Debates Concerning the Method of Selecting the Executive, 1787
Notes of James Madison

June 1, 1787:
The next clause in Resolution 7,relating to the mode of appointing, & the duration of, the Executive being under consideration,

          Mr. WILSON said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he wished to take place,
    being apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He would say however at least that in theory he was
    for an election by the people. Experience, particularly in N. York & Massts., shewed that an election of
    the first magistrate by the people at large, was both a convenient & successful mode. The objects of
    choice in such cases must be persons whose merits have general notoriety.

         Mr. SHERMAN was for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making him absolutely
    dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which was to be executed. An independence of the
    Executive on the supreme Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there was any
    such thing....

          Mr. WILSON renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the people. He wished to
    derive not only both branches of the Legislature from the people, without the intervention of the State
    Legislatures but the Executive also; in order to make them as independent as possible of each other, as
    well as of the States;

        Col. MASON favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He wishes however that Mr. Wilson
    might have time to digest it into his own form.-the clause "to be chosen by the National Legislature"-was
    accordingly postponed.-

        Mr. RUTLIDGE suggests an election of the Executive by the second branch only of the national
    Legislature.

         The Committee then rose and the House Adjourned.

July 17

9th Resol: "that Natl. Executive consist of a single person." Agd. to nem. con.

       "To be chosen by the National Legisl:"

          Mr. GOVERNR. MORRIS was pointedly agst. his being so chosen. He will be the mere creature
    of the Legisl: if appointed & impeachable by that body. He ought to be elected by the people at large, by
    the freeholders of the Country. That difficulties attend this mode, he admits. But they have been found
    superable in N. Y. & in Cont. and would he believed be found so, in the case of an Executive for the U.
    States. If the people should elect, they will never fail to prefer some man of distinguished character, or
    services; some man, if he might so speak, of continental reputation. -If the Legislature elect, it will be
    the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction; it will be like the election of a pope by a conclave of
    cardinals; real merit will rarely be the title to the appointment. He moved to strike out "National
    Legislature" & insert "citizens of U.S."

           Mr. SHERMAN thought that the sense of the Nation would be better expressed by the
    Legislature, than by the people at large. The latter will never be sufficiently informed of characters, and
    besides will never give a majority of votes to any one man. They will generally vote for some man in
    their own State, and the largest State will have the best chance for the appointment. If the choice be
    made by the Legislre. A majority of voices may be made necessary to constitute an election.

          Mr. WILSON. two arguments have been urged agnt. an election of the Executive Magistrate by the
    people. I  the example of Poland where an Election of the supreme Magistrate is attended with
    the most dangerous commotions. The cases he observed were totally dissimilar. The Polish nobles have
    resources & dependents which enable them to appear in force, and to threaten the Republic as well as
    each other. In the next place the electors all assemble in one place: which would not be the case
    with us. The 2d. argt. is that a majority of the people would never concur. It might be answered
    that the concurrence of a majority of people is not a necessary principle of election, nor
    required as such in any of the States. But allowing the objection all its force, it may be obviated by the
    expedient used in Masts. where the Legislature by majority of voices, decide in case a majority
    of people do not concur in favor of one of the candidates. This would restrain the choice to a good
    nomination at least, and prevent in a great degree intrigue & cabal. A particular objection with him agst.
    an absolute election by the Legislre. was that the Exec: in that case would be too dependent to stand the
    mediator between the intrigues & sinister views of the Representatives and the general liberties &
    interests of the people.

          Mr. PINKNEY did not expect this question would again have been brought forward; An Election
    by the people being liable to the most obvious & striking objections. They will be led by a few active &
    designing men. The most populous States by combining in favor of the same individual will be able to
    carry their points. The Natl. Legislature being most immediately interested in the laws made by
    themselves, will be most attentive to the choice of a fit man to carry them properly into execution.

