State of
Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram F. Supp.
1208 (D. Or. 1984) October 12,
1984
FRYE, Judge: Defendants have moved the court
to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. In ruling on a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a
claim, the court must assume the allegations of the
complaint to be true and
construe the allegations in favor of the plaintiff. In
general, "a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state
a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief." In its complaint, the State of
Oregon seeks a declaratory
judgment: 1. Declaring that the State of
Oregon is not required by
state law to recognize the municipal status of the
City of Rajneeshpuram
because to do so would violate the religion clauses of
the Oregon and United
States Constitutions. 2. Declaring that the State of
Oregon is not required to pay
public monies or provide public services to the City
of Rajneeshpuram ...
because to do so would violate the religion clauses of
the Oregon and United
States Constitutions. 3. Declaring the Proclamation of
Incorporation issued by
Wasco County on May 26, 1982, is null and void. 4. Granting such other and
further relief as the court may
deem just and proper. The basis for the State of
Oregon's request for such a
declaration is stated in paragraph A.4. of its
complaint: The
unique and pervasive interrelationship of
the City of Rajneeshpuram with corporate entities
created for and dedicated to
the advancement of a particular religion, i.e.,
Rajneeshism, raises fundamental
questions as to whether it would violate Article I,
sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of
the Oregon Constitution and the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution, for the State of
Oregon to recognize the City
of Rajneeshpuram as a valid municipal corporation and
to accord to it the
various benefits and powers, including the payment of
revenue sharing monies,
as provided by state law. The particular factual
allegations supporting this assertion
are as follows: The City of Rajneeshpuram is a
municipal corporation located
in Wasco County, Oregon. The City was incorporated by
a Proclamation of
Incorporation on May 26, 1982, following a unanimous
vote of 154 electors.
Later a city council was elected, a city government
organized, and a city
charter enacted. The City is comprised of three
separate parcels of land and a
county road connecting the parcels. An additional
parcel was later added by
annexation, which is being challenged in other
litigation. The City is located
entirely within the confines of Rancho Rajneesh, a
64,229 acre parcel
controlled by Rajneesh Foundation International (RFI).
The only public
thoroughfare and the only publicly owned property
within Rancho Rajneesh and
the City is a county road. RFI is a nonprofit religious
corporation organized to
advance the teachings of the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh.
The followers of the
Bhagwan assert that he is an enlightened religious
master. RFI is a part of the
organizational structure through which the followers
of the Bhagwan practice
their religion. The Rajneesh Investment Corporation
(RIC) is a for-profit
Oregon corporation. RIC was capitalized in December,
1981, by a transfer of the
Rancho Rajneesh real property from RFI to RIC in
exchange for stock. All of the
stock in RIC is owned by RFI. RIC is the sole owner of
Rancho Rajneesh,
including all of the real property within the City of
Rajneeshpuram, except the
county road. All of the officers and directors of RIC
are followers of the
Bhagwan. The Rajneesh Neo-Sannyas International
Commune ("the
Commune") is a corporation organized under Oregon's
Co-operative
Corporations Act and does not issue stock. The Commune was incorporated in
December, 1981. The purpose
of the Commune, according to its articles of
incorporation, is "... to be
a religious community where life is, in every respect,
guided by the religious
teachings of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh and whose members
live a communal life with
a common treasury ...." The Commune is governed by a
Board of Directors,
of which the personal secretary to the Bhagwan, Ma
Anand Sheela, is an ex
officio member. All members of the Commune are
followers of the Bhagwan.
