SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1968
ROBERT
ELI STANLEY,
Appellant,
-VS-
THE
STATE OF GEORGIA,
Appellee.
MOTION
TO DISMISS THE APPEAL AND AFFIRM THE
JUDGMENT, and BRIEF OF APPELLEE
LEWIS R. SLATON
Solicitor General
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
Assistant
Solicitor General
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
Assistant
Solicitor General
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
Fulton
County Courthouse
Atlanta Georgia 30303
Motion to
Dismiss or Affirm
………………………………………………………………………………...
Grounds of
Motion to
Dismiss……………………………………………………………………………..
Grounds of
Motion to Affirm
…………………………………………………………………………….….
Appellant's
Petition for
Certiorari presents no substantial federal Question ………………………………..
QUESTIONS
PRESENTED
………………………………………………………………………………...
REASONS
FOR AFFIRMING THE
JUDGMENT AND NOT GRANTING CERTIORARI ……………..
State may
penalize
possession for forbidden articles without violating
constitution………………………….
Marchetti
case did not
render void the search warrant of Sept. 7, 1966……………………………………….
Many
constitutional rulings
held not to have retroactive effect ………………………………………………
Seizure of
articles
illegally possessed tho' not described in warrant was
proper……………………………...
Marcus
decision is
distinguished from present case…………………………………………………………...
Facts and
circumstances
authorized finding that Stanley had knowledge of obscene
nature
of the films……………
Proof
showed community
standards and the extreme obscene nature of these films………………………….
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Aron v.
U.S.
Austin and
Gent
Cramp v.
Board of
Instruction
Crane v.
Campbell, Sheriff
Gilbert v.
California
Ginsberg
v. New York
Griffin v.
California
Harris v.
U.S.
Jacobellis
v. 0hio
Johnson v.
New Jersey
Linkletter
v. Walker
Mapp v.
Ohio
Marchetti
v. U.S.
Marcus v.
Search Warrants
of Property
Miranda v.
Arizona
People v.
Crawford
People v.
Saltis
Redrup v.
New York
Saltis v.
Illinois
Smith v.
California
State v.
Todaro
Tehan v.
Shott
Thompson
v. U.S.
Todaro v.
New Jersey
U.S. v.
Eisner
U.S. v.
Wade
Under the
authority of Rule
16 of the Supreme Court Appellee files this Motion to Dismiss the
appeal, or,
in the alternative, to affirm the judgment of the lower court. The
decision of
the court below, the Supreme Court of Georgia, is published in 224 Ga.
259 and
in 161 S.E.2d, 309.
Appellee
moves to dismiss
the appeal upon the ground that it does not present a substantial
federal
question, and on the ground that the judgment rests on an adequate
non-federal
basis. This is more particularly set forth as follows:
Appellant's
contention that
the Georgia Obscene Matter Statute "removes the element of scienter"
is not well founded. The statute does not remove the element of
scienter. The
statute has been construed by the Supreme Court of Georgia in the
decision in
this case. Said decision interpreting the statute held that the statute
did not
withdraw the element of scienter. The decision said that the
"contention" that the statute withdrew the element of scienter was
"without merit". (4th division of Opinion)
The
decision went on to say
that the language upon which Appellant relies, towit: "if such person
(an
accused) reasonably should know of the obscene nature of such matter"
merely amounts to a statutory expression of "a rule of evidence which
has
been extant in this State over many years." The decision pointed out
that
"whether a person has knowledge of a fact is a matter peculiarly within
the mind and it is rarely if ever that the defendant's guilty knowledge
is
susceptible of direct proof," and that all the surrounding
circumstances
may be shown as bearing upon the question whether the accused had
knowledge of
a certain thing or not.
In this
appeal, the Georgia
statute comes before the Court as interpreted by the Georgia Supreme
Court. The
authoritative interpretation by the State Supreme Court "puts these
words
in the statute as definitely as if it had been so amended by the
Legislature." Cramp v. Board of Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 82 S.Ct. 275
(5).
When it is
considered that
the Georgia statute does not eliminate the element of scienter, as
construed by
the Georgia court, then knowledge by the accused of the obscene nature
of the
literature or matter remains as a necessary element of the offense. The
statute
therefore does not come under the proscription of Smith v. California:
361 U.S.
147, which Appellant invokes.