          Mr. Govr. MORRIS. It is said that in case of an election by the people the populous States will
    combine & elect whom they please. Just the reverse. The people of such States cannot combine. If their
    be any combination it must be among their representatives in the Legislature. It is said the people will be
    led by a few designing men. This might happen in a small district. It can never happen throughout the
    continent. In the election of a Govr. of N. York, it sometimes is the case in particular spots, that the
    activity & intrigues of little partizans are successful, but the general voice of the State is never
    influenced by such artifices. It is said the multitude will be uninformed. It is true they would be
    uninformed of what passed in the Legislative Conclave, if the election were to be made there; but they
    will not be uninformed of those great & illustrious characters which have merited their esteem &
    confidence. If the Executive be chosen by the Natl. Legislature, he will not be independent on [FN27] it;
    and if not independent, usurpation & tyranny on the part of the Legislature will be the consequence. This
    was the case in England in the last Century. It has been the case in Holland, where their Senates have
    engrossed all power. It has been the case every where. He was surprised that an election by the people at
    large should ever have been likened to the polish election of the first Magistrate. An election by the
    Legislature will bear a real likeness to the election by the Diet of Poland. The great must be the electors
    in both cases, and the corruption & cabal wch. are known to characterise the one would soon find their
    way into the other. Appointments made by numerous bodies, are always worse than those made by single
    responsible individuals, or by the people at large.

           Col. MASON. It is curious to remark the different language held at different times. At one
    moment we are told that the Legislature is entitled to thorough confidence, and to indifinite power. At
    another, that it will be governed by intrigue & corruption, and cannot be trusted at all. But not to dwell
    on this inconsistency he would observe that a Government which is to last ought at least to be
    practicable. Would this be the case if the proposed election should be left to the people at large. He
    conceived it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for chief Magistrate to the
    people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours to a blind man. The extent of the Country renders it
    impossible that the people can have the requisite capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of the
    Candidates.

         Mr. WILSON. could not see the contrariety stated [by Col. Mason] The Legislre. might deserve
    confidence in some respects, and distrust in others. In acts which were to affect them & yr. Constituents
    precisely alike confidence was due. In others jealousy was warranted. The appointment to great offices,
    where the Legislre. might feel many motives, not common to the public confidence was surely
    misplaced. This branch of business it was notorious was  most corruptly managed of any that had
    been committed to legislative bodies.

         Mr. WILLIAMSON, conceived that there was the same difference between an election in this
    case, by the people and by the legislature, as between an appt. by lot, and by choice. There are at present
    distinguished characters, who are known perhaps to almost every man. This will not always be the case.
    The people will be sure to vote for some man in their own State, and the largest State will be sure to
    succeed. This will not be Virga. however. Her slaves will have no suffrage. As the Salary of the
    Executive will be fixed, and he will not be eligible a 2d. time, there will not be such a dependence on the
    Legislature as has been imagined.

         Question on an election by the people instead of the Legislature; which passed in
    the negative.

         Mas. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.C. no. S.C.no. Geo.no.

         Mr. L. MARTIN moved that the Executive be chosen by Electors appointed by the several
    Legislatures of the individual States.

         Mr. BROOME 2ds. On the Question, it passed in the negative.

         Mas. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.C.no. S.C.no. Geo.no.

         On the question on the words "to be chosen by the Nationl. Legislature" it passed unanimously in
    the affirmative.

July 19, 1787

           Mr. GOVERNEUR MORRIS. It is necessary to take into one view all that relates to the
    establishment of the Executive; on the due formation of which must depend the efficacy & utility of the
    Union among the present and future States. It has been a maxim in Political Science that Republican
    Government is not adapted to a large extent of Country, because the energy of the Executive Magistracy
    can not reach the extreme parts of it. Our Country is an extensive one. We must either then renounce the
    blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive with sufficient vigor to pervade every part of it. This
    subject was of so much importance that he hoped to be indulged in an extensive view of it. One great
    object of the Executive is to controul the Legislature. The Legislature will continually seek to
    aggrandize & perpetuate themselves; and will seize those critical moments produced by war, invasion or
    convulsion for that purpose. It is necessary then that the Executive Magistrate should be the guardian of
    the people, even of the lower classes, agst. Legislative tyranny, against the Great & the wealthy who in
    the course of things will necessarily compose the Legislative body. Wealth tends to corrupt the mind &
    to nourish its love of power, and to stimulate it to oppression. History proves this to be the spirit
    of the opulent. The check provided in the 2d. branch was not meant as a check on Legislative usurpations
    of power, but on the abuse of lawful powers, on the propensity in the 1st. branch to legislate too
    much to run into projects of paper money & similar expedients. It is no check on Legislative tyranny.
    On the contrary it may favor it, and if the 1st. branch can be seduced may find the means of success. The
    Executive therefore ought to be so constituted as to be the great protector of the Mass of the people. -It
    is the duty of the Executive to appoint the officers & to command the forces of the Republic: to appoint
    1. ministerial officers for the administration of public affairs. 2. officers for the
    dispensation of Justice. Who will be the best Judges whether these appointments be well made? The
    people at large, who will know, will see, will feel the effects of them. Again who can judge so well of
    the discharge of military duties for the protection & security of the people, as the people themselves
    who are to be protected & secured? -He finds too that the Executive is not to be re-eligible. What effect
    will this have?