Applications for membership in the Commune are
considered by the Board of
Directors, but no one may be admitted as a member
without the approval of Ma
Anand Sheela. The Commune holds a long-term
leasehold on Rancho Rajneesh,
including all of the real property within the City of
Rajneeshpuram, except the
county road. All of the City of Rajneeshpuram's real
property and offices are
subleased or otherwise made available to the City by
the Commune. Ma Anand Sheela is the President
of RFI. She is a member of
the Board of Directors of RIC. She holds an unlimited
general power of attorney
from the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh. She is married to
Swami Prem Jayananda, who is
the President and a member of the Board of Directors
of RIC. He is "senior
executive" of the Commune and has served as police
commissioner for the
City of Rajneeshpuram. Because of the
interrelationship of the religious and
for profit corporations that own and control all of
the real property within
the City of Rajneeshpuram, the sovereign power
exercised by the City is subject
to the actual, direct control of an organized religion
and its leaders. The Commune, lessee of all real
property in Rajneeshpuram,
is dedicated to creating and maintaining a religious
community guided by the
teachings of the Bhagwan. Because of the Commune's
control over all real
property in and around the City, no person may reside
in Rajneeshpuram without
the consent of the Commune and Ma Anand Sheela. All
residents of Rajneeshpuram
are either members or invitees of the Commune. The
Commune possesses and has
exercised substantial and direct control over visitor
access to Rajneeshpuram.
Only a small portion of Rajneeshpuram is accessible by
the county road. Most of
the City, including City Hall, is accessible only by
means of roads controlled
by the Commune. Visitors to the City are asked to
check in at a visitor's
center and have been required to obtain a visitor's
pass as a condition to access
to facilities (other than City Hall) not located
directly on the county road
right-of-way. Some visitors have been searched as a
condition of entry to the
City. The followers of the Bhagwan
assert that the development of
Rajneeshpuram is the fulfillment of a religious
vision. Work of every kind is
considered a form of worship. Work stations are called
"temples" and
various City functions are designated as temples and
supervised by the Commune.
The primary purpose for establishing the City of
Rajneeshpuram was to advance
the religion of Rajneeshism. The City was founded to
fulfil a religious vision.
The City was designed and functions as a spiritual
mecca for followers of the
Bhagwan worldwide. It serves as a monument to and the
residence of the Bhagwan,
and as a gathering place for followers at institutions
of religious training
and at three annual religious festivals. For purposes of the motion to
dismiss, the court assumes
that the above allegations are true. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS The first amendment to the
United States Constitution
provides in part that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof...."
The issue which this court will address is whether,
assuming the allegations of
the complaint are true, the Establishment Clause of
the first amendment to the
United States Constitution is violated by the
operation and existence of the
City of Rajneeshpuram as a sovereign municipal
government, validated and
supported by the State of Oregon as otherwise required
by state law. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court
explained the nature of the
Establishment Clause and set out the test as follows:
The language of the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is at best
opaque, particularly when
compared with other portions of the Amendment. Its
authors did not simply
prohibit the establishment of a state church or a
state religion, an area
history shows they regarded as very important and
fraught with great dangers.
Instead they commanded that there should be "no law
respecting an
establishment of religion." A law may be one
"respecting" the
forbidden objective while falling short of its total
realization. A law
"respecting" the proscribed result, that is, the
establishment of
religion, is not always easily identifiable as one
violative of the Clause. A
given law might not establish a state religion but
nevertheless be one
"respecting" that end in the sense of being a step
that could lead to
such establishment and hence offend the First
Amendment. In
the absence of
precisely stated constitutional prohibitions, we must
draw lines with reference
to the three main evils against which the
Establishment Clause was intended to
afford protection: "sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement
of the sovereign in religious activity." Every analysis in this area must
begin with consideration of
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over
many years. Three such
tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the
statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster
"an excessive government entanglement with religion."
Defendants' first argument in
support of their motion to
dismiss is that the State of Oregon cannot prevail
because in the present case
there is no governmental "act" to which the Lemon
tests can be
applied. Defendants contend that all of the
allegations contained in the
State's complaint involve merely private acts that,
taken individually, are
lawful and constitutionally protected, such as forming
the defendant
corporations and associating for the purpose of
practicing a religion.
Defendants contend that the only governmental acts
alleged by plaintiff are the
acts of City of Rajneeshpuram officials meeting with
religious leaders to plan
religious functions around the City. Defendants argue
that these are not the
types of acts with which the Establishment Clause
deals, and are "a
legitimate, neutral function of government" permitted
under Lemon. The State of Oregon argues,
however, that, taking all of the
allegations of its complaint together, recognition of
the municipal status of
the City of Rajneeshpuram constitutes the
establishment of a theocracy--that
is, the granting of governmental power to a religion.