Only the
first of the
"Questions Presented by the Appeal" presents a question which
Appellant claims to authorize jurisdiction for this appeal. That is the
Question in which Appellant contends that the Statute "removes the
question of scienter." Since this first Question is not valid, and
should
fall, in the light of the Georgia Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Statute, there is no proper basis for jurisdiction in this appeal.
We make
the motion to
affirm the judgment of the lower court upon the ground that it is
manifest that
the questions on which the decision of this cause would depend are so
unsubstantial as not to need further argument. If this Court were
presented
with an Obscene Matter Statute which did in fact withdraw the element
of
scienter, an entirely different question would be presented. But since
in the
present case the state statute retains the element of scienter, and
only sets
up a rule of evidence as to how scienter might be proved
circumstantially, this
appeal should be dismissed and the judgment of the lower court affirmed.
Since RULE
16 allows the
appellee to present "any other grounds" as reasons why the MOTION TO
AFFIRM should be granted, we suggest that the Court consider at this
point that
this is a case of HARD-CORE PORNOGRAPHY, being a case of possession of
three
reels of motion picture films showing nude men and nude women engaging
in acts
of sodomy and sexual intercourse (for further description see the
indictment
and the evidence), the condition of said films showing that they were
not newly
made films but considerably used, and the possession being shown to be
under
such circumstances that the jury was authorized to find that some
people were
about to gather in defendant's house for the exhibition of these motion
pictures, that a projection machine was in the home available for the
projection of said pictures for viewing by such audience, and that the
defendant knew of the obscene nature of said pictures.
APPELLANT'S
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI PRESENTS NO
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUE
We note
that appellant's
petition for appeal contains also the request that it be considered as
a
petition for certiorari; in the event it is dismissed as an appeal. On
this
phase of the case we make this Response and pray that the petition for
writ of
certiorari be denied, setting forth our reasons herein, with citations.
We
first give a summarized Response to the five Questions, which Appellant
says
are presented:
QUESTIONS
PRESENTED
1.
Appellant's first
question should have the last three lines stricken, since the Georgia
statute
does not remove the element of scienter. The Question then remains:
Whether the
Georgia Code section 26-6301, under which Appellant was convicted, is
repugnant
to the First and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States
guaranteeing freedom of press and due process.
2.
Question 2 might remain
substantially as Appellant presents it. But it omits one important item
for
consideration, the time. The Question might be put this way: Whether
Marchetti
v. U.S., decided January 29, 1968, rendered null and void a search
warrant
which had been issued September 7, 1966, for gambling material,
wagering
paraphernalia, etc.
3. This
question can remain
the same, but it is very indefinite and does not present any clear
federal
question as to validity or invalidity of the search warrant.
4. This is
not a clear
statement of a Question for decision. First, it says that the federal
search
warrant was "issued for failure to register as a gambler." This is an
incorrect reference to the search warrant. It issued for the search of
a
2-story residence for gambling material, wagering paraphernalia, and
other
described things. Next it merges two entirely separate questions into
one
clause of the statement, in the last two lines. It suggests a question
whether
officers executing a search warrant can ever seize an article of
alleged
contraband which was not described in the warrant. And it suggests a
question
as to whether a hard-core obscene motion picture film could ever be
seized
without a "prior adjudication" of obscenity. Both of these are
"questions" but they are not necessarily federal questions when
arising in a state trial for violation of a state statute.
5. Number
5 is not a proper
Question. It includes an absolutely incorrect assumption, towit: ". . .
where there is no evidence to show the appellant had prior knowledge
that they
were obscene." This statement faib to recognize that there can be
circumstantial evidence of any fact necessary to be proved in a
criminal trial,
and particularly in the area of knowledge and intent, where
circumstantial
evidence is recognized by the law as usually the only kind of evidence
available.
REASONS
FOR AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT AND NOT GRANTING CERTIORARI
No
Constitutional Protection For Hard-Core Pornography
Even
though Appellant's
contention that the Georgia statute eliminates scienter is not sound,
his
contention remains that the statute violates the constitutional
provisions of
freedom of speech and of the press. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,
upon
which Appellant places so much reliance, dealt with a Los Angeles City
Ordinance which in fact did remove the element of scienter from its
obscene
literature statute. One glance at the Los Angeles ordinance shows that
scienter
was eliminated. And for that reason the
ordinance was held unconstitutional, as curtailing freedom of speech
and press.