            Mr. RANDOLPH  thought an election by the Legislature with an incapacity to be elected a
    second time would be more acceptable to the people that the plan suggested by Mr. Govr.
    Morris.

           Mr. KING. did not like the ineligibility. He thought there was great force in the remark [FN8] of
    Mr. Sherman, that he who has proved himself to be [FN9] most fit for an Office, ought not to be
    excluded by the constitution from holding it. He would therefore prefer any other reasonable plan that
    could be substituted. He was much disposed to think that in such cases the people at large would chuse
    wisely. There was indeed some difficulty arising from the improbability of a general concurrence of the
    people in favor of any one man. On the whole he was of opinion that an appointment by electors chosen
    by the people for the purpose, would be liable to fewest objections.

         Mr. PATTERSON's ideas nearly coincided he said with those of Mr. King. He proposed that the
    Executive should be appointed by Electors to be chosen by the States in a ratio that would allow one
    elector to the smallest and three to the largest States. Mr. WILSON. It seems to be the unanimous sense
    that the Executive should not be appointed by the Legislature, unless he be rendered in-eligible a 2d.
    time: he perceived with pleasure that the idea was gaining ground, of an election mediately or
    immediately by the people.

         Mr. MADISON. If it be a fundamental principle of free Govt. that the Legislative, Executive &
    Judiciary powers should be separately exercised, it is equally so that they be independently exercised.
    There is the same & perhaps greater reason why the Executive shd. be independent of the Legislature,
    than why the Judiciary should: A coalition of the two former powers would be more immediately &
    certainly dangerous to public liberty. It is essential then that the appointment of the Executive should
    either be drawn from some source, or held by some tenure, that will give him a free agency with regard
    to the Legislature. This could not be if he was to be appointable from time to time by the Legislature. It
    was not clear that an appointment in the 1st. instance even with an eligibility afterwards would not
    establish an improper connection between the two departments. Certain it was that the appointment
    would be attended with intrigues and contentions that ought not to be unnecessarily admitted. He was
    disposed for these reasons to refer the appointment to some other source. The people at large was in his
    opinion the fittest in itself. It would be as likely as any that could be devised to produce an Executive
    Magistrate of distinguished Character. The people generally could only know & vote for some Citizen
    whose merits had rendered him an object of general attention & esteem. There was one difficulty
    however of a serious nature attending an immediate choice by the people. The right of suffrage was
    much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could have no influence in
    the election on the score of the Negroes. The substitution of electors obviated this difficulty and
    seemed on the whole to be liable to fewest objections.

         Mr. GERRY. If the Executive is to be elected by the Legislature he certainly ought not to be
    re-eligible. This would make him absolutely dependent. He was agst. a popular election. The people are
    uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing men. He urged the expediency of an appointment of
    the Executive by Electors to be chosen by the State Executives. The people of the States will then
    choose the 1st. branch: The legislatures of the States the 2d. branch of the National Legislature, and the
    Executives of the States, the National Executive. This he thought would form a strong attachnt. in the
    States to the National System. The popular mode of electing the chief Magistrate would certainly be the
    worst of all. If he should be so elected & should do his duty, he will be turned out for it like Govr.
    Bowdoin in Massts. & President Sullivan in N. Hamshire.

         On the question on Mr. Govr. Morris motion to reconsider generally the constitution of the
    Executive. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay & all the others ay.