The governmental acts
forming the basis of the alleged Establishment Clause
violation, the State of
Oregon argues, are not those of the private defendants
or restricted to those
of the City of Rajneeshpuram itself. Rather, Wasco
County's "act" in
granting the City of Rajneeshpuram municipal status,
and the State of Oregon's
"acts" in bestowing on the City of Rajneeshpuram the
incidents of
municipal status. For the purpose of ruling upon
this motion to dismiss, the
court adopts the State of Oregon's characterization of
its allegations. The
court deems that the governmental acts alleged are
those of the State of Oregon
and Wasco County, through the operation of state law,
in imparting sovereign
municipal status to the City of Rajneeshpuram and the
acts of the City of
Rajneeshpuram itself in using those powers. The
private defendants' individual
corporate and religious activities are not the acts
upon which the State's
claim is based. However, allegations of the private
defendants' individual, corporate,
and religious activities are necessary allegations in
support of the State of
Oregon's claim that granting municipal power and
status to the City of
Rajneeshpuram gives sovereign governmental power to a
religion and its leaders. Defendants next argue in support
of their motion to dismiss
the State of Oregon's complaint that governments do
not violate the
Establishment Clause simply by doing acts that
incidentally benefit religion,
so long as the acts have a secular purpose and the
non-secular benefit to
religion is remote, indirect, and incidental. For
example, defendants point out
that (1) it is not unconstitutional for a government
to give police, fire, or
other public services to a church in the same manner
as it provides such
services to other citizens; (2) that the operation of
an otherwise lawfully
incorporated city does not violate the Establishment
Clause simply because the
population of the city is composed of members of one
religious faith; and (3)
that many cities in the United States were established
by adherents of one
particular religious faith. Defendants' final argument is
that the first amendment not
only prohibits governmental establishment of religion,
but also restricts
governments from prohibiting the free exercise of
religion and the right to
free association. Defendants contend that if they are
not allowed to
incorporate and to operate the City of Rajneeshpuram,
their own first amendment
rights to practice religion and to associate freely
will be violated. The State of Oregon does not
quarrel with these premises
articulated by defendants, but rather argues that the
particular factual
situation alleged is so extreme as to permit a finding
that the existence and
operation of the City of Rajneeshpuram is
unconstitutional. The State of
Oregon's main argument is that it is unconstitutional
to give municipal power
and status to a city (1) in which all land is subject
to the control of a
religious corporation, (2) in which residency is
controlled by a religious
corporation and limited to followers of that religion
or their guests, and (3)
whose raison d'etre is the practice and advancement of
a particular religion.
Under such facts, the State of Oregon argues, giving
the City of Rajneeshpuram
municipal status and power is the same as giving
municipal status and power to
a religion, and that a clearer example of
establishment of religion could not
be imagined. The State of Oregon argues that
denying municipal status to
the City of Rajneeshpuram would not interfere with
defendants' rights to practice
religion, or to associate freely, or to have access to
public services. If the
City of Rajneeshpuram did not exist, the State of
Oregon argues, defendants
could still practice their religion and freely
associate; the only difference
would be that public services would be provided by
Wasco County rather than by
the City of Rajneeshpuram. Undoubtedly there is an inherent
tension between the
Establishment Clause on the one hand, and the Free
Exercise Clause on the
other. A review of the cases indicates that there is
no precise legal
formulation for the court to follow in determining
whether under the facts as
alleged by the State of Oregon the existence and
operation of the City of
Rajneeshpuram is an unconstitutional establishment of
religion, or whether on
the other hand, not allowing the City of Rajneeshpuram
to exist would violate
defendants' rights to freely practice their religion.
