CARSON v. MAKINSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CARSON, as parent and next friend of O. C., et al. v. MAKIN certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first circuitNo.
20–1088. Argued December 8, 2021—Decided June 21,
2022
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan J., joined, and in which Sotomayor, J., joined. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. Maine has enacted a program of tuition assistance for parents who live in school districts that do not operate a secondary school of their own. Under the program, parents designate the secondary school they would like their child to attend—public or private—and the school district transmits payments to that school to help defray the costs of tuition. Most private schools are eligible to receive the payments, so long as they are “nonsectarian.” The question presented is whether this restriction violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Maine’s Constitution provides that the State’s legislature shall “require . . . the several towns to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the support and maintenance of public schools.” In accordance with that command, the legislature has required that every school-age child in Maine “shall be provided an opportunity to receive the benefits of a free public education,” and that the required schools be operated by “the legislative and governing bodies of local school administrative units.” But Maine is the most rural State in the Union, and for many school districts the realities of remote geography and low population density make those commands difficult to heed. Indeed, of Maine’s 260 school administrative units (SAUs), fewer than half operate a public secondary school of their own.. Maine has
sought to deal with this problem in part by
creating a program of tuition assistance for
families that reside in such areas. Under that
program, if an SAU neither operates its own
public secondary school nor contracts with a
particular public or private school for the
education of its school-age children, the SAU
must “pay the tuition . . . at the
public school or the approved private school of
the parent’s choice at which the student is
accepted.” Parents who wish to take advantage of
this benefit first select the school they wish
their child to attend.If they select a private
school that has been “approved” by the Maine
Department of Education, the parents’ SAU “shall
pay the tuition” at the chosen school up to a
specified maximum rate. To be
“approved” to receive these payments, a private
school must meet certain basic requirements
under Maine’s compulsory education law. The
school must either be “[c]urrently accredited by
a New England association of schools and
colleges” or separately “approv[ed] for
attendance purposes” by the Department. Schools
seeking approval from the Department must meet
specified curricular requirements, such as using
English as the language of instruction, offering
a course in “Maine history, including the
Constitution of Maine . . . and
Maine’s cultural and ethnic heritage,” and
maintaining a student- teacher ratio of not
more than 30 to 1. Prior to
1981, parents could direct the tuition
assistance payments to religious schools.
Indeed, in the 1979–1980 school year, over 200
Maine students opted to attend such schools
through the tuition assistance program. In 1981,
however, Maine imposed a new requirement that
any school receiving tuition assistance payments
must be “a nonsectarian school in accordance
with the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.” That provision was enacted in
response to an opinion by the Maine attorney
general taking the position that public funding
of private religious schools violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. We
subsequently held, however, that a benefit
program under which private citizens “direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a
result of their own genuine and independent
private choice” does not offend the
Establishment Clause. Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris (2002). Following our
decision in Zelman, the Maine
Legislature considered a proposed bill to repeal
the “nonsectarian” requirement, but rejected it.
The
“nonsectarian” requirement for participation in
Maine’s tuition assistance program remains in
effect today. The Department has stated
that, in administering this requirement, it
“considers a sectarian school to be one that is
associated with a particular faith or belief
system and which, in addition to teaching
academic subjects, promotes the faith or belief
system with which it is associated and/or
presents the material taught through the lens of
this faith.” “The Department’s focus is on what
the school teaches through its curriculum and
related activities, and how the material is
presented.” “[A]ffiliation or association with a
church or religious institution is one potential
indicator of a sectarian school,” but “it is not
dispositive.” This case concerns two families that live in SAUs that neither maintain their own secondary schools nor contract with any nearby secondary school. Petitioners David and Amy Carson reside in Glenburn, Maine. When this litigation commenced, the Carsons’ daughter attended high school at Bangor Christian Schools (BCS), which was founded in 1970 as a ministry of Bangor Baptist Church. The Carsons sent their daughter to BCS because of the school’s high academic standards and because the school’s Christian worldview aligns with their sincerely held religious beliefs. Given that BCS is a “sectarian” school that cannot qualify for tuition assistance payments under Maine’s program, id., at 80, the Carsons paid the tuition for their daughter to attend BCS themselves.