Since the Georgia statute does not remove scienter, as we pointed out
in our
Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, the Smith case can give Appellant no
benefit.
As held in
Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally
protected speech or press. The language of this decision indicates that
the
Court recognized that there may be considerable difference between one
type of
alleged obscene matter and other types. This difference in type, or
difference
in degree, was referred to by Mr. Justice Stewart in his concurring
Opinion in
]acobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1676, in which he said:
Justice
Stewart did not
attempt to define what would be hard-core pornography. But we are sure
that the
present case is an example of it. We challenge the imagination to
produce more
hard-core pornography than the motion pictures contained in the films
in the
present case!
They are
in the evidence,
for the Court to see, if the description in the Record is not
sufficient.
Appellant's
contention that
the Georgia statute violates the constitutional provisions of freedom
of speech
and press, even as applied to such extreme pornographic matter as that
in the
present case, is not sound and should not be sustained.
In 12 C.J.
Secundum, page
753, dissussing the crime of possessing burglarious tools, it is stated
that
"under some statutes the bare possession of such tools and implements
is
an offense irrespective of the intent, and under statutes of this
character the
tool or implement must be one peculiarly adapted to the commission of
burglary
in order to render its possession a crime." It is pointed out by the
above
text and notes there under that a jury may infer the defendant's intent
to use
the articles in committing crime from the nature of the articles and
the
circumstances under which possessed.
Some
jurisdictions penalize
the possession of intoxicating liquor, some penalize the possession of
more
than a certain amount of it, and some penalize the possession of
apparatus for
making it, commonly called whiskey stills, without a license. Long
before
prohibition became a national issue, it was settled that "a state may
prohibit and punish the possession of intoxicating liquors." Crane v.
CamPbell, Sheriff (1917), 245 U.S. 304, 38 S.Ct. 98.
The
possession of weapons
is made a crime, under certain circumstances, varying considerably in
different
jurisdictions. The possession of a pistol concealed on one's person is
frequently
made a crime. In People v. Sallis, 328 Ill. 494, 160 N.E. 86, an
Illinois
statute was held constitutional which penalized the carrying of
concealed
weapons in one's possession, excepting police officers, wardens, etc.,
and
there was an appeal taken to the United States Supreme Court where the
appeal
was "dismissed for want of jurisdiction in the Supreme Court for the
reason that the federal questions sought to be presented are
frivolous."
Sallis v. Illinois, 277 U.S. 676, 48 S.Ct. 530. Even more stringent
laws exist
as to the possession of automatic weapons such as machine guns.
State laws
generally
penalize the mere possession of forged checks, notes, bills, etc., with
knowledge that they have been forged. These laws are discussed in 37
C.] .S.
page 60, under title Forgery.
The
keeping or possessing
of gaming tables or gambling paraphernalia, for the purpose of allowing
games
of chance to be played with them, is penalized in most of the states.
This is
discussed in 38 C.J.S. 154 et seq., under the title Gaming. And on page
158 it
is pointed out that some states penalize the possession of
slot-machines
controlled by the deposit of a coin, without regard to whether the
playing
amounts to gambling. Several cases cited in the notes under above text
refer to
the purpose of penalizing the possession of gambling devices, for
example, page
154 cites People v. Crawford, 25 N.Y.S.2d 259, as saying that the
purpose of
the legislation was "to combat an evil which constitutes not merely a
form
of gambling but a positive menace to every community." (We feel that we
can say that the possession of such hard-core pornographic motion
picture films
as in the present case constitutes a menace to the community in a very
real
sense, on a par with the keeping of gambling devices.)
The United
States
Government itself has many laws on the statute books penalizing the
possession
of various things, under various circumstances, for example: the
possession of
counterfeit currency, the possession of counterfeiting apparatus, the
possession
of blank cards of a draft board by one not entitled to such possession.
As an
example of the seizure of such illegally possessed draft cards, see
Harris v.
State, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098.
We cannot
hope to list here
all the instances in which valid laws are enacted penalizing possession
of
various things under various circumstances.