No federal case has
addressed the precise situation present in this case. The State relies heavily on
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459
U.S. 116 (1982). There, the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a Massachusetts
statute giving churches a discretionary power to veto
liquor license
applications of premises within five hundred feet of
the church. The court held
that the statute failed both the "primary effect" and
"excessive
entanglement" tests of Lemon. Turning to the third phase of
the inquiry called for by
Lemon v. Kurtzman, we see that we have not previously
had occasion to consider
the entanglement implications of a statute vesting
significant governmental
authority in churches. . . . In the present case,
assuming as true the facts
alleged by the State of Oregon, the existence and
operation of the City of
Rajneeshpuram impacts a number of the Grendel's Den
concerns. The existence of
the City of Rajneeshpuram gives the appearance of a
joint exercise of
legislative authority by church and state. Religious
organizations control or
own all real property within the City of
Rajneeshpuram. The potential for
religious-secular conflict with respect to actions of
the City is inherent.
Finally, the nature and extent of potential or actual
control by religion over
the government of the City raises serious entanglement
problems. Defendants argue that the Free
Exercise Clause of the first
amendment requires that the existence and operation of
the City of
Rajneeshpuram be allowed to continue. Otherwise,
defendants argue, they will be
denied benefits flowing from the incorporation and
operation of the City of
Rajneeshpuram ordinarily available to them as citizens
solely because of their
religious beliefs, a result forbidden by the Free
Exercise Clause. Defendants rely in part on
Thomas v. Review Board of the
Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707
(1981), and Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). As the Supreme Court has
stated: Where the state
conditions receipt of an important benefit ... or
where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious
belief, thereby putting
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his
beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the
compulsion may be indirect,
the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless
substantial. CONCLUSIONS AND RULING If the facts alleged in the
State of Oregon's complaint are
true, the court concludes that the potential injury to
the anti-establishment
principle of the first amendment by the existence and
the operation of the City
of Rajneeshpuram clearly outweighs the potential harm
to defendants' free
exercise of religion rights. To deny defendants the
right to operate a city is
the only means of achieving a compelling state and
federal interest that of
avoiding an establishment of religion. If the City of
Rajneeshpuram were to
cease to exist, defendants would not be precluded from
practicing their
religion nor from associating with whom they choose in
order to do so.
Defendants would not be denied access to public
services. Public services would
be provided by Wasco County. In short, although
defendants' freedom to freely
practice their religion would be burdened if the City
of Rajneeshpuram were no
longer recognized as a city, the burden upon them is
small and indirect
compared to the harm to be done to the Establishment
Clause by allowing the
City of Rajneeshpuram to operate as a city. Furthermore, if the facts
alleged in the State of Oregon's
complaint are true that (1) there is a close
interrelationship between various
defendant religious organizations; (2) these
organizations control all of the
real property within the City of Rajneeshpuram; and
(3) these religious
organizations control who may and may not reside
within the City of
Rajneeshpuram, then the court could conclude that the
exercise of control over
the City of Rajneeshpuram by these religious
organizations is different enough
from the control exercised by the religious leaders in
a city of private
landowners of one religion as to allow a
constitutional distinction to be made
between the two situations. Similarly, there is a difference
between the effect on and
benefit to religion of the provision of ordinary
municipal services to a city
of private landowners of one religion and to the City
of Rajneeshpuram, where
the land is communally owned and controlled by
religious organizations. The
provision of services by a municipal government in a
city whose residents are
private landowners of one religious faith has the
direct and primary effect of
aiding the individual landowners and residents living
in the city. The effect
on the religion of those private landowners is remote,
indirect, and
incidental. In contrast, if, as alleged, all of the
real property in the City
of Rajneeshpuram is owned or controlled by religious
organizations, the
provision of municipal services by the City of
Rajneeshpuram necessarily has the
effect of aiding not only the individual residents of
the City of
Rajneeshpuram, but also of directly, obviously, and
immediately benefitting the
religious organizations themselves. Given the facts as alleged by
the State of Oregon, the court
could conclude that the acts of the State of Oregon
and Wasco County in
recognizing the existence and operation of the City of
Rajneeshpuram have as a
principal and primary effect the advancement of the
religion of Rajneeshism.
Finally, given the alleged power and control of
religious organizations and
leaders over all real property and residency within
the City of Rajneeshpuram,
the court could conclude that the existence and
operation of the City of
Rajneeshpuram would represent "an excessive government
entanglement with
religion." IT IS ORDERED that defendants'
motion to dismiss is DENIED. |