         Mr. ELSEWORTH moved to strike out the appointmt. by the Natl. Legislature, and insert
    "to be chosen by electors appointed, by the Legislatures of the States in the following ratio; towit-one
    for each State not exceeding 200,000 inhabts. two for each above yt. number & not exceeding 300,000.
    and three for each State exceeding 300,000.

         Mr. BROOME 2ded. the motion

         Mr. RUTLIDGE was opposed to all the modes except the appointmt. by the Natl. Legislature. He
    will be sufficiently independent, if he be not re-eligible.

         Mr. GERRY preferred the motion of Mr. Elseworth to an appointmt. by the Natl. Legislature, or
    by the people; tho' not to an appt. by the State Executives. He moved that the electors proposed by Mr.
    E. should be 25 in number, and allotted in the following proportion. to N. H. 1. to Mas. 3. to R. I. 1. to
    Cont. 2. to N. Y. 2.  N. J. 2. Pa. 3. Del. 1. Md. 2.  Va. 3.  N. C. 2. S. C. 2. Geo. 1.

         The question as moved by Mr. Elseworth being divided, on the 1st. part shall ye. Natl. Executive be
    appointed by Electors? Mas. divd. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
    Geo. no.

         On  2d. part shall the Electors be chosen by  State Legislatures? Mas. ay. Cont. ay.
    N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

        The part relating to the ratio in which the States sd. chuse electors was postponed nem. con. 

         Mr. ELSEWORTH supposed any persons might be appointed Electors, excepting solely,
    members of the Natl. Legislature.

September 4, 1787

Mr. BREARLY from the Committee of eleven made a further partial Report as follows....

    (4) After the word 'Excellency' in sect. 1. art. 10. to be inserted. 'He shall hold his office during
    the term of four years, and together with the vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected in the
    following manner, viz. Each State shall appoint in such manner as its Legislature may direct, a number of
    electors equal to the whole number of Senators and members of the House of Representatives to which
    the State may be entitled in the Legislature. The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote
    by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with
    themselves; and they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each,
    which list they shall sign and certify and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Genl. Government, directed
    to the President of the Senate-The President of the Senate shall in that House open all the certificates;
    and the votes shall be then & there counted. The Person having the greatest number of votes shall be the
    President, if such number be a majority of that of the electors; and if there be more than one who have
    such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the Senate shall immediately choose by ballot
    one of them for President: but if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list, the
    Senate shall choose by ballot the President. And in every case after the choice of the President, the
    person having the greatest number of votes shall be vice- president: but if there should remain two or
    more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them the vice-President. The Legislature may
    determine the time of choosing and assembling the Electors, and the manner of certifying and
    transmitting their votes....'

         The (4) clause was accordingly taken up.

         Mr. GORHAM disapproved of making the next highest after the President, the vice-President,
    without referring the decision to the Senate in case the next highest should have less than a majority of
    votes. as the regulation stands a very obscure man with very few votes may arrive at that appointment

         Mr. SHERMAN said the object of this clause of the report of the Committee was to get rid of the
    ineligibility, which was attached to the mode of election by the Legislature, & to render the Executive
    independent of the Legislature. As the choice of the President was to be made out of the five highest,
    obscure characters were sufficiently guarded against in that case; and he had no objection to requiring
    the vice-President to be chosen in like manner, where the choice was not decided by a majority in the
    first instance

         Mr. MADISON was apprehensive that by requiring both the President & vice President to be
    chosen out of the five highest candidates, the attention of the electors would be turned too much to
    making candidates instead of giving their votes in order to a definitive choice. Should this turn be given
    to the business, the election would, in fact be consigned to the Senate altogether. It would have the
    effect at the same time, he observed, of giving the nomination of the candidates to the largest States.

         Mr. Govr. MORRIS concurred in, & enforced the remarks of Mr. Madison.

         Mr. RANDOLPH & Mr. PINKNEY wished for a particular explanation & discussion of the
    reasons for changing the mode of electing the Executive.