Our
purpose in listing some
such instances here is to point out that appellant's claim is unsound,
when he
contends that the Georgia obscenity statute violates the First and 14th
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution merely because it penalizes the
possession
(knowingly) of pornographic films such as these.
It is true
that the Supreme
Court has held in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, that the
bookseller could
not be penalized for having obscene material on his bookshelves, when
he had no
knowledge of the obscene nature of such material. That decision was
limited to
books, and the Court did not hold that a person could not be penalized
if he
did have knowledge of the obscene nature of the material.
We
recognize that the Court
held in Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, and in the Austin and Gent
cases,
decided simultaneously, that the penalizing of the alleged obscene
literature
there set forth violated the Constitution. But the Court did not rule
out all
obscene literature prosecutions as being unconstitutional.
In
Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274, a conviction was allowed to stand,
involving as it
did the sale of obscene literature to a minor, in violation of a New
York
statute. The Court reiterated the statement of the ROTH case, supra,
that
"obscenity is not within the area of protected speech or press."
In
division II of the
GINSBERG decision (page 1283 of 88 S.Ct. Reporter) , it was pointed out
that
there was a "challenge to the scienter requirement of the statute,
and
that the challenge centers on the definition of 'knowingly' insofar as
it
includes 'reason to know' or 'a belief or ground for belief which
warrants
further inspection or inquiry or both.'" After discussing the alleged
insufficient requirement of scienter, the GINSBERG decision refuses to
hold
that the element of scienter is insufficiently incorporated in the
statute. The
statute in question penalized the proscribed acts if "knowingly"
made, and defined the word as follows: " (g)
Knowingly
means having general knowledge of, or reason to know, or a belief or
ground for
belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry or both."
The above
is somewhat
similar to the Georgia statute under consideration, which used the word
"knowingly" and later in the statute used the words "if such
person has knowledge or reasonably should know of the obscene nature
of such
matter," the latter words being held by the Georgia Supreme Court to be
merely a statutory expression of a rule of evidence.
Scienter
remains an element
of the Georgia statute, just as it was held to remain a requirement of
the New
York statute under consideration in the GINSBERG case. The Georgia
statute
passes the constitutional tests suggested in all of the foregoing
cases, and
should. therefore be held not invalid for any reason upon which it is
attached..
Marchetti Case did not Render Void the
Search Warrant of Sept. 7, 1966
Under
Question 2, as
presented by Appellant, he contends that the case of Marchetti v. U.S.,
390
U:S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, which was decided January 29, 1968, rendered
void the
search warrant which had been issued by U.S. Commissioner Holden on
September
7, 1966. We have read the MARCHETTI decision and find nothing in it,
which says
or indicates that all search warrants issued for search of premises for
gambling paraphernalia are void.
The
holding was that in a
federal prosecution for alleged evasion of payment of federal
occupational tax
on wagering and for failure to register and pay such tax, the
"defendant's
assertion of privilege against self-incrimination constituted a
complete
defense to the prosecution."
In the
present case the
accused Stanley presented no claim of self-incrimination at his trial.
His present
claim, in this regard, is merely an afterthought. The MARCHETTI case
contained
no holding that all persons in past convictions of whatever crimes,
state or
federal, could have their wnvictions voided under this sort of
contention. In
the present case the contention is not valid, not based upon any
previous
contention or ruling in the prior history of the case.
The
MARCHETTI case does not
even hold that all prospective search warrants issued by federal
magistrates
for search and seizure of gambling paraphernalia would be void. It
certainly
does not hold that all prior search warrants issued by federal
magistrates for
search and seizure of gambling paraphernalia are void. The Court
declared in
MARCHETTI:
In view of
the above, it
can hardly be maintained that the MARCHETTI decision rendered void all
search
warrants issued by federal magistrates for gambling paraphernalia,
prospective
and past.
The United
States Supreme
Court has made many rulings on constitutional questions, especially in
the
realm of criminal prosecutions that were declared to apply
prospectively and
not retrospectively.
In Mapp v.
Ohio) 367 U.S.
64,3, the Supreme Court made an important new ruling in the realm of
search and
seizure, but held it was not retroactive in Linkletter v. Walker) 831
U.S. 618.