Petitioners Troy and Angela Nelson live in
Palermo, Maine. When this litigation commenced,
the Nelsons’ daughter attended high school at
Erskine Academy, a secular private school, and
their son attended middle school at Temple
Academy, a “sectarian” school affiliated with
Centerpoint Community Church. The Nelsons sent
their son to Temple Academy because they
believed it offered him a high-quality education
that aligned with their sincerely held religious
beliefs. While they wished to send their
daughter to Temple Academy too, they could not
afford to pay the cost of the Academy’s tuition
for both of their children. BCS and Temple Academy are both accredited by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges (NEASC), and the Department considers each school a “private school approved for attendance purposes” under the State’s compulsory attendance requirement. Yet because neither school qualifies as “nonsectarian,” neither is eligible to receive tuition payments under Maine’s tuition assistance program. Absent the “nonsectarian” requirement, the Carsons and the Nelsons would have asked their respective SAUs to pay the tuition to send their children to BCS and Temple Academy, respectively. In 2018,
petitioners brought suit against the
commissioner of the Maine Department of
Education. They alleged that the “nonsectarian”
requirement of Maine’s tuition assistance
program violated the Free Exercise Clause and
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment..
. . II The Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
pro tects against “indirect coercion or
penalties on the free exercise of religion, not
just outright prohibitions.” In particular, we
have repeatedly held that a State violates the
Free Exercise Clause when it excludes religious
observers from otherwise available public
benefits. See Sherbert v. Verner
(1963). A State may not withhold unemployment
benefits, for instance, on the ground that an
individual lost his job for refusing to abandon
the dictates of his faith.. . . . To satisfy strict scrutiny, government action “must advance ‘interests of the highest order’ and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.” “A law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment . . . will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.” This is not one of them. As noted, a neutral benefit program in which public funds flow to religious organizations through the independent choices of private benefit recipients does not offend the Establishment Clause. Maine’s decision to continue excluding religious schools from its tuition assistance program after Zelman thus promotes stricter separation of church and state than the Federal Constitution requires. . But as we explained in both Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza, such an “interest in separating church and state ‘more fiercely’ than the Federal Constitution . . . ‘cannot qualify as compelling’ in the face of the infringement of free exercise.” Justice Breyer stresses the importance of “government neutrality” when it comes to religious matters, but there is nothing neutral about Maine’s program. The State pays tuition for certain students at private schools—so long as the schools are not religious. That is discrimination against religion. A State’s anti-establishment interest does not justify enactments that exclude some members of the community from an otherwise generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise. IIIMaine may provide a strictly secular education in its public schools. But BCS and Temple Academy—like numerous other recipients of Maine tuition assistance payments—are not public schools. In order to provide an education to children who live in certain parts of its far-flung State, Maine has decided not to operate schools of its own, but instead to offer tuition assistance that parents may direct to the public or private schools of their choice. Maine’s administration of that benefit is subject to the free exercise principles governing any such public benefit program—including the prohibition on denying the benefit based on a recipient’s religious exercise.The dissents are wrong to say that under our decision today Maine “must” fund religious education. Maine chose to allow some parents to direct state tuition payments to private schools; that decision was not “forced upon” it. The State retains a number of options: it could expand the reach of its public school system, increase the availability of transportation, provide some combination of tutoring, remote learning, and partial attendance, or even operate boarding schools of its own. As we held in Espinoza, a “State need not subsidize private education. But once a State decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious . . ..” Maine and the dissents invoke Locke v. Davey (2004), in support of the argument that the State may preclude parents from designating a religious school to receive tuition assistance payments. In that case, Washington had established a scholarship fund to assist academically gifted students with postsecondary education expenses. But the program excluded one particular use of the scholarship funds: the “essentially religious endeavor” of pursuing a degree designed to “train[ ] a minister to lead a congregation.”We upheld that restriction against a free exercise challenge, reasoning that the State had “merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.”Our opinions in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza, however, have already explained why Locke can be of no help to Maine here. Both precedents emphasized, as did Locke itself, that the funding in Locke was intended to be used “to prepare for the ministry.” Funds could be and were used for theology courses; only pursuing a “vocational religious” degree was excluded.Locke’s reasoning expressly turned on what it identified as the “historic and substantial state interest” against using “taxpayer funds to support church leaders.” But as we explained at length in Espinoza, “it is clear that there is no ‘historic and substantial’ tradition against aiding [private religious] schools comparable to the tradition against state-supported clergy invoked by Locke.” Locke cannot be read beyond its narrow focus on vocational religious degrees to generally authorize the State to exclude religious persons from the enjoyment of public benefits on the basis of their anticipated religious use of the benefits. Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for its otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Regardless of how the benefit and restriction are described, the program operates to identify and exclude otherwise eligible schools on the basis of their religious exercise. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It
is so ordered. Justice Breyer,
with whom Justice
Kagan joins, and with whom Justice Sotomayor
joins except as to Part I–B, dissenting.