         Mr. Govr. MORRIS said he would give the reasons of the Committee and his own. The 1st. was
    the danger of intrigue & faction if the appointmt. should be made by the Legislature. 2. the
    inconveniency of an ineligibility required by that mode in order to lessen its evils. 3. The
    difficulty of establishing a Court of Impeachments, other than the Senate which would not be so proper
    for the trial nor the other branch for the impeachment of the President, if appointed by the Legislature,
    4. No body had appeared to be satisfied with an appointment by the Legislature. 5. Many
    were anxious even for an immediate choice by the people. 6. the indispensible necessity of
    making the Executive independent of the Legislature. -As the Electors would vote at the same time
    throughout the U. S. and at so great a distance from each other, the great evil of cabal was avoided. It
    would be impossible also to corrupt them. A conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the
    Supreme Court the Judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the President after the trial of
    the impeachment.

         Col: MASON confessed that the plan of the Committee had removed some capital objections,
    particularly the danger of cabal and corruption. It was liable however to this strong objection, that
    nineteen times in twenty the President would be chosen by the Senate, an improper body for the purpose

         Mr. BUTLER thought the mode not free from objections, but much more so than an election by
    the Legislature, where as in elective monarchies, cabal faction & violence would be sure to prevail.

         Mr. PINKNEY stated as objections to the mode 1. that it threw the whole appointment in
    fact into the hands of the Senate. 2. The Electors will be strangers to the several candidates and
    of course unable to decide on their comparative merits. 3. It makes the Executive reeligible
    which will endanger the public liberty. 4. It makes the same body of men which will in fact elect
    the President his Judges in case of an impeachment.

         Mr. WILLIAMSON had great doubts whether the advantage of reeligibility would balance the
    objection to such a dependence of the President on the Senate for his reappointment. He thought at least
    the Senate ought to be restrained to the two highest on the list

         Mr. Govr. MORRIS said the principal advantage aimed at was that of taking away the opportunity
    for cabal. The President may be made if thought necessary ineligible on this as well as on any other
    mode of election. Other inconveniences may be no less redressed on this plan than any other.

         Mr. BALDWIN thought the plan not so objectionable when well considered, as at first view. The
    increasing intercourse among the people of the States, would render important characters less & less
    unknown; and the Senate would consequently be less & less likely to have the eventual appointment
    thrown into their hands.

         Mr. WILSON. This subject has greatly divided the House, and will also divide people out
    of doors. It is in truth the most difficult of all on which we have had to decide. He had never made up an
    opinion on it entirely to his own satisfaction. He thought the plan on the whole a valuable improvement
    on the former. It gets rid of one great evil, that of cabal & corruption; & Continental Characters will
    multiply as we more & more coalesce, so as to enable the electors in every part of the Union to know &
    judge of them. It clears the way also for a discussion of the question of reeligibility on its own merits,
    which the former mode of election seems to forbid. He thought it might be better however to refer the
    eventual appointment to the Legislature than to the Senate, and to confine it to a smaller number than
    five of the Candidates. The eventual election by the Legislature wd. not open cabal anew, as it would be
    restrained to certain designated objects of choice, and as these must have had the previous sanction of a
    number of the States: and if the election be made as it ought as soon as the votes of the electors are
    opened & it is known that no one has a majority of the whole, there can be little danger of corruption.
    Another reason for preferring the Legislature to the Senate in this business, was that the House of Reps.
    will be so often changed as to be free from the influence & faction to which the permanence of the
    Senate may subject that branch.

         Mr. RANDOLPH preferred the former mode of constituting the Executive, but if the change was
    to be made, he wished to know why the eventual election was referred to the Senate and not to the
    Legislature? He saw no necessity for this and many objections to it. He was apprehensive also that the
    advantage of the eventual appointment would fall into the hands of the States near the Seat of
    Government.

         Mr. Govr. MORRIS said the Senate was preferred because fewer could then, say to the
    President, you owe your appointment to us. He thought the President would not depend so much on the
    Senate for his re-appointment as on his general good conduct.

         The further consideration of the Report was postponed that each member might take a copy of the
    remainder of it....

September 5, 1787

The Report made yesterday as to the appointment of the Executive being taken up.