In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, the Court made an important
constitutional ruling on the prosecution's comment on a defendant's
failure to
testify, but in Tehan v. Shott, 382 US. 406, held it would not be
applied
retroactively. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, the Court
established
drastic new constitutional rules as to admissibility of confessions
when a
defendant had not been warned in certain respects, but in Johnson v.
New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, the Court held this ruling not to be retroactive.
In U.S.
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, the Court held that identification testimony
based upon
earlier identification of a prisoner in the absence of his lawyer would
not be
admissible, but in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 held this ruling
would
not be applied retroactively.
Very
forceful reasons were
given in some of the above decisions as to why the rulings referred to
would
not be applied retroactively, including the "serious impact" and
"serious disruption" that would follow the retroactive application of
such rulings upon the administration of criminal laws. The same logic
applies
with great force in the present situation. For the reasons cited in the
above
decisions, we earnestly submit that the ruling in MARCHETTI should not
be given
retroactive application, and especially should not be held to render
void a
search warrant for gambling paraphernalia which had been issued by a
U.S. Commissioner
16 months prior thereto.
Seizure of Articles lllegally Possessed
Though Not Described in the Warrant Was Proper
Under
Questions 3 and 4,
Appellant contends that the seizure of the films was illegal because
they were
not described in the search warrant. The Search & Seizure law of
Georgia,
Ga. Laws 1966, page 567, 569, says that when an officer is in the
process of
effecting a lawful search he is not limited to seizing the particular
objects
described in the search warrant, but may seize any object, thing or
matter_ the
possession of which is unlawful, or any object, thing or matter, other
than the
private papers of any person, which is tangible evidence of the
commission of a
crime against the laws of Georgia.
This same
legal principle
has been upheld in federal cases. In Harris v. U.S., 331 U.S. 145, 150,
67
S.Ct. 1098, some officers had arrested Harris in the living room of his
home on
a warrant charging mail fraud, and then began search of his apartment
for
certain documents which they believed would support the charge. In the
course
of that search they found something else, towit: some draft cards which
were
the property of the United States and had been stolen. The above
decision held
that "even though obtained by agents searching for evidence in
connection
with a different charge against the accused, the draft cards were not
seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The HARRIS
case has been
cited and followed in a number of other federal cases, among them being:
Marcus Decision Is Distinguished From the Present Case
On pages
14 to 16,
appellant cites and relies upon Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property,
367 U.S.
717. In that case the ruling was far different from the question
presented in
this case. The MARCUS decision states, at its beginning: "This appeal
presents the question whether due process under the 14th Amendment was
denied
the appellants by the application in this case of Missouri's procedures
authorizing the search for and seizure of allegedly obscene
publications
preliminary to their destruction by burning or otherwise if found by a
court to
be obscene." No description of the publications was required by the
statute and none was given in the search warrants. Under the search
warrants
the Missouri officers seized "approximately 11,000 copies of 280
publications." (Page 723) After being under seizure for two months, 180
of
the publications were found by a court to be not obscene and ordered
returned.
(Pages 732-733)
The United
States Supreme
Court was greatly concerned over the curtailment of freedom of speech
and of
press as applied to those 180 publications which were withheld from the
bookshelves for over two months, although not obscene and eventually
ruled so
by the court. The decision said that "Mass seizure in the fashion of
this
case was thus effected without any safeguards to protect legitimate
expression." (Page 738)
No
analagous situation
exists in the present case. Freedom of
Speech or Press is not involved, under the ROTH case ruling that
obscenity is
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press. No
such
unconstitutional seizure of quantities of non-obscene matter took
place, as in
MARCUS.
Question 5
is the one,
which makes an incorrect assumption that "there is no evidence to show
the
appellant had prior knowledge" that the films were obscene. While the
State did not have "direct evidence" of what as in his mind, there
were facts and circumstances shown which were sufficient to authorize
the
finding that he did have knowledge of the obscene nature of the films.
