial exception was recognized
to preserve a church’s
independent authority in such matters. When the so-called ministerial
exception finally reached
this Court in Hosanna-Tabor, we unanimously recognized
that the Religion
Clauses foreclose certain employment discrimination
claims brought against
religious organizations. The constitutional foundation
for our holding was the
general principle of church autonomy to which we have
already referred:
independence in matters of faith and doctrine and in
closely linked matters of
internal government. The three prior decisions on which
we primarily relied
drew on this broad principle, and none was exclusively
concerned with the
selection or supervision of clergy. In Hosanna-Tabor, Cheryl Perich, a
kindergarten and fourth
grade teacher at an Evangelical Lutheran school, filed
suit in federal court,
claiming that she had been discharged because of a
disability, in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The
school responded that
the real reason for her dismissal was her violation of
the Lutheran doctrine
that disputes should be resolved internally and not by
going to outside
authorities. We held that her suit was barred by the
“ministerial exception”
and noted that it “concern[ed] government interference
with an internal church
decision that affects the faith and mission of the
church.” We declined “to
adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee
qualifies as a minister,”
and we added that it was “enough for us to conclude, in
this our first case
involving the ministerial exception, that the exception
covers Perich, given
all the circumstances of her employment.” We identified
four relevant
circumstances but did not highlight any as essential. First, we noted that her church had
given Perich the title
of “minister, with a role distinct from that of most of
its members.” Although
she was not a minister in the usual sense of the
term—she was not a pastor or
deacon, did not lead a congregation, and did not
regularly conduct religious
services—she was classified as a “called” teacher, as
opposed to a lay teacher,
and after completing certain academic requirements, was
given the formal title
“ ‘Minister of Religion, Commissioned.’ ” Second,
Perich’s position “reflected
a significant degree of religious training followed by a
formal process of
commissioning.” Third, “Perich held herself out as a
minister of the Church by
accepting the formal call to religious service,
according to its terms,” and by
claiming certain tax benefits. Fourth, “Perich’s job
duties reflected a role in
conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its
mission.” If titles were all-important, courts
would have to decide
which titles count and which do not, and it is hard to
see how that could be
done without looking behind the titles to what the
positions actually entail.
Moreover, attaching too much significance to titles
would risk privileging
religious traditions with formal organizational
structures over those that are
less formal. For related reasons, the academic
requirements of a position
may show that the church in question regards the
position as having an
important responsibility in elucidating or teaching the
tenets of the faith.
Presumably the purpose of such requirements is to make
sure that the person
holding the position understands the faith and can
explain it accurately and
effectively. But insisting in every case on rigid
academic requirements could
have a distorting effect. This is certainly true with
respect to teachers.
Teaching children in an elementary school does not
demand the same formal
religious education as teaching theology to divinity
students. Elementary
school teachers often teach secular subjects in which
they have little if any
special training. In addition, religious traditions may
differ in the degree of
formal religious training thought to be needed in order
to teach. In short,
these circumstances, while instructive in Hosanna-Tabor,
are not inflexible
requirements and may have far less significance in some
cases. What matters, at bottom, is what an
employee does. And
implicit in our decision in Hosanna-Tabor was a
recognition that educating
young people in their faith, inculcating its teachings,
and training them to
live their faith are responsibilities that lie at the
very core of the mission
of a private religious school. As we put it, Perich had
been entrusted with the
responsibility of “transmitting the Lutheran faith to
the next generation.” One
of the concurrences made the same point, concluding that
the exception should
include “any ‘employee’ who leads a religious
organization, conducts worship
services or important religious ceremonies or rituals,
or serves as a messenger
or teacher of its faith.” Religious education is vital to many
faiths practiced in the
United States. This point is stressed by briefs filed in
support of OLG and St.
James by groups affiliated with a wide array of faith
traditions. In the
Catholic tradition, religious education is “‘intimately
bound up with the whole
of the Church’s life.’ ” Under canon law, local bishops
must satisfy themselves
that “those who are designated teachers of religious
instruction in schools . .
. are outstanding in correct doctrine, the witness of a
Christian life, and
teaching skill.” When we apply this understanding of
the Religion Clauses to
the cases now before us, it is apparent that
Morrissey-Berru and Biel qualify
for the exemption we recognized in Hosanna-Tabor. There
is abundant record
evidence that they both performed vital religious
duties. Educating and forming
students in the Catholic faith lay at the core of the
mission of the schools
where they taught, and their employment agreements and
faculty handbooks
specified in no uncertain terms that they were expected
to help the schools
carry out this mission and that their work would be
evaluated to ensure that
they were fulfilling that responsibility. As elementary
school teachers
responsible for providing instruction in all subjects,
including religion, they
were the members of the school staff who were entrusted
most directly with the
responsibility of educating their students in the faith.
And not only were they
obligated to provide instruction about the Catholic
faith, but they were also
expected to guide their students, by word and deed,
toward the goal of living
their lives in accordance with the faith. They prayed
with their students,
attended Mass with the students, and prepared the
children for their
participation in other religious activities. Their
positions did not have all
the attributes of Perich’s. Their titles did not include
the term “minister,”
and they had less formal religious training, but their
core responsibilities as
teachers of religion were essentially the same. And both
their schools
expressly saw them as playing a vital part in carrying
out the mission of the
church, and the schools’ definition and explanation of
their roles is
important. In a country with the religious diversity of
the United States,
judges cannot be expected to have a complete
understanding and appreciation of
the role played by every person who performs a
particular role in every
religious tradition. A religious institution’s
explanation of the role of such
employees in the life of the religion in question is
important. Respondents argue that
Morrissey-Berru cannot fall within
the Hosanna-Tabor exception because she said in
connection with her lawsuit
that she was not “a practicing Catholic,” but acceptance
of that argument would
require courts to delve into the sensitive question of
what it means to be a
“practicing” member of a faith, and religious employers
would be put in an
impossible position. Morrissey-Berru’s employment
agreements required her to
attest to “good standing” with the church. Beyond
insisting on such an
attestation, it is not clear how religious groups could
monitor whether an
employee is abiding by all religious obligations when
away from the job. Was
OLG supposed to interrogate Morrissey-Berru to confirm
that she attended Mass
every Sunday? Respondents argue that the
Hosanna-Tabor exception is not workable
unless it is given a rigid structure, but we declined to
adopt a “rigid
formula” in Hosanna-Tabor, and the lower courts have
been applying the
exception for many years without such a formula. Here,
as in Hosanna-Tabor, it
is sufficient to decide the cases before us. When a
school with a religious
mission entrusts a teacher with the responsibility of
educating and forming
students in the faith, judicial intervention into
disputes between the school
and the teacher threatens the school’s independence in a
way that the First
Amendment does not allow. |