         Mr. PINKNEY renewed his opposition to the mode, arguing 1. that the electors will not
    have sufficient knowledge of the fittest men, & will be swayed by an attachment to the eminent men of
    their respective States. Hence 2dly. the dispersion of the votes would leave the appointment with the
    Senate, and as the President's reappointment will thus depend on the Senate he will be the mere creature
    of that body. 3. He will combine with the Senate agst. the House of Representatives.
    4. This change in the mode of election was meant to get rid of the ineligibility of the President a second
    time, whereby he will become fixed for life under the auspices of the Senate

         Mr. GERRY did not object to this plan of constituting the Executive in itself, but should be
    governed in his final vote by the powers that may be given to the President.

         Mr. RUTLIDGE was much opposed to the plan reported by the Committee. It would throw the
    whole power into the Senate. He was also against a re-eligibility. He moved to postpone the Report
    under consideration & take up the original plan of appointment by the Legislature, to wit. "He shall be
    elected by joint ballot by the Legislature to which election a majority of the votes of the members
    present shall be required: He shall hold his office during the term of seven years; but shall not be
    elected a second time."

         On this motion to postpone

         N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
 

         Col. MASON admitted that there were objections to an appointment by the Legislature as
    originally planned. He had not yet made up his mind, but would state his objections to the mode
    proposed by the Committee. 1. It puts the appointment in fact into the hands of the Senate, as it
    will rarely happen that a majority of the whole votes will fall on any one candidate: and as the Existing
    President will always be one of the 5 highest, his reappointment will of course depend on the Senate. 2.
    Considering the powers of the President & those of the Senate, if a coalition should be
    established between these two branches, they will be able to subvert the Constitution-The great
    objection with him would be removed by depriving the Senate of the eventual election. He accordingly
    moved to strike out the words "if such number be a majority of that of the electors."

         Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded. the motion. He could not agree to the clause without some such
    modification. He preferred making the highest tho' not having a majority of the votes, President, to a
    reference of the matter to the Senate. Referring the appointment to the Senate lays a certain foundation
    for corruption & aristocracy.

         Mr. Govr. MORRIS thought the point of less consequence than it was supposed on both sides. It
    is probable that a majority of votes will fall on the same man. As each elector is to give two votes, more
    than 1/4 will give a majority. Besides as one vote is to be given to a man out of the State, and as this vote
    will not be thrown away, 1/2 the votes will fall on characters eminent & generally known. Again if the
    President shall have given satisfaction, the votes will turn on him of course, and a majority of them will
    reappoint him, without resort to the Senate: If he should be disliked, all disliking him, would take care to
    unite their votes so as to ensure his being supplanted.

         Col. MASON those who think there is no danger of there not being a majority for the same person
    in the first instance, ought to give up the point to those who think otherwise.

         Mr. SHERMAN reminded the opponents of the new mode proposed that if the small states had
    the advantage in the Senate's deciding among the five highest candidates, the large States would have in
    fact the nomination of these candidates

         On the motion of Col: Mason

         N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
    no. 

         Mr. WILSON moved to strike out "Senate" and insert the word "Legislature"

         Mr. MADISON considered it as a primary object to render an eventual resort to any part
    of the Legislature improbable. He was apprehensive that the proposed alteration would turn the attention
    of the large States too much to the appointment of candidates, instead of aiming at an effectual
    appointment of the officer, as the large States would predominate in the Legislature which would have
    the final choice out of the Candidates. Whereas if the Senate in which the small States predominate
    should have this [FN14] final choice, the concerted effort of the large States would be to make the
    appointment in the first instance conclusive.

         Mr. RANDOLPH. We have in some revolutions of this plan made a bold stroke for Monarchy.
    We are now doing the same for an aristocracy. He dwelt on the tendency of such an influence in the
    Senate over the election of the President in addition to its other powers, to convert that body into a real
    & dangerous Aristocracy.

         Mr. DICKINSON was in favor of giving the eventual election to the Legislature, instead of the
    Senate. It was too much influence to be superadded to that body.

         On the question moved by Mr. Wilson

         N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
 

         Mr. MADISON & Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to strike out the word "majority" and insert "one
    third" so that the eventual power might not be exercised if less than a majority, but not less than 1/3 of
    the Electors should vote for the same person.

         Mr. GERRY objected that this would put it in the power of three or four States to put in whom
    they pleased.