- The
three motion picture
films were found in a desk drawer in the master bedroom on the 2nd
floor. (99,
I II-II 2)
- This was
the home of just
one individual person, a bachelor, towit: Robert Eli Stanley. (86, 90,
101,
Ill)
- In a
different room on
the 2nd floor was a motion picture projection machine, which was used
by the
officers to view the films. (92, 100, 131)
- In the
desk where the
films were found were letters addressed to the defendant and stock
brokerage
forms with his name on them, and other papers bearing his name, these
indicating his personal contact with the location. (l01)
- There
was also a motion
picture screen up there in that second floor room. (l03, 94-95)
- In the
room where the
films were found there was a closet in which were numerous suits, some
of which
had laundry marks with appellant's name on them. (101-102)
- Before
leaving with the
officers for police headquarters, the defendant asked to get his coat,
and went
to the bedroom referred to and got his coat out of the closet there to
go with
them. (97)
- The
three films found by
the officers were badly scratched and dirty, and one of them had been
rewound
backwards, indicating that they were not in new condition and
"obviously
had been shown before." This was testified to by Officer Farr, who had
been a professional photographer for 3 years and was familiar with
films and
projection machines. (131, 132)
- When the
officers
arrived, around 6:00 p.m., the dining room table was set for eight
people; plates,
knives and forks set in place; and in the kitchen was a large pan with
about 2
dozen prepared uncooked biscuits covered by a cloth ready to go in the
oven.
(89, 91)
- After
the officers
arrived, several visitors arrived or came to the back door to enter,
but were
turned away; first was a lady, then a man, then two young ladies came
to the
back door to enter; they were well dressed people. (90-91)
- The
three rolls of films
showed "men and women, naked men and women having sexual relations,
acts
of perversion…acts of sodomy." (101)
It would
be a reasonable
conclusion or inference from all the facts and circumstances that the
appellant
put the films in this private and concealed location, where he had
other
documents and objects of a personal nature, because he had knowledge of
the
contents of the films and wanted to keep them within his own private
control
and have them available for display or use at such time as he chose to
display
them; that they had been previously displayed by him or in his
presence, and
that a group of people were about to gather at this private home of the
appellant for a supper-party, with these obscene films available for
showing to
such persons for their entertainment within a few feet of where the
supper-table was laid out for their repast!
Proof Showed Community Standards and the
Extreme Obscene Nature of These Films
We should
probably add,
before closing, that the State showed by testimony in this trial that
the
predominant appeal of these films was to a "shameful and morbid
interest
in nudity and sex." This was shown by people who testified that they
were
familiar with the contemporary community standards with reference to
morality
and decency in Fulton County, and some in particular portions of Fulton
County,
and from that knowledge gave their opinion of these films as above set
forth.
Some testified that the films and their contents had "no redeeming
social
value" based on their described knowledge of such subject. One such
witness was a police officer (page 116); one was a Gulf filling station
proprietor (161); one was an attorney and prosecuting officer (168-169
et seq)
; one was a retired locomotive engineer (177 et seq) ; one was an
optometrist
with office at 864% Hunter Street, S.W., doing business in that
Southwest
community of Atlanta, Fulton County, (183 et seq) ; one was a colored
real
estate dealer living at 1487 Mozley Drive, S.W., with offices at 905
Hunter
Street, N.W. (192 et seq) ; another was an assistant solicitor general
who had
been engaged in contact with prosecuting work for over 30 years and
residing in
Fulton County. (200)
Another
testifying to the
above effect as to the nature of the three films, which he had viewed,
was Dr.
James P. Wesberry, Baptist pastor and chairman of the Georgia
Literature
Commission, who testified that during the 13 years he had been a member
of that
Commission he had had a great many occasions to examine and look at
matter
alleged to be obscene, and that from his knowledge of the contemporary
community standards of decency he could say that the predominant appeal
of
these films was a shameful and morbid interest in nudity and sex,
extremely so
(138), that there is no redeeming social value or importance whatsoever
in
these films (139), and that they were the "most obnoxious, nauseating,
sickening, foul and disgusting" that he had seen in his life. (140)
For the
foregoing reasons,
Appellee urges that this Court dismiss the appeal and affirm the
judgment and
deny the petition for certiorari in this case.
Respectfully
submitted,
LEWIS R. SLATON
Solicitor General
Atlanta Judicial
Circuit
J. WALTER LECRAW
Assistant Solicitor
General
Atlanta Judicial
Circuit
J. ROBERT SPARKS
Assistant Solicitor
General
Atlanta Judicial
Circuit
Fulton
County Courthouse
Atlanta, Georgia 30303