The First
Amendment begins by forbidding the government
from “mak[ing] [any] law respecting an
establishment of religion.” It next forbids them
to make any law “prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” The Court today pays almost no
attention to the words in the first Clause while
giving almost exclusive attention to the words
in the second. The majority also fails to
recognize the “ ‘play in the joints’ ”
between the two Clauses. That “play” gives
States some degree of legislative leeway. It
sometimes allows a State to further
anti-establishment interests by withholding aid
from religious institutions without violating
the Constitution’s protections for the free
exercise of religion. In my view, Maine’s
nonsectarian requirement falls squarely within
the scope of that constitutional leeway. I
respectfully dissent. This potential for religious strife is still with us. We are today a Nation with well over 100 different religious groups, from Free Will Baptist to African Methodist, Buddhist to Humanist. People in our country adhere to a vast array of beliefs, ideals, and philosophies. And with greater religious diversity comes greater risk of religiously based strife, conflict, and social division. The Religion Clauses were written in part to help avoid that disunion. As Thomas Jefferson, one of the leading drafters and proponents of those Clauses, wrote, “ ‘to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.’ ” And as James Madison, another drafter and proponent, said, compelled taxpayer sponsorship of religion “is itself a signal of persecution,” which “will destroy that moderation and harmony which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion, has produced amongst its several sects.”To interpret the Clauses with these concerns in mind may help to further their original purpose of avoiding religious-based division. I have also previously explained why I believe that a “rigid, bright-line” approach to the Religion Clauses—an approach without any leeway or “play in the joints”—will too often work against the Clauses’ underlying purposes. Not all state-funded programs that have religious restrictions carry the same risk of creating social division and conflict. In my view, that risk can best be understood by considering the particular benefit at issue, along with the reasons for the particular religious restriction at issue. Recognition that States enjoy a degree of constitutional leeway allows States to enact laws sensitive to local circumstances while also allowing this Court to consider those circumstances in light of the basic values underlying the Religion Clauses. In a word,
to interpret the two Clauses as if they were
joined at the hip will work against their basic
purpose: to allow for an American society with
practitioners of over 100 different religions,
and those who do not practice religion at all,
to live together without serious risk of
religion-based social divisions.. . . Maine’s nonsectarian requirement also serves to avoid religious strife between the State and the religious schools. Given that Maine is funding the schools as part of its effort to ensure that all children receive the basic public education to which they are entitled, Maine has an interest in ensuring that the education provided at these schools meets certain curriculum standards. Religious schools, on the other hand, have an interest in teaching a curriculum that advances the tenets of their religion. And the schools are of course entitled to teach subjects in the way that best reflects their religious beliefs. But the State may disagree with the particular manner in which the schools have decided that these subjects should be taught. This is a situation ripe for conflict, as it forces Maine into the position of evaluating the adequacy or appropriateness of the schools’ religiously inspired curriculum. Maine does not want this role. As one legislator explained, one of the reasons for the nonsectarian requirement was that “[g]overnment officials cannot, and should not, review the religious teachings of religious schools.” Another legislator cautioned that the State would be unable to “reconcile” the curriculum of “private religious schools who teach religion in the classroom” with Maine “standards . . . that do not include any sort of religion in them.”. I emphasize the problems that may arise out of today’s decision because they reinforce my belief that the Religion Clauses do not require Maine to pay for a religious education simply because, in some rural areas, the State will help parents pay for a secular education. After all, the Establishment Clause forbids a State from paying for the practice of religion itself. And state neutrality in respect to the teaching of the practice of religion lies at the heart of this Clause. There is no meaningful difference between a State’s payment of the salary of a religious minister and the salary of someone who will teach the practice of religion to a person’s children. At bottom, there is almost no area “as central to religious belief as the shaping, through primary education, of the next generation’s minds and spirits.” The Establishment Clause was intended to keep the State out of this area. Maine wishes to provide children within the State with a secular, public education. This wish embodies, in significant part, the constitutional need to avoid spending public money to support what is essentially the teaching and practice of religion. That need is reinforced by the fact that we are today a Nation of more than 330 million people who ascribe to over 100 different religions. In that context, state neutrality with respect to religion is particularly important. The Religion Clauses give Maine the right to honor that neutrality by choosing not to fund religious schools as part of its public school tuition program. I believe the majority is wrong to hold the contrary. And with respect, I dissent. |