         Mr. WILLIAMSON. There are seven States which do not contain one third of the people. If the
    Senate are to appoint, less than one sixth of the people will have the power.

         On the question

         N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
 

         Mr. GERRY suggested that the eventual election should be made by six Senators and seven
    Representatives chosen by joint ballot of both Houses.

         Mr. KING observed that the influence of the Small States in the Senate was somewhat balanced by
    the influence of the large States in bringing forward the candidates; and also by the Concurrence
    of the small States in the Committee in the clause vesting the exclusive origination of Money bills in
    the House of Representatives.

         Col: MASON moved to strike out the word "five" and insert the word "three" as the highest
    candidates for the Senate to choose out of.

         Mr. GERRY 2ded. the motion

         Mr. SHERMAN would sooner give up the plan. He would prefer seven or thirteen.

         On the question moved by Col: Mason & Mr. Gerry

         N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Delaware Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
 

         Mr. SPAIGHT and Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to strike out "five" and insert "thirteen"- to which all
    the States disagreed-except N. C. & S. C.

         Mr. MADISON & Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to insert after "Electors" the words "who shall have
    balloted" so that the non voting electors not being counted might not increase the number necessary as a
    majority of the whole, to decide the choice without the agency of the Senate.

         On this question

         N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
 

         Mr. DICKINSON moved, in order to remove ambiguity from the intention of the clause as
    explained by the vote, to add, after the words "if such number be a majority of the whole number of the
    electors" the word "appointed"

         On this motion

         N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Con: ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Delaware Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
 

         Col: MASON. As the mode of appointment is now regulated, he could not forbear expressing his
    opinion that it is utterly inadmissible. He would prefer the Government of Prussia to one which will put
    all power into the hands of seven or eight men, and fix an Aristocracy worse than absolute monarchy.
    The words "and of their giving their votes" being inserted on motion for that purpose, after the words
    "The Legislature may determine the time of chusing and assembling the electors."

         The House adjourned

September 6, 1787

The Report made yesterday as to the appointment of the Executive being taken up.

         Mr. PINKNEY renewed his opposition to the mode, arguing 1. that the electors will not
    have sufficient knowledge of the fittest men, & will be swayed by an attachment to the eminent men of
    their respective States. Hence 2dly. the dispersion of the votes would leave the appointment with the
    Senate, and as the President's reappointment will thus depend on the Senate he will be the mere creature
    of that body. 3.  He will combine with the Senate agst. the House of Representatives. 4.
    This change in the mode of election was meant to get rid of the ineligibility of the President a second
    time, whereby he will become fixed for life under the auspices of the Senate

         Mr. GERRY did not object to this plan of constituting the Executive in itself, but should be
    governed in his final vote by the powers that may be given to the President.

         Mr. RUTLIDGE was much opposed to the plan reported by the Committee. It would throw the
    whole power into the Senate. He was also against a re-eligibility. He moved to postpone the Report
    under consideration & take up the original plan of appointment by the Legislature, to wit. "He shall be
    elected by joint ballot by the Legislature to which election a majority of the votes of the members
    present shall be required: He shall hold his office during the term of seven years; but shall not be
    elected a second time."

         On this motion to postpone

         N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
 

         Col. MASON admitted that there were objections to an appointment by the Legislature as
    originally planned. He had not yet made up his mind, but would state his objections to the mode
    proposed by the Committee. 1. It puts the appointment in fact into the hands of the Senate, as it
    will rarely happen that a majority of the whole votes will fall on any one candidate: and as the Existing
    President will always be one of the 5 highest, his reappointment will of course depend on the Senate. 2.
    Considering the powers of the President & those of the Senate, if a coalition should be
    established between these two branches, they will be able to subvert the Constitution-The great
    objection with him would be removed by depriving the Senate of the eventual election. He accordingly
    moved to strike out the words "if such number be a majority of that of the electors."

         Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded. the motion. He could not agree to the clause without some such
    modification. He preferred making the highest tho' not having a majority of the votes, President, to a
    reference of the matter to the Senate. Referring the appointment to the Senate lays a certain foundation
    for corruption & aristocracy.

         Mr. Govr. MORRIS thought the point of less consequence than it was supposed on both sides. It
    is probable that a majority of votes will fall on the same man. As each elector is to give two votes, more
    than 1/4 will give a majority. Besides as one vote is to be given to a man out of the State, and as this vote
    will not be thrown away, 1/2 the votes will fall on characters eminent & generally known. Again if the
    President shall have given satisfaction, the votes will turn on him of course, and a majority of them will
    reappoint him, without resort to the Senate: If he should be disliked, all disliking him, would take care to
    unite their votes so as to ensure his being supplanted.

         Col. MASON those who think there is no danger of there not being a majority for the same person
    in the first instance, ought to give up the point to those who think otherwise.

         Mr. SHERMAN reminded the opponents of the new mode proposed that if the small states had
    the advantage in the Senate's deciding among the five highest candidates, the large States would have in
    fact the nomination of these candidates

         On the motion of Col: Mason

         N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
    no.

         Mr. WILSON moved to strike out "Senate" and insert the word "Legislature"

         Mr. MADISON considered it as a primary object to render an eventual resort to any part
    of the Legislature improbable. He was apprehensive that the proposed alteration would turn the attention
    of the large States too much to the appointment of candidates, instead of aiming at an effectual
    appointment of the officer, as the large States would predominate in the Legislature which would have
    the final choice out of the Candidates. Whereas if the Senate in which the small States predominate
    should have this final choice, the concerted effort of the large States would be to make the
    appointment in the first instance conclusive.

         Mr. RANDOLPH. We have in some revolutions of this plan made a bold stroke for Monarchy.
    We are now doing the same for an aristocracy. He dwelt on the tendency of such an influence in the
    Senate over the election of the President in addition to its other powers, to convert that body into a real
    & dangerous Aristocracy.

         Mr. DICKINSON was in favor of giving the eventual election to the Legislature, instead of the
    Senate. It was too much influence to be superadded to that body.

         On the question moved by Mr. Wilson

         N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
 

         Mr. MADISON & Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to strike out the word "majority" and insert "one
    third" so that the eventual power might not be exercised if less than a majority, but not less than 1/3 of
    the Electors should vote for the same person.

         Mr. GERRY objected that this would put it in the power of three or four States to put in whom
    they pleased.

         Mr. WILLIAMSON. There are seven States which do not contain one third of the people. If the
    Senate are to appoint, less than one sixth of the people will have the power.

         On the question

         N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
 

         Mr. GERRY suggested that the eventual election should be made by six Senators and seven
    Representatives chosen by joint ballot of both Houses.

         Mr. KING observed that the influence of the Small States in the Senate was somewhat balanced by
    the influence of the large States in bringing forward the candidates; and also by the Concurrence
    of the small States in the Committee in the clause vesting the exclusive origination of Money bills in
    the House of Representatives.

         Col: MASON moved to strike out the word "five" and insert the word "three" as the highest
    candidates for the Senate to choose out of.

         Mr. GERRY 2ded. the motion

         Mr. SHERMAN would sooner give up the plan. He would prefer seven or thirteen.

         On the question moved by Col: Mason & Mr. Gerry

         N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Delaware Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
 

         Mr. SPAIGHT and Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to strike out "five" and insert "thirteen"- to which all
    the States disagreed-except N. C. & S. C.

         Mr. MADISON & Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to insert after "Electors" the words "who shall have
    balloted" so that the non voting electors not being counted might not increase the number necessary as a
    majority of the whole, to decide the choice without the agency of the Senate.

         On this question

         N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
 

         Mr. DICKINSON moved, in order to remove ambiguity from the intention of the clause as
    explained by the vote, to add, after the words "if such number be a majority of the whole number of the
    electors" the word "appointed"

         On this motion

         N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Con: ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Delaware Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
 

         Col: MASON. As the mode of appointment is now regulated, he could not forbear expressing his
    opinion that it is utterly inadmissible. He would prefer the Government of Prussia to one which will put
    all power into the hands of seven or eight men, and fix an Aristocracy worse than absolute monarchy.
    The words "and of their giving their votes" being inserted on motion for that purpose, after the words
    "The Legislature may determine the time of chusing and assembling the electors."

         The House adjourned.

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